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LEARNING FROM THE ENEMY: IDENTITY, CONFLICT, AND INTER-
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
 
ABSTRACT 
Conflict provides an opportunity to learn. However, conflict also activates 
identity and dysfunctional learning processes that protect identity. Neither the 
learning nor the identity literatures provide an explanation for how some 
organizations overcome that challenge and learn; and relatively little research 
has considered the connection between identity, conflict and organizational 
learning. 
This thesis attempts to fill this gap through a qualitative research study that 
examines the relationships between identity, conflict, and organizational learning, 
using a comprehensive practice based model of inter-organizational learning. 
The specific research questions guiding this study are: What is the role of 
identity in organizational learning between organizations in conflict? And: How 
does an organization learn from another organization with which it is in conflict? 
I use a case study design to examine a single exceptional case in the 
context of an extreme inter-organizational conflict. Qualitative data were collected 
through archival research, semi-structured interviews, and on-site observations.  
My findings provide a rich basis for analysis and theorizing, and provide 
evidence in support of my proposed model of inter-organizational learning. This 
study suggests that inter-organizational conflict is a situation where individual to 
individual learning can ultimately influence the learning that occurs in their 
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respective organizations. Conflict stimulates individuals from each organization to 
interact over an issue. Their interpretations of the issue and their responses to 
each other are affected by their social and role identities and by their respective 
organizational identities. It is the actions of individuals and the social processes 
and practices through which they interact that either facilitates or constrains inter-
organizational learning. 
This dissertation contributes to academic research by highlighting the 
importance of the relationships between identity, conflict and learning; by 
exploring the role played by the practices associated with identity in shaping 
individual behaviour and organizational learning; and by demonstrating the 
implications of different sources of conflict on inter-organizational learning. 
Finally, my process model of inter-organizational learning as practice provides a 
more socialized theoretical background for understanding and addressing the 
challenges of learning between “enemies”. 
 
Key words: Inter-organizational learning, conflict, identity, practice-based view 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
The growing use of cross-sector partnering, multi-party initiatives and the 
rise of activism by shareholders and stakeholders have increased the need for 
firms to consider and integrate diverse perspectives (Hart & Sharma, 2004; 
Rothman & Friedman, 2001). More than ever it is critical that firms “anticipate and 
respond to impending threats, conduct experiments, engage in continuing 
innovation” (Argyris & Schon, 1996, p. xvii). Nevertheless in practice few firms 
readily embrace the learning opportunities inherent in the conflict that confronts 
them, and managers appear skeptical about the power of conflict to invigorate 
problem solving (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997; Tjosvold, 2008). The 
role of conflict in learning has been given scant attention in research as well, 
despite Argyris and Schon‟s (1978) early recognition that conflict provides an 
opportunity to learn.  
Research to date has revealed a seeming paradox in the relationship 
between conflict and learning. This paradox could be characterized as the reality 
of conflict versus the promise of conflict. The promise of conflict is that learning 
can result when individuals explore the reasoning behind their conflicting 
positions and the meaning these positions have for them (Argyris & Schon, 1978; 
Bush & Folger, 1994; Rothman & Friedman, 2001). Conflict is also a key part of 
creating shared understandings and interpretations; a mechanism through which 
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learning occurs at the collective, group and/or organization level (Crossan, H. 
Lane, & White, 1999; Senge, 1990). 
Conflict's promise for organizational learning is based on the information 
processing view of individual and group dynamics, as are earlier explanations of 
organizational learning (e.g. Huber, 1991). In this perspective the generation and 
implementation of varied or original ideas is the result of negotiations over scarce 
resources or the reconciliation of differences in knowledge. However, research 
has shown that no matter what its origin, conflict tends to quickly shift to identity 
differences, particularly if it persists (Mooney, Holahan, & Amason, 2007). This is 
the more pessimistic view and one that is supported by much evidence. That is, 
the conflict created by a diversity of perspectives produces divisions and tensions 
and negative performance outcomes in general. This view is the social identity 
perspective and explains the inter-personal and inter-group defensiveness 
triggered by difference (Mannix & Neale, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Conflict that is rooted in identity has been shown to be dysfunctional with 
regard to learning (A. Brown & Starkey, 2000). Often individuals‟ ability to learn is 
blocked by defensive reasoning (Argyris, 1991; A. Brown & Starkey, 2000). 
Moreover individuals‟ multiple identities and the identities that they attribute to 
their organizations can inhibit learning (Nag, K. G. Corley, & D. A. Gioia, 2007). 
Research has shown that individuals will support activities that are consistent 
with their organization‟s identity, they will stereotype themselves and others, and 
they will work to maintain coherence between their activities and their identity, as 
well as their organization‟s identity (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton & Dukerich, 
1991; Nag et al., 2007). While these theories describe how conflict inhibits 
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learning they do not explain how individuals and organizations might overcome 
the constraints imposed by identity, thus enabling them to address differences in 
knowledge and understanding, even while the identity based conflict persists. 
In this dissertation, I explore the conditions that enable organizations and 
their managers to overcome the multi-level constraints imposed on learning by 
their social, role, and organization identities. I focus on the impact of identity 
because research and practice has shown that all conflicts are at least in part 
rooted in the identities of the individuals, groups, or organizations involved (De 
Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). While conflict may originate from resource scarcity, 
knowledge differences, or identity differences, all are usually present in any 
situation (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). Additionally, in situations of pervasive and 
escalating conflict, issues of identity tend to predominate over other concerns 
(Fiol, M. Pratt, & O‟Connor, 2009; Lederach, 1995; Mooney et al., 2007). I 
contend that the impact of identity on beliefs and behaviours must be understood 
before either identity-based conflict or knowledge-based conflict can be 
effectively addressed. Therefore, I explore the conditions and practices that 
support a shift in attention away from identity and ideological differences to the 
potentially more productive knowledge-based and/or resource-based aspects of a 
conflict. 
The key concepts used in this dissertation are: 
Inter-organizational learning - the consequence of an organization‟s direct 
interaction with other organizations. It is both a process and an outcome and 
involves cognitive and behavioural change at multiple levels of the organization. 
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Social identity – is an individual‟s self-categorization as a member of a group as 
well as the value and emotional significance that the individual places on that 
membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Role identity - refers to the meanings and behaviours that people attach to the 
multiple roles they typically play, such as occupations and/or professions (Stryker 
& P. Burke, 2000).  
Organizational identity – comprises both institutionalized notions of identity which 
constrain and shape individuals‟ interpretations and collective meanings that are 
formed as individuals reach mutual understanding and shared interpretations (D. 
Gioia, Shultz, & K. Corley, 2000; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). 
Conflict- entails incompatible activities such that one party‟s actions interfere, 
obstruct, or in some way get in the way of another‟s action (Deutsch, 1949; 
1973). In this dissertation “enemies” are organizations with incompatible 
activities. 
1.2 Research Questions 
Based on the motivation and background outlined, in this dissertation I 
consider the following research questions: 
Research Question 1: What is the role of identity in organizational 
learning between organizations in conflict?      
I begin to answer this question by first establishing that inter-organizational 
learning outcomes are possible in the context of conflict. Having established that 
inter-organizational learning is possible, I then examine the practices through 
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which this learning was accomplished and the conditions that were present; in 
particular the individual and organization identities and their attendant 
behaviours. I draw a link between identities, behaviour (practice), and learning 
outcomes. Drawing on previous research, I look at actions taken by individuals 
and groups with regard to a specific conflict to understand identity activation 
against learning opportunities. 
Research Question 2: How does an organization learn from another 
organization with which it is in conflict? 
In order to explore the processes that support inter-organizational learning, I 
consider different actions at the moments of engagement between the 
organizations and how that action manifests back across the individual and 
organizational levels over time. I examine behaviours at the nexus of inter-
organizational learning, conflict and identity. I then determine, from the data, the 
processes through which the identities and inter-organizational learning are 
connected. 
In the next section I introduce the theoretical grounding for this study. 
1.3 Theoretical Grounding 
Inter-organizational learning in conflict is a case where individual to 
individual learning can ultimately influence each individual‟s respective 
organization. The basic building block of learning is stimulus - response, with the 
conflict acting as the stimulus. Individuals from different organizations become 
associated with a conflict and it is the conflict that activates their identities. The 
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individual and respective organizational identities that are activated strongly 
influence what the individuals attend to and also their interpretation of it. Their 
individual interpretation of the conflict, the other individuals involved, and the 
situation in turn influences their response (i.e. their feedback) to others both 
outside and within their organizations. As noted above, there has been limited 
theorizing on the connection between identity and organizational learning and it is 
equivocal, suggesting that identity‟s impact on the process of organizational 
learning can be negative (A. Brown & Starkey, 2000) or positive (K. Corley & D. 
Gioia, 2003) depending on the context and conditions. 
My focus on behavior derives from my intention to understand the range of 
conditions associated with inter-organizational learning. Empirical studies are 
dominated by the assumption that inter-organizational learning is positive and 
that it manifests as changes in knowledge bases (i.e., patent counts) or as 
mastering a specific competence or technology (e.g. Argote, Ingram, J. Levine, & 
Moreland, 2000). In this research I consider how individuals and organizations 
learn from and with each other and about the context within which they are 
operating and how identity influences inter-organizational learning in that context. 
To address Research Question 1, I develop premises which support a 
model describing the relationships between the concepts of identity, learning, and 
conflict. I propose that the extent to which individuals experiment with new 
behaviours is a function of the interaction of their individual social and role 
identities and their respective organizations‟ identities. Previous research has 
shown that under certain conditions individuals will experiment with new 
behaviours, without changing their beliefs (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). Building on 
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this research I suggest that depending on their “repertoire” of identities and the 
stability of their organizational identity, individuals may be able to tap into the 
behaviours associated with a common social or role identity. This common 
identity provides a common language and set of behaviours with which to 
approach the conflict. 
Likewise, the likelihood that individuals will experiment with new behaviours 
depends on the emphasis of their organization‟s identity and their level of 
identification with it. For example, individuals that identify with an organization 
that defines itself by deutero-learning processes, such as discovery (Schon, 
1986), are more likely to experiment, regardless of their individual beliefs. 
If these individuals persist in this changed behaviour they may be able to 
suspend their belief systems and explore new interpretations. This shift in 
interpretation facilitates dialogue within and between organizations and raises the 
possibility of the integration of new information (Bohm, 1996; Crossan et al., 
1999). Depending on the congruence of this new information with their current 
identities, as well as on their own and their organization‟s practices, they may 
then be prompted to examine their existing beliefs, including their individual or 
their organization‟s identity (Rothman & Friedman, 2001). I put forward that inter-
organizational learning occurs at the intersection of identity (who we are) and 
practice (what we do). 
Whereas Research Question 1 is developed through theoretical grounding 
and framed by specific premises, Research Question 2 is opened for exploration 
within the structure of this dissertation. Given the dearth of research examining 
the social processes of inter-organizational learning between conflicting 
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organizations I allowed the data to speak for itself. In the next section I describe 
the research design that supported this approach. 
1.4 Research Design 
The research was conducted using a case study methodology to compile 
and compare themes in a single industry, salmon farming in British Columbia, 
Canada, which has been plagued by conflict since its inception. The case study 
method is most appropriate for research that asks “how” and “why” research 
questions and that is conducted by accessing people who can recall the 
important events with relative accuracy (Yin, 2009). Also this method is well 
suited to an in-depth analysis of complex phenomena via multiple sources of 
data, as described below. Iterative tabulation of evidence for each construct 
sharpens construct definition, validity, and measurability. Finally, comparison with 
confirming and contradicting literature helps to build internal validity. 
This methodology enabled me to capture both the relationships between 
identity, conflict and learning (through semi-structured interviews) and the 
dynamics of those relationships over time (through repeated interviews with the 
same individuals or organizations, archival documents, newspaper articles, and 
observations). 
I analyzed data from semi-structured interviews with 47 people, 1077 
newspaper articles, several hundred pages of archival documents, and numerous 
hours of direct observation. I further triangulated data by including multiple 
sources, such as company spokespeople, environmentalists, government 
officials, industry association representatives, academics, members of First 
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Nations, and other community members. The data collection process occurred in 
two phases. The first phase involved updating an existing data base that I had 
been instrumental in compiling. After an initial analysis of that data, I focused my 
second phase of data gathering on the negotiation and implementation of a 
specific learning initiative between the largest company in the industry and a 
coalition of environment groups. 
I analyzed the data using NVivo to identify relevant contextual factors, the 
major constructs and learning outcomes.  Following the trajectory of the learning 
activities and outcomes, I categorized the relationship between the major 
constructs and the processes underpinning the repeated interactions of the focal 
organizations. 
My prior experiences and beliefs undoubtedly shaped this research (Willig, 
2001). Accordingly, I present a statement of reflexivity to allow readers to 
“explore the ways in which a researcher‟s involvement with a particular study 
influences, acts upon and informs such research” (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999, 
p. 228). I am a life-long resident of Ontario in central Canada. I come to this 
research and to the conflict surrounding the salmon farming industry in British 
Columbia with no prior involvement or affiliations with either the industry or the 
environmental movement. I began this research without an opinion on the extent 
of salmon farming‟s impact and now, after 5 years of studying the situation, I 
have no clearer alignment on that question than when I started. It is a complex 
question that concerns me both as a Canadian, as a researcher, and as an 
advisor to organizations. I am an accredited mediator, with more than 20 years 
management consulting experience and I have facilitated conflict-laden 
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interactions within and between a variety of individuals, groups, and 
organizations.  Recently I helped to manage the post-merger integration of two 
financial services companies, concurrent with completing a Master of Arts in 
Organizational Conflict at Royal Roads University in British Columbia. This 
experience ignited my interest in the conditions and processes that underlie 
mutually positive individual and inter-organizational connections, and especially 
around contentious issues.  It also exposed me, for the first time, to the extent of 
the conflict around salmon farming, and to the range of views and perspectives 
present in the context. Finally, as a result of my experience and education, I find 
it difficult to view conflict resolution and learning as independent processes. Thus 
in collecting and analyzing the data contained in the study, I am undoubtedly 
biased toward learning as a positive outcome. I would like readers to be aware of 
my perspective when assessing my research and findings. 
1.5 Thesis Contribution 
The main contribution of this study is in highlighting the relationship between 
conflict, identity and learning. This case showed the importance of identity in 
shifting behaviour and the role of conflict and learning processes in shifting 
aspects of identity. Examining these concepts together provides insight into the 
conditions under which inter-organizational learning is more likely to occur. 
This research demonstrates the role played by social, role, and 
organizational identity in shaping individual actions in response to conflict and in 
doing so demonstrates the importance of behaviour to learning in such situations. 
My findings suggest that unless we understand how individual and organizational 
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identities are connected to behaviour it is hard to understand their impact on 
learning. In the case of conflicted relationships the behaviours or activities 
associated with common identities may hold the key to sustained behavioural 
change which may generate cognitive change and learning. 
My process model of inter-organizational learning as practice provides a 
more socialized theoretical background for understanding the challenges of inter-
organizational learning. It highlights the importance of considering all of the 
components of learning and suggests that it is the nexus of practitioners, 
practice, and praxis that delivers inter-organizational learning.  
Finally, this work contributes to the understanding of the implications of 
different sources of conflict to inter-organizational interaction. This work revealed 
that a shift in emphasis from identity based conflict to the socio-cognitive aspects 
of a conflict, instigated mutual problem solving behaviour, even while the 
underlying conflict of interest persisted. This research underscores the 
importance of understanding that at some level all conflicts are identity based, 
and the need to understand how organizations come to work together despite, 
and in the presence of, their identity differences. 
This dissertation also contributes to management practice by alerting 
managers and organizational leaders to the possibilities inherent in conflict and in 
interaction with diverse organizations. If organizations are more attuned to social 
trends and sensitivities, managers may be alerted to risks and opportunities they 
might not otherwise have spotted, and organizational capabilities will likely 
increase. In addition, this work raises managerial awareness of the implications 
of their organization‟s characteristics (i.e. its identity) on its ability to learn from 
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other organizations. This is especially relevant to organizations involved in 
partnering, joint ventures, or mergers. Finally, this research provides guidelines 
on ways to consider and integrate disparate perspectives and to staff inter-
organizational learning initiatives. 
1.6 Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized in seven chapters. 
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the phenomenon of interest and the 
research questions. 
In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literatures on learning, identity, and 
conflict, in order to provide theoretical background for my study. 
In Chapter 3, I position my research in the practice based view and develop 
premises in support of a model that explains the relationship between conflict, 
individual and organizational identities, and inter-organizational learning.  
Chapter 4 explains the methodology used in this study, including the 
rationale for a case based design, the data collection methods and the analytical 
procedures. 
Chapter 5 presents the analysis and interpretation of my findings and their 
relationship to the premises and model. 
In Chapter 6, I present a discussion of my findings in the context of current 
research. 
Chapter 7 concludes this dissertation by providing academic and 
practitioner implications of the findings, discussing the limitations of this study, 
and suggesting directions for future research. 
13 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: LEARNING, IDENTITY, AND CONFLICT  
Inter-organizational learning is strongly influenced by the context within 
which it occurs yet learning is the process by which individuals and organizations 
both adapt to and alter their context. Learning and adaptation occurs in spite of 
the constraints provided by the respective organization‟s institutionalized learning 
(i.e. practices, procedures, and routines) and the individuals involved. Conflict is 
necessary to prompt learning yet conflict frequently inhibits learning by triggering 
defensive responses at all levels.  In this section I review the relevant literature 
on inter-organizational learning, identity, and conflict. For each of these fields I 
first provide an overview of the relevant literature, I then summarize how that 
particular stream of research has addressed the other two phenomena and in the 
final section I summarize and integrate prior theory (See Figure 2-1: Learning 
from Enemy: The Theoretical Context). 
 
Figure 2-1: Learning from Enemy: The Theoretical Context 
Conflict
IdentityLearning
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2.1 Inter-Organizational Learning  
2.1.1 Organizational Learning as the Basis of Inter-Organizational Learning 
Current understanding of inter-organizational learning builds on the rich 
body of literature on organizational learning. Organizational learning is an 
established field of study that has been reviewed at regular intervals over the 
past several decades (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004; Crossan, H. Lane, White, & 
Djurfeldt, 1995; Easterby-Smith, 1997; Easterby-Smith, Crossan, & Nicolini, 
2000; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Leavitt & March, 1988). Earlier 
work, (e.g. Huber, 1991) took an information processing perspective of 
organizational learning, depicting the conflict created by a diversity of views as 
very important to learning.  Later research considered the social processes 
involved and raised questions, still relatively unexplored, about the impact of 
conflict on learning (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000). While these reviews illustrated 
the long standing ambivalence of organizational learning scholarship toward 
conflict they also identified some common threads. 
Organizational learning, broadly defined as organizational development and 
change, is a multi-level phenomenon (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000) containing 
four related processes – intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing, 
which occur at the individual, group and organizational levels (Crossan et al., 
1999). The processes of intuiting and interpreting are augmented by the action-
based processes of information seeking and experimenting at the individual and 
group level (Zietsma, Winn, Branzei, & Vertinsky, 2002).  Organizational learning 
depends on the interaction of both the content and the context (J. Brown & 
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Duguid, 2002; Lave & Wenger, 1991) and it refers to both the process of learning 
and the products of the learning process. Generally the learning literature 
emphasizes learning as a mechanism through which organizations can enhance 
performance (Argyris & Schon, 1978; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985) despite 
recognition that learning may be “equally about how to negotiate current 
relationships” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2000, p. 13). 
There is also general agreement that organizations learn through individuals 
and that individual learning is a fundamental building block of organizational 
learning (e.g. Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). However an organization‟s learning may 
be more or less than the sum of individual learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978; 
Crossan et al., 1999; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985; Huber, 1991; Starbuck & Whalen, 
2008). Individuals and the social processes, through which they interact, both 
within and outside their own organization, either facilitate or constrain 
organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999). This is because the 
institutionalized learning of their respective organizations, including the 
established practice, procedures and routines, constrain how individuals and 
groups interpret and integrate feedback. 
2.1.2 Inter-Organizational Learning Defined 
As with organizational learning, inter-organizational learning can be thought 
of as both a process and the products of that process. Inter-organizational 
learning is typically described as the process through which a group or 
organization exchanges, receives, and is influenced by the competence and 
technical knowledge of others (Van Wijk & M. Lyles, 2008).  It depends both on 
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the respective resources and capacities and the inter-organizational dynamics of 
the organizations involved, as well as the nature of the knowledge being 
exchanged or created (Easterby-Smith, M. Lyles, & Tsang, 2008). Reciprocal 
learning is a form of inter-organizational learning and it refers to the blending of 
knowledge and skills by organizations to jointly develop new knowledge, 
capabilities and products, i.e. create new knowledge (Lubatkin, Florin, & P. Lane, 
2001). 
Drawing on Crossan et al. (1999) and Van Wijk and Lyles (2008) this 
dissertation adopts a comprehensive definition of inter-organizational learning. 
Inter-organizational learning is the consequence of a focal organization‟s direct 
interaction with other organizations. It is both process and result and involves 
cognitive and behavioural change at multiple levels of the organization. The 
learning of the focal organization may be the result of transfer, sharing or 
acquisition of knowledge from other organizations or from the co-creation of new 
knowledge. This definition is appropriate for this study because it stresses both 
the cognitive and behavioural aspects of learning, highlights interaction (i.e., 
practices) between organizations, emphasizes the multi-level nature of inter-
organizational learning, and draws attention to the two manifestations of inter-
organizational learning (process and product). 
Vicarious learning has been excluded from consideration as it refers to 
learning from second hand experience or mimicking other organizations (Huber, 
1991) and I will only consider it to highlight aspects of inter-organizational 
learning that results from interaction. In addition, I do not draw on studies 
focusing explicitly on knowledge transfer (e.g. Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; 
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Tsai, 2001) knowledge sharing (e.g. Tsai, 2002), knowledge flows (e.g. Schulz, 
2001), or knowledge acquisition (e.g. M. Lyles & Salk, 1996) as those literatures 
tend to focus on learning a competence or technology and less on the 
behavioural aspects of inter-organizational learning. 
2.1.3 The Relationship Between Cognition and Behaviour in Learning 
Fiol and Lyles (1985, p. 806) stated that “it is essential to note the difference 
between cognition and behaviour, for not only do they represent two different 
phenomena, but also one is not necessarily an accurate reflection of the other”. 
They distinguish between changes in cognition and changes in behaviour and 
suggest that they may occur independently at the organizational level. In this 
dissertation organizational learning is the collective cognitions and behaviours of 
the individuals in the group or organization and it is represented by such things 
as an organization‟s procedures, structure, practices, and strategy. 
Cognitive theorists describe individuals as being able to perceive, analyze, 
plan and choose. These descriptions align with perceptions of individuals as 
autonomous conscious beings that make choices and influence their 
environments, i.e., exercise agency. Cognitive theories can explain how people 
(and organizations) suddenly act in novel ways. Cognitive theorists have focused 
on processes that are not directly observable such as memory, information 
storage, attention, interpretation and rehearsal (Mazur, 1990). In this view 
interpretation is a key process which is strongly influenced by an individual‟s 
multiple identities which activate various cognitive structures that facilitate 
interpretation (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Stryker & P. Burke, 2000). 
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Behavioural theories of learning explain as much behaviour as possible 
without allowing for conscious thought. In the behavioural view learning arises 
from reactions to performance feedback. Because individuals‟ environments 
generate such feedback, behavioural theories say that the environment strongly 
influences what is learned.  Behaviouralist theories describe three main types of 
learning: classical, operant, and latent. Classical conditioning looks at the 
relationship between various stimuli and changes to automatic or spontaneous 
responses (e.g. Pavlov, 2010 /1927). Operant conditioning looks at the 
relationship between various stimuli and changes in deliberate responses, given 
various rewards and punishments (e.g. Reynolds, 1975). Latent learning 
suggests that rather than simply learning automatic responses triggered by 
environmental stimuli, individuals can learn facts about the world that they can 
subsequently use in a flexible manner, demonstrating the link between agency 
and response (e.g. Tolman & Honzik, 1930). 
In cognitive theories the effectiveness of learning in pursuit of a goal hinges 
on individuals‟ perceptions. As a result, cognitive theories offer little help in 
explaining how individuals can alter their responses and improve their 
performance when they encounter differing interpretations of the environment, as 
is probably the case in a situation of conflict.  Behavioural learning theories 
attempt to explain how effective learning can occur in spite of individuals‟ 
perceptual errors and biases (i.e., in response to feedback) (Starbuck & Whalen, 
2008). This suggests that an examination of the behavioural aspect of learning 
may be key to understanding inter-organizational learning around conflict laden 
issues that may involve misunderstandings by one or all parties. 
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Inkpen and Crossan (1995) draw on both the cognitive and behavioural 
theories of learning to describe the various learning states experienced by an 
individual and draw on Fiol and Lyles (1985) to extend this framework to the 
organizational level (see Figure 2-2: The Relationship between Cognition and 
Behaviour). When there is no cognitive or behavioural change there is no 
learning; and conversely, when both change there is integrated learning. They 
suggest that behavioural change without cognitive change and visa versa sets up 
a transitional state because of the tension created when an individual‟s behaviour 
or cognition is not supported by corresponding changes in their cognition and 
behaviour, respectively. This tension results in “cognitive dissonance” and its 
reduction is a “basic process in humans” (Festinger, 1957, p. 4). Individuals will 
always work to align their behaviour and their beliefs (Festinger, 1957). 
 
Figure 2-2: The Relationship between Cognition and Behaviour1 
 
                                            
1
 Inkpen, A. & Crossan, M. (1995). Believing is seeing: Joint ventures and organizational learning. 
Journal of Management Studies. 32:5 p. 599 
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For example, if a behavioural change is forced it will likely resolve itself into 
no learning as individuals will continue to interpret stimuli through their current 
beliefs. However, if learning is experimental, individuals may suspend their belief 
systems to try a new behaviour and as a result be open to new interpretations of 
the outcomes. This behavioural change framework suggests that behavioural 
change presents the possibility of integrated learning depending on the 
conditions and the way outcomes are interpreted. 
Despite these early distinctions between the cognitive and behavioural 
aspects of organizational learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985; 
Inkpen & Crossan, 1995), our understanding of the conditions necessary for 
behavioural change to transition to organizational learning remains relatively 
under developed (Starbuck & Whalen, 2008). By exploring practices that occur 
when organizations engage with each other, this dissertation highlights the 
importance of behaviour change in inter-organizational learning irrespective of 
cognitive structures such as conflict, that otherwise constrain learning. 
2.1.4 The Challenge of Inter-Organizational Learning 
Inter-organizational learning offers the potential for much higher and more 
relevant learning than organizational learning. However research has shown this 
type of learning is challenging (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004). Conveying knowledge 
between organizations is more complex because of the multifaceted nature of the 
boundaries, culture, identities, and processes involved. Additionally, a given firm 
does not have equal capacity to learn from all other firms. Lane and Lubatkin 
(1998) found that a firm learned more from its partner when they had similar 
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knowledge bases, organizational structures and dominant logics. Conversely, the 
firm may simply not have the knowledge base to identify the learning opportunity, 
to usefully absorb and apply the others‟ knowledge, or even recognize its value in 
their own context (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). In addition, a firm‟s learning from a 
partner depends on its prior experience with that partner as well as its experience 
with other partners (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002). In contrast, Inkpen & Crossan 
(1995) observed that even when firms have all of this as well as explicit learning 
objectives they may be unable to create the appropriate mechanisms and 
systems to transfer knowledge from the joint venture to the parent. They found 
that while individual managers involved in the joint venture were often positive 
about their learning experiences, integration of the learning experience at the 
parent firm level was problematic, thus limiting the institutionalized learning. They 
concluded that the institutionalized learning associated with an unwillingness to 
cast off past practices can limit the effectiveness of inter-organization learning 
(Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). This raises the question of how, from a cognitive 
viewpoint, firms overcome institutionalized learning to change practices; or from 
the behavoural viewpoint, change practices to alter institutionalized learning. 
Most of the empirical research on inter-organizational learning has focused 
on strategic alliances and joint ventures where partner selection is based on 
learning prospects and their commercial impact (Bapuji & Crossan, 2004) or on 
research collaborations where collective action is required to solve a joint 
problem or repel a common threat (i.e. Corey, 1997). This work has tended to 
frame cooperation and competition as opposite ends of a continuum and conflict, 
if considered at all, is typically resource based such as conflicts of interests or 
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scarcity of resources. Learning is generally found to be contingent on some level 
of conflict resolution, which may be characterized as developing trust (Dhanaraj, 
M. Lyles, Steensma, & Tihanyi, 2004; e.g. Inkpen & Currall, 2004) or learning to 
manage the relationship (e.g. B. Anand & Khanna, 2000). In a unique departure 
from these prior findings, Steensma, Barden, Dhanaraj, Lyles & Tihanyi, (2008) 
reveal that learning can occur even while conflict persists. While not the main 
emphasis in their study, the presence of both high levels of conflict and high 
levels of learning is an exceptional finding. This dissertation directly addresses 
questions about the processes by which that might occur. 
In addition, there is a broad assumption in the extant research that 
increased knowledge sharing and inter-organizational learning contribute to an 
organization‟s performance or innovativeness. Thus if firms understand the 
knowledge transfer process and the variables that affect it, the firm‟s capabilities 
can be enhanced (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). More recent conceptualizations 
of learning do not assume improved organizational performance. My research will 
explore the full range of behavioural and cognitive learning outcomes, whether 
they contribute to improved performance or not, as well as the processes by 
which inter-organizational learning occurs. 
2.1.5 Individual and Organizational Learning and Identity 
Identity influences individual and organizational learning via the powerful 
hold it can have on both individual and organizational cognition and behaviour. 
Theories of individual cognition tell us that people interpret the world through a 
process of sensemaking that is supported by their individual interpretations and 
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strongly influenced by their past experience, social and role identities, and 
organizational context (K. Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). Organizational 
identity usually endures for some time and it provides a context in the form of 
systems, structures and procedures and for feedback on events and experiences 
(Crossan et al., 1999; Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985; Nag et al., 2007). This context 
may facilitate or impair the organization‟s ability to respond to its environment. 
The language and the dominant logic that forms the institutionalized learning, and 
consequently the identity of an organization, may present a significant obstacle to 
the introduction of new ideas (Crossan et al., 1999; Lawrence, Mauws, Dyck, & 
Kleysen, 2005). Dutton and Dukerich‟s (1991) study of the New York Port 
Authority provides a vivid illustration of the power of identity in the form of 
institutionalized learning to impact interpretations positively and negatively. Until 
aspects of the institutionalized logic that underpin an organization‟s identity can 
be set aside, even temporarily, new insights or intuitions are unlikely (Crossan et 
al., 1999). 
Theories of identity provide a rationale both for the way that individuals 
make sense of and respond to the stimuli they encounter. The learning literature 
has long recognized the importance of the context within which individuals 
function and from which they extract data to the interpretive process (Cook & 
Yanow, 1996; Crossan et al., 1999). Yet direct links to identity are relatively 
recent and tend to support the conclusion that identity influences group learning 
primarily by protecting the existing identity, thereby inhibiting or distorting learning 
(Antonacopoulou, 2006; Argote, A. A., 2009; A. Brown & Starkey, 2000; K. Corley 
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& D. Gioia, 2003; Hong & O, 2009; Kane, Argote, & J. M. Levine, 2005; Nag et 
al., 2007; Rodrigues & Child, 2003; Schwenk, 2002). 
One of the most prominent links between individual and group learning and 
identity has been through the notions of situated learning and communities of 
practice (J. Brown & Duguid, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991). They describe how 
individuals learn to function in a community, acquiring the community‟s point of 
view and language. Shared understanding is reached through continuing 
conversation and shared practice. Thus, individual learning relies on the social 
interactions between different levels of community members and learning and 
socialization into the group are intertwined. Learning is understood in terms of 
communities being formed or joined and individual identities being altered. This 
stream of literature draws attention to behaviours (practice) involved in altering 
individual identity and creating collective meaning. In contrast, recent research 
has acknowledged the inter-group dynamics between communities, and has 
begun to explore the ways that situated learning can negatively impact 
organizational learning and performance (Hong & O, 2009; e.g. Macpherson & 
Clark, 2009). In this research I consider the inter-group dynamics between 
organizations in order to reconcile the equivocal findings around identity, and 
moreover identify the practices and conditions that might inhibit or promote inter-
organizational learning. 
2.1.6   Individual and Organizational Learning and Conflict 
Research to date has revealed a seeming paradox in the relationship 
between conflict and learning, perhaps best captured by the notion of the promise 
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versus the reality of conflict. On one hand, Argyris and Schoen (1978) maintain 
that conflict is necessary for learning; that it provides an opportunity to learn. 
They and others have suggested that transformative or double loop learning is a 
response to conflict in which individuals explore the reasoning behind their 
positions and the meaning these positions have for them (Argyris & Schon, 1978; 
Bush & Folger, 1994; Rothman & Friedman, 2001). 
Conflict has been identified as a key part of group and organizational 
learning as well. Conflict contributes to higher level learning and in doing so is 
particularly relevant to strategic management because it is this level of learning 
that impacts long term survival (Fiol & M. A. Lyles, 1985). It has been shown to 
be instrumental in creating shared understandings, a key process through which 
group and ultimately organizational learning occurs (Crossan et al., 1999; Senge, 
1990). Although Crossan and her colleagues (1999) acknowledge that mutual 
adjustment and negotiated actions are required for coherent collective action to 
emerge they do not address the potentially dysfunctional aspects of conflict 
inherent in the process, with the attendant risk of failure. Quite the contrary, they 
employ the bucolic image of a flock of birds to illustrate the process of groups 
arriving at shared meaning. In this study, I examine the actual practices of 
individuals and groups to describe the processes by which mutual adjustment 
occurs. 
Researchers also have argued that conflict works against learning. Often 
individuals‟ ability to learn is blocked by dysfunctional learning processes such as 
defensive reasoning (Argyris, 1991; A. Brown & Starkey, 2000; Lawrence et al., 
2005). Dysfunctional learning processes can be triggered by threats to 
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individuals‟ social or role identities as well as to the identities that they attribute to 
their organizations (Nag et al., 2007). Individuals tend to support activities that 
are consistent with their organization‟s identity, they will stereotype themselves 
and others, and they will work to maintain coherence between their activities and 
the organization‟s identity (Antonacopoulou, 2006; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; K. 
Corley & D. Gioia, 2003; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). While these theories describe 
how conflict inhibits learning they do not explain how sometimes individuals and 
firms overcome those constraints and learn from each other, even while conflict 
persists. So while the “promise” of conflict in organizational learning has been 
acknowledged by some (although by no means all) organizational learning 
scholars the more pessimistic view of conflict has received limited attention. This 
dissertation addresses Easterby-Smith et al.‟s (2000) assertion that “the time is 
ripe to start addressing learning … in light of the inherent conflicts between 
…goals, interests … agendas” (p. 13) and explores the conditions that enable 
organizations to overcome these multi-level constraints and learn from each 
other. 
2.2  Identity  
“Identity is a self-referential description that provides answers to the 
question “who am I?” or “who are we?” (Ashforth, Harrison, & K. Corley, 2008, p. 
327). In the previous section I described how identity has been characterized in 
the organizational learning literature. In this section I draw on the extant identity 
literature, and specifically the literature on social identity and role identity at the 
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individual level, and at the collective or organizational level, organizational 
identity. 
2.2.1 Identity Defined at the Individual Level 
Social identity is understood to be an individual‟s self-categorization as a 
member of a group as well as the value and emotional significance that the 
individual places on that membership (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). While 
people may think of themselves as independent individuals and define 
themselves based on personal characteristics or preferences (i.e. their personal 
identity) there are many situations where people primarily define themselves and 
others in terms of their group memberships (Tajfel, 1978). Personal identities are 
unique to individuals and differentiate between individuals (often within their in-
group) whereas social identities are shared by members and differentiate groups 
from one another. Social identity explains and links individuals‟ identity, inter-
group relations, and group processes in social settings (Stets & P. J. Burke, 
2000). Social identity is an important conceptualization of identity for 
understanding inter-group conflict (Ashforth et al., 2008; De Dreu & Gelfand, 
2008) therefore social identity along with role identity, and not personal identity, 
will be considered in this research. 
Social identities reside in collectives such as groups, teams or 
organizations, and social identity theories provide insight into group processes 
and inter-group dynamics. Identity theory, which comprises structural identity 
theory and identity control theory, defines identity as those “parts of a self 
composed of the meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles they typically 
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play” (Stryker & P. Burke, 2000, p. 284). In this view role identities reside in 
socially defined roles such as jobs, functions, responsibilities, professions etc. 
(Ashforth et al., 2008). Role identity theory seeks to explain the role related 
behaviour of individuals (Stryker & P. Burke, 2000). 
Some identities have more importance and prominence than others and are 
organized into a hierarchy via an individual‟s self (Ashforth et al., 2008; Mead, 
1934; Stryker, 1968). Mead (1934), whose work serves as the foundation for 
several recent studies (e.g. Hatch & Schultz, 2002), defined the self as the 
“whole” person, encompassing an individual‟s multiple identities and as an 
integrative structure ordering and binding their various identities together.  Stryker 
(1968) proposed that the self orders these discrete identities into a hierarchy of 
salience. The more important a particular identity is to an individual, the more 
likely the person will attempt to affirm that identity through his or her actions (P. 
Burke, 1980; P. Burke & Reitzes, 1991). Therefore, an individual‟s behaviour is 
usually the manifestation of the identities positioned higher in their salience 
hierarchy. The self integrates existing identities and provides a link between 
social structures such as roles, expectations, and positions, and individual 
actions. It is this link between social structures, identities and action that 
motivates and is explored more fully in this dissertation. 
2.2.2 Identity Defined at the Organizational Level 
Whereas individual level theories of identity tie an individual‟s self- concept 
to a social group or to a role, organizational identity considers how individuals 
understand and categorize the organization to which they belong (Albert & 
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Whetten, 1985; Ashforth & Mael, 1989; K. G. Corley, Harquail, M. G. Pratt, Glynn, 
& Hatch, 2006; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994). Building on psychological 
theories of identity, Albert and Whetten (1985) observed how organizational 
identities emerge from comparisons with other entities, and how the perceived 
similarity or difference supports members‟ self-categorizations of their 
organization. They defined organizational identity as those aspects of the 
organization that members self-referentially claimed as providing its “central 
character, distinctiveness and temporal continuity” (Albert & Whetten, 1985, p. 
265). Recently Whetten (2006, p. 220) has specified the concept as “the central 
and enduring attributes of an organization that distinguish it from other 
organizations.” These represent a set of stable and enduring self descriptions 
that change with great difficulty (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Whetten, 2006; Whetten 
& Mackey, 2002). 
Organizational identity also involves meaning at the collective level, which 
may be tacit or explicit, taken for granted, or conscious and deliberate (K. Corley 
& D. Gioia, 2003). Some identity beliefs are central while others are peripheral 
and many authors have argued that organizations can have multiple identities 
(Fiol, 1991; Golden-Biddle & Rao, 1997; M. G. Pratt & Kraatz, 2009; M. Pratt & 
Foreman, 2000). 
There have been two main approaches to the construct of organizational 
identity: a social constructionist and an institutional perspective (Elstak, 2008; 
Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). Social constructionists argue that organizational 
members collectively build a shared understanding of their organization through 
their interaction (e.g. D. Gioia et al., 2000). Institutionalists argue that identity is a 
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set of stable and enduring self descriptions of an organization that exists 
irrespective of the individual members and that changes only with great difficulty 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006; Whetten, 2006; Whetten & 
Mackey, 2002).  The differences between these perspectives are significant when 
considering the impact of organizational identity on learning. The social 
constructionists by definition acknowledge the possibility, even the inevitability of 
learning, while the institutionalists reject the notion that changes to identity can be 
accomplished without great effort. I will describe each perspective in turn. 
Some scholars (e.g. Whetten, 2006) view organizational identity as an 
attribute of the organization that can only be determined by the organization‟s 
commitments, obligations and actions. In this view organizational identity exists in 
a set of explicit statements of what the organization is and what it represents, 
termed institutional claims. These institutional claims provide consistent and 
legitimate narratives that influence members‟ perceptions of the organization‟s 
central, enduring and distinctive features and allows them to construct a 
consistent collective sense of self (Whetten & Mackey, 2002). From the social 
actor or institutional perspective, organizational identity is defined as a set of 
emotionally laden, stable and enduring self descriptions that change only rarely 
and with great difficulty (Ashforth & Mael, 1996; Whetten, 2006; Whetten & 
Mackey, 2002). 
Conversely other scholars take a more social constructivist view examining 
how members‟ beliefs about what is central and distinctive about their 
organization may evolve in the face of internal and external stimuli (K. G. Corley 
et al., 2006; K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al., 
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1994; D. Gioia & J. Thomas, 1996). In this view attention is focused on the 
“collective understandings of the features presumed to be central and relatively 
permanent and that distinguish the organization” (D. Gioia et al., 2000, p. 64). 
Organizational identity is the product of the tension between collective, shared 
cognition on one hand and socially constructed individual cognitions on the other 
(D. Gioia, 1998; Haslam & Ellemers, 2005).  This view de-emphasizes endurance 
and considers how strategic responses to environmental changes may be driven 
by organizational leaders promoting a new narrative (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004). 
In this dissertation I consider organizational identity as both providing the 
institutional constraints that shape members‟ interpretations and as being shaped 
by members reaching mutual understanding and shared interpretations (D. Gioia 
et al., 2000; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). I contend that the institutionalized notions 
of organizational identity are also collective, in the same fashion that laws and 
governments represent collective meaning. These identities do change, albeit at 
a much slower pace and via different processes than organizational level 
collective meanings (Elstak, 2008; Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003; Ravasi & 
Schultz, 2006). Consequently, in this study I define organizational identity as 
comprising both institutional claims and collective understandings. 
There are a number of concepts that, while closely related to organizational 
identity, are separate and distinct constructs. Most significantly, as noted above, 
organizational identity is self-referential. Corporate identity and organizational 
image, in contrast, involve the projection of identity related notions to external 
audiences (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; D. Gioia et al., 2000).  Likewise, reputation 
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is often defined as how external audiences view the organization (Fombrun, 
1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
Organizational identity is closely tied to organizational culture because 
identity provides a set of skills and a way of using and evaluating those skills that 
produce characteristic ways of doing things (Cook & Yanow, 1996; Nelson & 
Winter, 1982). Hatch and Schultz (2002) suggest that identity is the 
interrelationship between culture and image, where identity expresses cultural 
understandings at the same time as it mirrors images which outsiders attribute to 
the organization (K. G. Corley et al., 2006). Similarly organizational identity is 
different from organizational values, although it can encompass values that are 
important to the organization when those values are part of what is believed to be 
central, distinctive and continuous about the organization. 
2.2.3 Identity and Learning 
Identities are cognitive maps that facilitate making sense of a situation and 
structuring the unknown (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Schwenk, 2002; Stryker & P. 
Burke, 2000; K. E. Weick, 1979). Integrating, according to most prior literature, 
requires that individuals and groups first overcome the barriers to learning 
inherent in different identities and find an acceptable overarching goal that 
integrates efforts and provides direction to the learning process (A. Brown & 
Starkey, 2000; Hong & O, 2009; Nag et al., 2007; Rodrigues & Child, 2003; M. 
Sherif & C. Sherif, 1956). By looking at inter-organizational learning between 
“enemies” this dissertation considers whether integration is possible in the 
absence of an overarching shared goal. 
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As discussed above, identity provides the context, be it the industry, 
profession, or the community, within which learning takes place and is in turn 
altered by the process of learning. Organizational resources, especially 
knowledge, skills, and expertise, are likely to be influenced by the basic 
assumptions that organization members use to define “who we are” as an 
organization (Kogut & Zander, 1996). For instance, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) 
found that members‟ sense of the organization‟s identity was associated with a 
set of routines or standard procedures. When activated by conflict over a specific 
issue, these routines were identified as “typical” of the organization. Corley and 
Gioia (2004) found that changes in organizational identity corresponded with 
behavioural changes among the organization‟s members, especially those in 
leadership positions. 
This connection between identity and behavioural expectations, as well as 
behaviour change, has been described using the concept of scripts (Abelson, 
1981; Barley & Tolbert, 1997; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). Scripts are a subset of 
knowledge structures or schemas and are primarily concerned with 
understanding behaviour in routine situations at the individual (Abelson, 1981) 
and organizational level (D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). Whereas a schema is a 
generalized cognitive framework that serves as a guide to interpret information, 
actions, and expectations (e.g. Daft & K. Weick, 1984) a script is a schema that 
describes behaviours appropriate for a particular context or situation (D. Gioia & 
P. Poole, 1984). Scripts represent shared, agreed cultural and social knowledge. 
Barley and Tolbert describe scripts as the behavioural regularities which are 
“observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a 
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particular setting” (1997, p. 98). Individuals perpetuate existing behavioural 
expectations such as those attached to a role identity through their actions 
because they have internalized those expectations as guiding principles of action 
(Barley & Tolbert, 1997; Giddens, 1979; Jarzabkowski, 2008). 
An individual‟s identities are linked to scripts in that a role or affiliation with a 
group can be considered a special case of a script (D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). A 
role or a social identity can be thought of as a higher level script governing 
situation specific behaviour. Given that scripts are individual cognitive structures, 
they may differ in some aspects from typical social and role expectations 
reflecting that individual‟s unique interpretation. An individual will activate their 
salient identity or the identity they believe is required in a given situation and that 
in turn will activate a script. To paraphrase March & Heath (1994), the 
appropriate script in one‟s repertoire would answer the question: “what should a 
person like me [identity] do in a situation like this [relevant script]”. When 
individuals encounter novel situations they may consciously enact new 
behaviours.  In doing so they develop new scripts or alter existing scripts, i.e. 
experiment. Conversely, individuals may continue with the practices and 
behaviours they attach to their salient identity and in so doing block learning or 
distort the knowledge (Nag et al., 2007). 
Organizational identities are also linked to scripts. Barney et al (1998) 
suggest that once a firm determines “who they are” it is very easy to determine 
what they “must do” (p. 113).  Barney and his colleagues (1998) also suggest that 
a firm can begin with a clear action or behaviour and develop “who they are” out 
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of that action. A “theory of we are” or an organizational identity is interdependent 
with, and requires a corresponding “theory of action” or script. 
For example, Koch Industries of Wichita, Kansas, identifies itself as a 
“discovery company”, not as the institutionalized organizational identities of oil 
and gas company or resource company (Barney et al., 1998); and this identity 
has “a profound impact on behavior inside Koch” (p. 109). Employees are 
expected to always be “discovering” new ways to add value to the firm, new 
businesses to leverage existing skills, and new or improved practices. Similarly, 
an organization that identifies itself as a “learning” organization will facilitate the 
enactment of behaviours in support of exploration and experimentation. 
At both levels scripted behaviours are often performed unconsciously, 
although active cognition is involved during the process of script development 
and when encountering unusual, novel or unconventional situations (D. Gioia & 
P. Poole, 1984). A generic script may be developed that is appropriate to a 
category of situations such as strategy retreats or responding to media criticism 
(D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). When an individual or organization encounters a 
new situation that shares some common elements with previous experience they 
compare it to their existing scripts. Information that “generally” matches a script 
signals that active thought and analysis is not necessary and the script can be 
enacted (D. Gioia, 1992). This often occurs without any adjustment for 
differences in information about the current situation that may be important, as 
illustrated by Gioia‟s description of Ford‟s reaction to the Pinto fires (1992). 
The aggregation of scripts associated with each of an individual‟s discrete 
identities represents their behavioural repertoire. An individual will activate their 
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salient identity or the identity they believe is required in a given situation and that 
in turn will activate a script. When individuals encounter novel situations they may 
employ a generic script within that repertoire, or they may consciously enact new 
behaviours. This suggests that by choosing to enact new behaviours individuals 
develop new or alter existing cognitive scripts which in turn may shift their 
interpretation of their identities. 
Organizations develop their scripts through a variety of direct experiences 
and observations including interacting with regulators or through rewards and 
reinforcement such as market share increases. Indirect means of script 
development at the organizational level might come for example, from portrayal in 
the media or from a social movement‟s description of appropriate organizational 
behaviour in a given situation. Modeling provides another means of script 
development for organizations (D. Gioia & Manz, 1985; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 
1984). Observing the positive experience of a role model provides an indication 
of the right behavioural script for certain situations. As is the case with 
individuals, changes in behavioural scripts may modify cognitive scripts and 
ultimately organizations‟ institutionalized learning. Extant research typically 
depicts organizational identity as existing in the minds of organization members 
with limited attention given to its behavioural expressions (D. Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991; Nag et al., 2007). In this research I consider the implications of the 
behavioural expressions of identity on learning. 
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2.2.4 Identity and Conflict 
Conflict resulting from external pressure increases the likelihood that 
organization members will explicitly reflect on organizational identity issues 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; D. Gioia et al., 2000; Ravasi & Schultz, 2006). 
Research on identity suggests that negative feedback from the environment 
“destabilizes” organizational members‟ self-perceptions (e.g. D. Gioia et al., 2000; 
Hatch & Schultz, 2002) and a serious discrepancy between external expectations 
and internal beliefs may induce organizational members to reevaluate their 
understandings (Albert & Whetten, 1985; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984; D. Gioia et 
al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Organizational identity typically becomes an 
issue when an organization faces difficult decisions such as a change in strategic 
direction (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Whetten, 2006) or is faced with resolving an 
unfamiliar or unique challenge (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Ravasi & Schultz, 
2006). It is at these difficult junctures that organization members often ask “Who 
are we?”, “What kind of business are we in?” or “What do we want to be?” (Albert 
& Whetten, 1985, p. 265). 
Identities are cognitive maps that facilitate making sense of a situation and 
structuring the unknown (Ring & van de Ven, 1994; Stryker & P. Burke, 2000; K. 
E. Weick, 1979; 1995). Conflict provokes strong emotions and strong emotions 
appear to be key to initiating both identity change and cognitive and behavioural 
change. It is conflict that evokes the strong emotions (K. Weick et al., 2005) 
necessary to instigate a change in individual cognitive maps but it is the presence 
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of a range of identities that enable individuals to explore the new information 
surfaced in the conflict (Rothman & Friedman, 2001). 
However, conflict may trigger responses, such as defensive routines and an 
over reliance on generic scripts, that inhibit individuals‟ and organizations‟ ability 
to engage in the mindful behaviour associated with new script development (Fiol 
et al., 2009; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). Factors that, in a situation of conflict, 
would tend to work against a mindful approach and toward the use of generic 
scripts, include priming, information complexity, and the need to preserve a 
positive self-concept (D. Gioia & P. Poole, 1984). The opposing perceptions of 
the conflict laden issue and conflicting views of the purpose of their interaction 
would prime individuals and organizations for script selection bias.  In order to 
simplify and manage the high level of complexity of the information surrounding 
conflict laden issues, individuals and organizations will tend to rely on generic 
scripts that may or may not be appropriate. Finally, an individual‟s and 
organization‟s need to preserve and protect a positive self image (identity) might 
lead individuals and organizations to take inappropriate action.  Given that these 
factors will direct individuals and organizations towards the relatively automatic 
use of generic scripts (which will tend to reinforce existing identities and conflicts) 
another mechanism is required to activate new cognitive and behavioural scripts. 
2.3 Conflict 
The study of conflict, regardless of whether it is undertaken in psychology, 
sociology, economics, political science, organizational behaviour, strategic 
management or communications, focuses on how individuals and groups 
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manage their interdependence with one another (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). 
Conflict is ubiquitous within and between organizations, leading some to 
conclude that organizations without conflict simply do not exist (e.g. Pondy, 
1967). However, in research, conflict has often been considered in isolation 
rather than in connection with other organizational phenomena, such as 
organizational learning. Conflict is a multi-level phenomenon and although 
extensive research has been done at various levels, consideration of the cross 
level influences of conflict is relatively recent. In this study I consider how conflict 
impacts organizational learning across levels. 
2.3.1 Conflict Defined 
Traditionally conflict has been defined as opposing interests involving 
scarce resources, goal divergence and frustration of goal achievement (e.g. 
Pondy, 1967). For example, De Dreu and Gelfand (2008, p. 6), building on 
Pondy‟s (1967) theme of opposing interests, defined conflict as a “process that 
begins when an individual or group perceives differences and opposition between 
oneself and another individual or group about interests and resources, beliefs, 
values or practices that matter to them”. Defining conflict as opposing interests‟ 
sets up the assumption that conflict is competitive, ignoring that parties with 
compatible goals often have conflict. Also the notion of conflict as opposing 
interests is confounded with the construct of competition which is often defined as 
incompatible goals. The broader business literature, in particular, has tended to 
equate conflict not only with differences but also with incompatible goals 
(competition) and as a win-lose circumstance (Tjosvold, 2008). 
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Deutsch (1949; 1973) defined conflict as incompatible activities; one party‟s 
actions, interfere, obstruct, or in some way get in the way of another‟s action. 
This view of conflict is similar to Pondy‟s (1967) description of manifest conflict, 
as “conflictual behavior, ranging from passive resistance to overt aggression” 
(298). According to Deutsch, whether parties believe their goals are competitive 
or cooperative affects their expectations, interactions and outcomes. In turn, how 
they negotiate their conflicts affects whether they believe their goals are 
competitive or cooperative (Tjosvold, 2008). In addition to individual‟s perceptions 
of the conflict situation, Pondy (1967) identified the antecedents of conflictual 
behaviour and the affective states of the individuals involved as critical to 
understanding conflict processes and outcomes. Following Deutsch (1949; 1973) 
and Pondy (1967) this study will highlight the behavioural aspect of conflict while 
recognizing the implications of cognition on behaviour of individuals and 
organizations. 
2.3.2 Conflict Over Time 
Well-established models of conflict behaviour suggest that conflict has two 
broad phases; a differentiation phase followed by an integration phase (Deutsch, 
1973; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; K. Thomas, 1976; Walton, 
1969). During differentiation, the parties raise the conflict issues, clarify their 
positions with regard to the issues, pursue the reasons behind those positions, 
and acknowledge the severity of their differences. When further escalation seems 
unproductive, an integration phase begins. In this phase parties begin to 
acknowledge common ground, explore possible options, and move towards 
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solution – sometimes one that meets everyone‟s needs but sometimes one that 
they can just all live with (Folger, M. Poole, & Stutman, 2001). The key to 
avoiding protracted escalation of the conflict is to achieve the benefits of 
differentiation (highlighting differences, accepting other‟s position as legitimate, 
motivation to move forward) and to make a clean transition to integration, setting 
the conflict on a different course. 
One of the most frequently used frameworks in assessing whether a conflict 
is ready for transition is ripeness theory (I. W. Zartman, 1989; I. William Zartman 
& Berman, 1982). This theory suggests that the parties to a conflict will not be 
ready to transition until they mutually reach a point where they are able to 
recognize 1) a hurting stalemate (i.e. the costs and /or the risks of continuing are 
too large) and 2) a possibility of a way out through negotiation. While widely used 
ripeness theory is limited by poorly established generalizability outside 
international diplomacy, limited consideration of non-rational factors, and low 
predictability (Pruitt, 2005). 
Readiness theory (Pruitt, 2005) is an effort to overcome these limits by 
considering each condition as a psychological state and not a necessary 
condition. The hurting stalemate becomes the degree of motivation to end the 
conflict and the perceived way out becomes the degree of optimism that the 
conflict can be ended. Motivation can be influenced by the extent of the cost and 
dysfunctionality of the conflict or by pressure from third parties. Optimism can be 
influenced by perceptions about the other party‟s readiness, about the context, or 
by the presence of a third party.  Also the psychological state of each party is 
considered separately and not as a mutual state. The two parties might both be 
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“ready” but for different reasons. One party can be highly motivated but not very 
optimistic while the other may be optimistic but not very motivated. The notions of 
motivation and optimism add flexibility to ripeness theory, particularly in predicting 
parties “readiness” to move to the integration phase. 
Moving to integration requires the parties to fundamentally change their 
behaviour, turning from a focus on differences to some level of cooperation. 
Several conditions have been identified that facilitate this transition. First it is 
important that differences have been surfaced completely and they are 
understood by all parties, even if they do not agree. It is important that the parties 
are balanced in terms of power such that neither can nor will be pushed into an 
inferior agreement. If each party persistently strives for outcomes that are truly 
meaningful to them the other party is likely to recognize the need to explore 
possible options (J. Z. Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). The negative consequences of 
differentiation can also motivate parties to move to integration. In many cases a 
third party can be a significant help in transitioning from differentiation to 
integration. Parties may trust the third party and will follow their advice where 
they would not accept it from each other (Folger et al., 2001). 
2.3.3 Conflict Research versus Negotiation Research 
Negotiation researchers understand much about individual and group 
behaviour in formal and informal negotiations however those interactions are 
fundamentally different from what conflict management researchers have 
examined. Negotiation researchers for the most part explore the relationship 
between behaviours and the quality of settlements (Fisher & S. Brown, 1988; 
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Fisher & Ury, 1981). Conflict researchers examine the relationship between 
behaviours and intangible outcomes such as individual, relationship, and group 
transformation (Bush & Folger, 1994; Dukes, 1993; Olekans, Putnam, & 
Weingart, 2008). 
A large segment of negotiation research measures the behaviour of the 
parties to the conflict directly, often through experiments and simulations (S. 
Wilson & Putnam, 1990). The interaction of parties is considered in the context of 
"deal making" and not the emotionally charged context of long term disputes. 
Indeed, negotiation researchers have tended to focus on the immediate patterns 
of action-reaction as opposed to how an entire conflict episode unfolds. Whereas 
most negotiation research has focused on strategy patterns and substantive 
outcomes, conflict research had considered the intangible consequences of 
strategy use such as the transformation of individuals, of the relationship between 
parties, or of groups (e.g. Bush & Folger, 1994). Finally, conflict research looks at 
the effectiveness of strategies to manage conflicts while negotiation research has 
focused on the quality of a settlement. 
The distinction between conflict management research and negotiation 
research is important - negotiation is all about getting to the deal (i.e. what 
behaviors and process got us to the best quality deal that satisfies both parties) 
as opposed to a transformational perspective (i.e. what happened to the 
participants cognitions and broader behaviors as a result of the process). 
Therefore the conflict management literature is more relevant to this research 
which is examining the processes involved in coming to some kind of mutual 
understanding. 
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2.3.4  Conflict Across Levels of Analysis 
At the individual level in organizations conflict processes may involve 
individual motivation, concern for self versus concern for others (Pruitt, 1983), 
cognition, and emotional states as well as individual differences in conflict 
management approaches (K. Thomas, 1976). The consequences of conflict can 
be negative including individual well being and health, absenteeism, and turnover 
(Spector & Bruk-Lee, 2008) and most relevant to this research they can promote 
positive individual change. Conflict can enhance individual‟s development of 
skills, and moderately intense conflict has been shown to increase employee 
performance, individual creativity, and cognitive flexibility (Carnevale & Probst, 
1998; Nemeth, 1986; Schulz-Hardt, Mojzisch, & Vogelgesang, 2008; Van de 
Vliert & De Dreu, 1994). 
At the group level, conflict processes relate to patterns of interaction in 
managing conflict, negotiation, and small group communication (Olekans et al., 
2008). Conflicts over scarce resources between groups strengthen within group 
cohesion and individual motivation to contribute to the group‟s success (Erev, 
Bornstein, & Galili, 1993). Negative conflict consequences can include 
aggression and escalation within and between groups (Lederach, 1995; Pruitt, 
2008) and more positively group innovation, improved performance, and 
increased group member satisfaction and commitment (Beersma, Conlon, & 
Hollenbeck, 2008; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2008). Moderate levels of task related 
conflict have been shown to contribute to group effectiveness (De Dreu, 2006; 
Jehn, 1995) by prompting people to re-evaluate their working assumptions, to 
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correct errors, and to approach decision making from multiple perspectives 
(Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2008). Conflict has 
also been shown to promote group change by improving decision making 
(Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995; 1997) and to lead to redefined social identities 
through the disappearance of certain group characteristics (Terry & Amiot, 2008). 
At the organizational level, conflict has been studied in the context of 
resource scarcity, union-management relations, and mergers and acquisitions. 
Resource conflicts, such as budget deficiency or decreased slack, have been 
shown to stimulate organizations to experiment and innovate in order to cope 
with overload or change beyond their immediate control (N. Anderson, De Dreu, 
& Nijstad, 2004; Zaltman, Duncan, & Holbek, 1973). Active confrontation through 
negotiation (union-management) promotes inter-group communication, increases 
mutual understanding and results in greater acceptance of agreements and 
decisions than more tacit forms of coordination (Putnam, 1993). In other studies 
however active confrontation has been shown to have both negative (strikes, lock 
outs) and positive (improved organizational performance) outcomes (Walton, 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld, & McKersie, 1994). De Dreu and Gelfand (2008) suggest 
that the relationship between engagement and outcomes is moderated by the 
context within which it occurs. They propose that whether conflicts benefit or hurt 
organizations depends on where, how and how intensely conflicts impact 
individual, group and organization level functions. Only recently has conflict 
research begun to explore the implications of context for conflict in organizations. 
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2.3.5 Sources of Conflict 
The source or root cause of conflict has been the focus of much prior 
research, which has shown that the source of conflict has implications for its 
dynamics, impact, and outcomes. This work tends to cluster around three 
theoretical perspectives on sources of conflict that are apparent at all levels (e.g. 
De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; De Dreu, Harinck, & Van Vianen, 1999; K. Thomas, 
1992). Resource conflicts are a result of scarce resources or mixed motive inter-
dependencies, and have also been referred to as real conflict (e.g. M. Sherif & C. 
Sherif, 1953), conflicts of interest (Deutsch, 1949; e.g. 1973), conflict over 
outcomes (e.g. Pruitt, 1981), games or co-opetition (e.g. Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1996). Value or identity conflicts are the result of the need to develop 
and maintain a positive view of one‟s self and one‟s group (Tajfel, 1978) and are 
sometimes referred to as relationship (e.g. Jehn, 1995; e.g. 1997) or affective 
conflicts (e.g. Amason, 1996). In contrast to controlled experiments where 
resource conflicts can be separated from identity based conflicts, “such clear 
distinctions cannot be made in the context of organizations where participants are 
outcome inter-dependent by definition” (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008, p. 18). 
Socio-cognitive conflicts arise when there are incompatible or divergent 
interpretations of information. Socio-cognitive conflict is a result of a desire to 
develop and maintain cognitive consistency (Festinger, 1957) and to hold a 
socially validated and shared understanding of the world and the tasks that need 
to be done. They are sometimes referred to as cognitive (e.g. Amason, 1996) 
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task (e.g. Jehn, 1995; 1997) or process (e.g. Jehn, Northcroft, & Neale, 1999) 
related conflicts. 
Individual, group, and organizational conflicts typically involve aspects of all 
three major sources. However, regardless of the root cause of conflict between 
individuals, groups, or organizations, when that conflict escalates identity conflict 
tends to dominate (e.g. Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Mooney et al., 2007). This is 
consistent with the research on organizational identity discussed above; no 
matter what the source of conflict, if it is considered serious it will activate identity. 
Therefore to understand inter-organizational learning with its inherent conflict it is 
necessary to understand the implications of identity conflict on behaviour and 
cognition. Given this, I first examine the implications of identity on behaviour at 
the individual level. I then consider the implications of identity for learning at the 
collective (group, organizational) and inter-organizational levels. 
2.3.6 Conflict and Identity 
Prior research on the impact of differences in individual characteristics 
within and between groups splits into two perspectives: information processing 
and social identity (Mannix & Neale, 2005). As discussed previously, the 
information processing perspective suggests that differences will lead to an 
increase in opportunities for learning. The social identity perspective suggests 
that differences create divisions and tensions and negative performance 
outcomes (Mannix & Neale, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Conflicts rooted in 
identity appear at the individual, collective, and the inter-group level. Social 
identity theory shows how social categorization can lead individuals to identify at 
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the individual, group, or organization level and that identification then drives 
behaviour in both identity and resource based conflicts (De Dreu & Gelfand, 
2008).  Social identity theory also allows us to understand conflicts at any level. 
While it was developed at the individual and intergroup level, and not the 
organizational level, it brings to light the social psychological processes that are 
inherent in individual and group interaction and the probable impact of identify on 
the interaction between individuals from separate conflicting organizations. 
Therefore the theoretical predictions of social identity theory can be equally 
applied to conflicts between entire organizations (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). 
Conflict between groups and organizations has been shown to shape and 
redefine their relative status positions, reshape social boundaries, and alter 
identity through the disappearance of certain characteristics and subcultures and 
their expressions, such as language (Terry & Amiot, 2008). In addition, conflict 
has been shown to shape identity by explicitly or implicitly stimulating some 
members of an organization to leave, usually fostering turnover in peripheral 
group members more than in those seen as core (Schneider, 1987). 
2.3.7 Conflict and Learning 
Much work has been done at the individual and group level to understand 
how people manage socio-cognitive conflicts as well as their impact on learning 
and especially creative decision making. Building on developmental psychology 
(e.g. J. M. Levine, Resnick, & Higgins, 1993) and social psychology (e.g. 
Festinger, 1954), socio-cognitive conflict theory addresses incompatible 
understanding and interpretation of facts and figures and considers the way 
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people manage these conflicts, as well as their impact on learning and creative 
decision making (e.g. Amason, 1996; Brehmer, 1976; Schwenk, 2002). Socio-
cognitive conflict theory rests on three assumptions; first, people are motivated to 
hold accurate perceptions about themselves and their world. Second, people are 
boundedly rational and lack information and information processing capabilities, 
and as a result different people develop different beliefs, insights and 
understandings of identical objects of perception. Finally, people seek cognitive 
consistency and social validation of their beliefs, insights and understandings and 
divergence vis a vis others creates tension that people are compelled to resolve. 
These conflicts can be resolved by persuading the other party, by changing one‟s 
mind, by integrating seemingly opposing views, or by dissolving the relationship 
(De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). 
Socio-cognitive conflicts can be over problems which have correct solutions 
according to commonly accepted standards or they can be judgmental problems 
that have no correct solution. A key source of socio-cognitive conflict within and 
between organizations entails opinion, insights, and beliefs that are not 
consensually shared (Brehmer, 1976; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2008). These emerge 
out of preference or belief diversity in groups. Work on minority dissent and 
devil‟s advocacy has shown that when a minority faction opposes the majority 
view, group members are more likely to question their assumptions, search for 
new information, and consider multiple perspectives (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 
Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Mannix & Neale, 2005; Schwenk, 2002). 
Much less work has been undertaken, from a conflict theory perspective, on 
socio-cognitive conflicts at the inter-group and organizational level of analysis, 
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despite its relevance at those levels (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). For example 
mergers should trigger debate among beliefs, opinions and ideas, in addition to 
social identity conflicts; however this aspect of inter-group conflict has not yet 
been explored. This dissertation addresses the inter-organizational level of 
analysis and links it to the individual level. 
2.4 Integrating Learning, Identity and Conflict 
Conflict provides an opportunity to learn by provoking strong emotions. 
Strong emotions are key to initiating both the cognitive and behavioural change 
(Schwenk, 2002; K. Weick et al., 2005) necessary to instigate learning but it is 
the presence of multiple identities that enable individuals to explore the new 
information surfaced in the conflict (Rothman & Friedman, 2001; Schwenk, 2002). 
Individual learning processes, including intuiting, experimenting, and 
interpreting take place in relation to an environment. Weick (1979) argues that 
people are more likely to “see something when they believe it” rather than 
“believe it when they see it”. This suggests that even high quality information may 
hold multiple and/or conflicting meanings for different individuals (Huber & Daft, 
1987; Rodrigues & Child, 2003) depending on their identities (K. Weick et al., 
2005). These discrepant interpretations lay the foundation for conflict between 
individuals and groups. However, other belief systems within the same individuals 
or group may hold the key to bridging across that conflict. Conflict also activates 
identity and with it the behavioural scripts that tend to protect identity. 
And so we are left with the paradox between the relatively straightforward 
predictions that “conflict stops learning” and “learning stops conflict”. These 
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notions underlie the positive bias toward learning that predominates the existing 
literature and the relatively negative predisposition toward conflict. However, 
existing literatures do not provide an explanation for how some organizations are 
able to learn from each other even while conflict persists. In the next section, l 
draw on the conclusions of prior research to develop a model explaining how that 
might happen. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, MODEL AND 
PREMISE DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Rationale for Research 
The paradoxical phenomenon of “learning from the enemy” cannot be 
explained by any one or even two of the literatures reviewed in the previous 
section. While the organizational learning literature has shown that conflict 
promotes learning by calling assumptions and behaviour into question at the 
individual and collective level, it has not adequately addressed how organizations 
deal with the identify or value based aspects of conflict that activate defensive 
routines and inhibit learning. Recently, organizational learning scholars have 
begun to recognize the significance of differences in identity to organizational 
learning (e.g. Nag et al., 2007), but not its implications in an inter-organizational 
situation. 
Identity scholars have made the link between learning and identity but have 
not attempted to address the impact of identity differences on organizational 
learning. Research into communities of practice has shown that identity promotes 
learning within a particular community and that identity formation processes are 
intimately linked to learning processes. But, as communities of practice become 
insular and rigid, their common identity blocks individual and collective learning 
(Hong & O, 2009; Macpherson & Clark, 2009). Research into identity, that takes 
a conflict perspective, has shown that while identity reduces conflict by providing 
a common basis for interaction within groups, it also promotes conflict through 
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inter-personal and inter-group rivalry. Indeed it is well established that the very 
act of identification with a group, ensures some level of inter-group conflict (M. 
Sherif & C. Sherif, 1956). Inter-group conflict is often studied from a conflict 
management or conflict resolution perspective which does not typically address 
the mutual learning that must underpin any change in the relationship between 
individuals, groups or organizations. 
Conflict scholars have determined the types of responses that each source 
of conflict provokes and have identified resource and socio-cognitive conflict as 
the most potentially constructive. However they have only recently begun to 
acknowledge that, in practice, without high levels of interpersonal and inter-group 
integration, all conflict “feels” like identity conflict (e.g. Mooney et al., 2007), the 
least constructive and least amenable to conciliation. Research on conflict has 
not yet addressed how organizations shift emphasis away from identity conflict 
and towards aspects of the conflict more likely to promote learning. 
In summary, previous research has acknowledged the importance of conflict 
to learning and the centrality of identity to conflict and to a lesser extent identity‟s 
influence on learning; however the relationship between these three key concepts 
has not been articulated. That is what I do in this dissertation. In this section I 
describe the ontological approach that I have taken to study this phenomenon, 
and the premises that form the foundation of my model linking identity, conflict 
and inter-organizational learning. 
54 
 
 
3.2 The Practice Based View  
Research on organizational learning, including inter-organizational learning, 
has predominantly considered knowledge as the codification of experience in 
some form of cognitive structure or behaviour pattern, and of learning as the 
process through which such structures change (i.e. Easterby-Smith, 1997; Fiol & 
M. A. Lyles, 1985). Organizations are thought of as information processing units 
that acquire knowledge through reflecting on experience. This understanding of 
learning draws directly from individual psychology and is extended to firms 
through the delineation of levels while still regarding knowing as primarily 
cognitive (Nicolini, Gherardi, & Yanow, 2003). Research on organizational identity 
has followed a similar ontological tradition, and until recently it has been depicted 
as existing in the minds of organization members with less attention given to its 
behavioural aspects (Nag et al., 2007) even though basic assumptions about 
“who we are” as an organization inevitably influence “what we do” and “how we 
do things around here” (Kogut & Zander, 1996). In contrast, research on conflict 
has to a great extent been driven from a practice perspective, but the link back to 
theory, especially, as it relates to socio-cognitive conflict has been limited. 
The practice based view draws on recent work in philosophy and social 
science to move beyond the “prevailing notions that depict it (learning) as the 
static result of thinking by disinterested and autonomous individuals” (Nicolini et 
al., 2003, p. 7). In the practice based view, learning in organizations is “social, 
processual, materially and historically mediated, emergent, situated, and always 
open-ended and temporary in character” (Nicolini et al., 2003). It is understood 
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through individual performances (Feldman & Pentland, 2003) or episodes 
(Hendry & Seidl, 2003) of “situation-specific enactments by individuals working in 
specific places, at specific times” (Branzei & Fredette, 2008, p. 395). Recent 
research on identity suggests that organizational identity manifests in collective 
practices (Nag et al., 2007).  To meet my goal of multi-level theorizing, I have 
employed the practice-based view. 
The practice-based view seeks to overcome the split between 
“individualism” which favours individual action while ignoring macro-forces, and 
“societism”, a concept that focuses on the widespread societal forces while 
discounting individual action (Whittington, 2006). Recently Johnson, Melin, and 
Whittington (2003) proposed a relatively narrow view of practice focusing on the 
activities that organizational actors conduct (micro-level), their consequences for 
organizational outcomes (macro level) and the feedback loop from context and 
the organization back to the actors. They argue that this approach does not 
replace traditional management theories such as the resource based view or 
institutional theory, but rather provides an explanation of the mechanisms that 
underpin each. 
There is a fundamental difference between the “content”, “process”, and 
“practice” approaches in terms of the research questions asked, the theories 
used and the phenomena explained (G. Johnson et al., 2003). Content theories 
such as the resource based view, provide conceptual explanations of 
organizational outcomes and focus mainly on firm performance. They attempt to 
determine “what”. Content theories prioritize nouns over verbs (Garud & van de 
Ven, 2006) and employ broad, static, and convenient constructs, resulting in 
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repeated inconclusive studies (G. Johnson et al., 2003). Researchers that take 
the practice based view suggest the lack of consistent findings is because the 
macro processes studied do not capture the micro processes in the actual 
activities (Nayyar, 1992; Zona, 2009). 
Process theories address questions of “how” by examining how inputs are 
transformed into outputs, such as learning or identity, in an organization as a 
whole  (G. Johnson et al., 2003). They also seek to explain firm level outcomes. 
A typical process theory holds that similar inputs subjected to similar processes 
will lead to similar outcomes; and that there are certain conditions necessary for 
the outcome to be reached. Typical patterns of events, such as variation and 
selective retention, are core theoretical constructs (Van de Ven & M. Poole, 
1995). Conversely, the practice based view looks inside the process (J. Brown & 
Duguid, 2002). 
The distinctive characteristic of the practice based view, proposed by 
Johnson and colleagues (2003) is the use of verbs and an inherent process 
based orientation. This is because practice-based approaches focus on what 
people actually do. Attention is directed toward understanding how and under 
what conditions action actually occurs. The object of inquiry, the unit of analysis, 
is the practice or the action; the capacity of humans to perform actions, the 
temporal organization of such actions, and the resources required (Gherardi, 
2009; Nicolini et al., 2003). Another feature is that in this view organizational 
learning, identity maintenance, and conflict responses are conceived of as social 
processes sustained by processes of participation in, socialization into, and 
membership in social groups like communities. This is different than the more 
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traditional individual-centred social cognition perspectives (Feldman & Pentland, 
2003; Nicolini et al., 2003). 
Most practice based approaches refer to the situated nature of practice (i.e. 
Feldman & Pentland, 2003). This implies that learning, for example, and “its 
subjects and objects must be understood as being produced together within a 
temporally, geographically, or relationally situated practice” (Nicolini et al., 2003, 
p. 23). Finally and perhaps most relevantly for this study, practice-based 
approaches recognize uncertainty, conflict, incoherence, paradox, tension, and 
inconsistency as fundamental to elements of practice. 
The latest developments in practice based view research in strategy 
(Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl, 2007) propose to conceptualize any 
phenomenon as a situated, socially accomplished activity, which comprises 
actions, interactions, and negotiations of multiple actors and the situated 
practices that they draw upon in accomplishing this activity (Jarzabkowski, 2005). 
Therefore, following this stream of practice research, I have conceptualized inter-
organizational learning as a situated activity. The practice based view studies 
episodes of organizational activities (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) in order to uncover 
the mechanisms underlying the inter-organizational learning practice. It asks 
questions such as “how is the conduct of a joint project consequential in terms of 
how identity issues arise and contribute to learning?” 
Whittington (2006) proposes that three elements are key to understanding 
practice: praxis, practices, and practitioners each of which involves a different 
analytic choice and provides a somewhat different entry into the study of inter-
organizational learning as practice. Praxis refers to the actual activities that make 
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up the substance of, in this case, learning and may be operationalized at different 
levels and through interactions between levels (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007). 
Practice represents the shared routines of behaviour, norms, procedures and 
artefacts such as white boards, and meeting minutes that guide collective activity 
(Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Gherardi, 2009). Practice might be considered 
institutionalized learning (Crossan et al., 1999). While practices are diverse and 
variable and can be altered according to the activity in which they are used 
(Seidl, 2007) they are carried out within a framework of procedures and 
expectations. However the particular actions taken (praxis) are to some extent 
novel (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Practitioners are the individuals who draw 
upon practices to act, i.e. perform praxis. They derive agency through their use of 
practice and such agency is embodied in who they are, how they are able to act 
and is always connected to the situation and context in which it is derived, i.e. 
their individual and organizational identities. These three elements are the 
integrated parts of a whole called inter-organizational learning. 
I use Jarzabkowski et al.‟s (2007) framework of a theory of practice in the 
context of inter-organizational learning (See Figure 3-1: A Framework for 
Analyzing Inter-Organizational Learning as Practice). As depicted in Figure 3-1 
learning practitioners are organizational leaders, executive and middle managers 
who contribute to organizational learning in two ways: by establishing learning 
practice and receiving feedback from it (A) and by conducting learning praxis by 
engaging with other organizations and making sense of the interaction (C). 
Practice interacts with praxis (B) in that the practice conditions the praxis which in 
turn influences practice. The interaction between the three components of the 
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framework is always bi-directional and learning is accomplished by their 
combination. 
 
Figure 3-1: A Framework for Analyzing Inter-Organizational Learning as 
Practice2 
 
Following the recommendation of Johnson, Langley, Melin and Whittington 
(2007), in this study I put the interaction between practitioners and praxis in the 
foreground and focus on the activities that individuals perform and how and why 
they make sense of them. I do not ignore practice, which in this case is the 
                                            
2
 Modeled on Jarzabkowski, Balogun, & Seidl (2007). Strategizing: The challenges of a practice 
perspective. Human Relations. 60(1) 
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institutionalized learning of the organizations (procedures, policies, etc.), 
however, gaps between it and praxis yield important, albeit secondary, insights. 
The practitioners are the point of access and the unit of analysis is the actions of 
engagement between organizations whose activities are incompatible or 
“enemies”. My data collection and data analysis encompass the individual, 
activity, group, and organization levels. This focus on practice extends our 
understanding of the processes of inter-organizational learning by giving full 
consideration to the richness and depth of the phenomena by allowing us to look 
inside the processes. 
3.3 Model of Identity, Conflict, and Inter-organizational Learning 
In this section I develop an inter-organizational learning model to address 
the phenomenon of inter-organizational learning in the context of a conflict. Like a 
framework, my model defines the territory and takes us a step closer to a theory 
(Crossan et al., 1999). A model has several requirements, the first being to 
identify the phenomenon of interest, in this case “learning between enemies”. 
Next the key premises or assumptions underlying the framework need to be 
explained (Sutton & Staw, 1995; K. E. Weick, 1995). Finally the relationships 
between the elements in the model need to be described (Sutton & Staw, 1995; 
K. E. Weick, 1995). While the individual elements have been established in prior 
literature, what is unique to my model is that I am showing the interrelationships 
and embeddedness across the levels. My model makes high level connections. It 
is underpinned by 5 key premises or assumptions: 
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1. Inter-related and Embedded: Conflict, learning, and identity are inter-
related in that one influences the formation of the others and they are 
embedded in activities (praxis) of individuals and in practices 
(institutionalized behaviours and beliefs) at the collective level. 
2. Multi-level Impacts: Conflict, learning, and identity are inter-related across 
the individual and collective levels via feedback and feed forward 
mechanisms. 
3. Individual Engagement: Praxis-Practitioners-Practice:  Change in conflict, 
learning, and identity resulting from inter-organizational engagement takes 
place through the activities (praxis) of individuals (practitioners) and 
practices of organizations or groups. 
4. Repeated Engagement between Equals: Conflict, learning, and identity 
continue to evolve with repeated engagement. Their movement is 
determined by the nature of the engagement between individuals. 
5. Conditions: Research has identified a range of conditions that favour inter-
organizational learning. There are conditions around the conflict itself, 
conditions related to the organizations, and to the individuals involved. 
I now will describe each premise in more detail. 
3.3.1 Inter-Related and Embedded 
Conflict, learning, and identity are related in that one influences the 
formation of the others and they are embedded in the praxis (activities) of 
individuals and in practices (institutionalized behaviours) at the collective level 
(See Figure 3-2: Embeddedness). The relationships between conflict and both 
individual and organizational learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978), conflict and 
identity (e.g. Mannix & Neale, 2005), and to a somewhat lesser extent identity 
and organizational learning (e.g. Cook & Yanow, 1996) have been established in 
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prior research. My model highlights the extent to which they are related to each 
other through praxis and practice (activities and behaviour). 
Conflict, as defined in this dissertation, entails incompatible activities such 
that one individual‟s or organization‟s actions interfere with or obstruct another‟s 
action (Deutsch, 1949; 1973). It acts as the stimulus for action. In the context of 
the practice based view then the actions taken (praxis) by individuals 
(practitioners) in response to conflict, based on their organization‟s routines, 
procedures, and behavioural practices, instigates learning (with or without an 
accompanying shift in beliefs) (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). In a similar vein, 
individuals‟ identity is expressed through their actions (praxis) which are a 
reflection of the practices of those individuals‟ social and role identities and their 
organizations‟ identities. 
Organizational identity manifests in collective practices (Nag et al., 2007). 
Even within cooperative groups these practices can create conflict (Deutsch, 
1949; 1973; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The practices related to any particular identity 
impact what can be learned in that they represent a collective and 
institutionalized learning or knowledge base that shapes the behaviour and 
beliefs of individuals (practitioners) and their organization (J. Brown & Duguid, 
1991; Nag et al., 2007). Conflict may interfere with or obstruct actions at the 
organizational level as well as at the individual level. I proceed on the premise 
that conflict, identity, and learning are inter-related and embedded in actions and 
practices. 
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Figure 3-2: Embeddedness  
 
3.3.2 Multi-Level Impacts 
Conflict, learning, and identity are inter-related across the individual and 
collective levels via feedback and feed forward mechanisms. While conflict, 
identity, and learning are inter-related within levels, the overall process is 
inherently multi-level. Individual beliefs and behaviours regarding the practices 
related to identities and conflict both influence and aggregate to higher level 
practices and understandings. These higher level understandings in turn provide 
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the basis for feedback to the sub-groups, and individuals in the organization 
(Chreim, Williams, & Hinings, 2007; K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2003; Crossan et al., 
1999; De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Individuals' praxis 
(activities) in response to feedback are shaped by and in turn modify their 
understanding of the conflict, their identities and their learning. Organizational 
practices in response to feedback are shaped by and in turn modify 
organizational identity and learning and collective understanding of the conflict. 
The context of this study is situations of conflict between organizations. My 
model centers on engagement that occurs practitioner to practitioner, described 
more fully in the next section.  Each organization, through the practices created 
by its institutionalized learning and inherent in its identity uniquely influences the 
individuals‟ identity, and hence their potential for learning, as well as their 
potential for conflict. The identities of work, professional and social group 
memberships as well as their prior knowledge also exert an influence on 
individuals (See Figure 3-3: Multilevel). I proceed on the premise that conflict, 
identity and learning are inter-related across levels. 
It is important to note that in my model the organization level refers to the 
collective consensus of individual behaviours and beliefs. It is the collective level 
as compared to the individual level. Also, this structure follows from the basic 
assumption that individuals, not organizations, have insights and take action 
(Crossan et al., 1999; Simons, 1991). 
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Figure 3-3: Multilevel 
 
3.3.3 Individual Engagement: Practitioners-Praxis-Practice 
In the context of inter-organizational conflict, change in conflict, learning, 
and identity results from practitioner engagement between organizations. Change 
is anchored in feedback and feed forward cycles, through the praxis (activities) of 
practitioners (individuals) and practices of organizations or groups (see Figure 
3-4: Practice-Practitioner-Praxis). 
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Figure 3-4: Practitioner-Praxis-Practice 
 
However, engagement between individuals from organizations in conflict 
may trigger actions, such as defensive routines and an over reliance on past 
experiences, that inhibit their ability to learn (Fiol et al., 2009; D. Gioia & P. Poole, 
1984). Information complexity and/or the need to preserve a positive self-concept 
also tend to work against experimentation and hence learning (D. Gioia & P. 
Poole, 1984). A relatively automatic enactment of existing practices by individuals 
will tend to reinforce existing identities and conflict. Consequently certain 
conditions may be required to allow for experimentation to occur. 
Organizational learning between organizations in conflict may then depend 
on individuals‟ ability to tap into a range of less salient identities and particularly 
into identities based on communities of practice or roles. While an individual‟s 
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behaviour is usually an expression of their more salient identities (P. Burke, 1980; 
P. Burke & Reitzes, 1991), when opportunities to express that identity are 
unavailable individuals will often reorder the importance of existing identities 
(Serpe, 1987). Field studies have shown that contextual factors can render some 
identities much more meaningful than others (R. Brown, 2000). Experiments in 
psychology have demonstrated that common group membership (cross 
categorization) reduces in-group bias (e.g. Deschamps & Doise, 1978). This is 
important in the case of engagement between “enemies” as engagement forms a 
common group and raises the possibility of new activities that result from 
activation of a different identity. 
Communities of practice, such as the community of scientists, provide 
individuals with common vocabulary and practice with which to engage and 
address each other (J. Brown & Duguid, 1991). Whereas within an organization it 
is often role and social identities that differentiate individuals, in engagement 
between “enemies” an otherwise less salient social or role identity may provide 
an opportunity for them to connect. Also, in a relatively new inter-organizational 
relationship behaviours are not entrenched, permitting more individual leeway. 
Employing the practices associated with their common identity allows 
practitioners to explore new activities in response to the conflict. While 
engagement between individuals from organizations in conflict is likely to evoke 
the strong emotions (K. Weick et al., 2005) necessary to instigate 
experimentation (i.e. new activities), I propose that it is the presence of multiple 
social and role identities that enable individuals to constructively engage, so that 
feedback from experimentation leads to new interpretations and integration. 
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While the existence of common social or role identities is necessary, given 
the influence of organizational identity, it may not be sufficient to ensure 
enactment of new behaviour in response to feedback. For such enactment to 
occur something must loosen the hold that this collective identity places on 
individual actions. Researchers have suggested that feedback from the external 
environment “destabilizes” individuals‟ perception of their organization‟s identity 
(e.g. D. Gioia et al., 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 2002). Although minor 
inconsistencies between external perceptions and internal beliefs regarding their 
organization‟s identity are likely to trigger defensiveness, a serious discrepancy 
may induce organizational members to reevaluate their understandings and alter 
their actions (D. Gioia et al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). Consequently, in 
order for the individuals to experiment with new actions that run contrary to the 
dominant logic, their respective organizational identities must be in some state of 
flux. 
When members‟ collective understanding of organizational identity is in a 
state of flux, perhaps as a result of a crisis in the industry or a merger, the 
characteristics of the organization that are central, enduring and unique become 
less clear. This leads to ambiguity regarding the organization‟s practices. As a 
result the constraints that the organizational identity formerly placed on 
individuals‟ activities may relax and their individual, social and role identities 
become relatively more important. In this situation the presence of common 
social or role identities can facilitate new activities based on those common 
identities. In addition to supporting new activities this has the potential to shift the 
relative focus of individuals away from identity differences between themselves 
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and their organizations. With this shift the more socio-cognitive aspects of the 
conflict may become the focus. 
In addition, the extent to which an individual identifies with their 
organization‟s identity influences whether they will change their behaviour in 
response to feedback that is inconsistent with that identity. For behavioural 
change to occur individuals must identify strongly with their organization‟s 
distinctive characteristics.  When individuals do so, enacting behaviour related to 
the organizational identity is more likely to take relative priority over their other 
identities. This is especially the case if the individual is over-identified with their 
organization (McGregor & Little, 1998; Schwenk, 2002). The extent to which an 
organization‟s identity aligns with institutionalized norms in its industry, also 
impacts the likelihood that individuals will be bound by institutionalized norms and 
logics. Hence, the level of an individual identification with their organization‟s 
identity, along with the alignment of that identity with the norms in its category, 
determine the potential for individuals to alter their behaviour and to shift 
emphasis to aspects of the conflict other than identity differences. The interaction 
of identification and organizational identity can relax the constraints on individual 
praxis in the same way that they are relaxed when an organization‟s identity is in 
flux. 
To summarize, conflict, identity, and learning serve as filters through which 
the individuals make sense of feedback. Feedback that is consistent with their 
understanding will not prompt any change in praxis. Feedback that is inconsistent 
with their understandings may prompt a different interpretation of the situation, 
resulting in experimentation with new activities or the activation of a new identity.  
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As stated above the extent to which individuals will consciously experiment with 
new actions in response to conflict is a function of the interaction between their 
social or role identities and their respective organizations‟ identities. I proceed on 
the premise that individuals‟ subsequent praxis in response to feedback is related 
not only to their understanding of the conflict but also to their identities, their 
learning, and to the learning and identities of the groups and organizations with 
which they identify. These are conditions for engagement between individuals. 
3.3.4 Repeated Engagement  
Conflict, learning, and identity evolve with repeated engagement. The 
trajectory of their movement is determined by the nature of the engagement, 
which occurs between individuals from the organizations in conflict. 
As described above, in interactions between individuals from organizations 
in conflict, the process of learning may be thought of as the capacity to activate 
different, probably less salient, identities and the accompanying behaviours in 
response to feedback. Once enacted, the new behaviours alter the context and 
create a novel situation that requires conscious interpretation first by the 
individuals themselves. Individuals must be “willing to suspend their belief 
systems to try a new behaviour, and in doing so are open to new and different 
interpretations of the results of the behaviour” (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995, p. 600). 
This interpretation of their own new behaviour may lead to altered beliefs about 
the source of the conflict (identity versus socio-cognitive or interests) and in turn 
activate new beliefs and behaviours. The extent of the shared understanding of 
individuals from each of the organizations forms the foundation for integration 
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and collective learning between them and for the integration and potentially the 
inter-organizational learning in their respective organizations (See Figure 3-5: 
Repeated Engagement). 
To move from individual to collective learning shared understandings must 
be developed. This is accomplished through various forms of interaction; first 
between individuals within the inter-organizational group, and subsequently 
between these individuals and groups within their organization (Crossan et al., 
1999; Isaacs, 1993). The nature of the interaction between the individuals and 
groups, and particularly the practices such as structures and mechanisms which 
connect them, strongly influence inter-organizational learning (Argote, McEvily, & 
Reagans, 2003; Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). 
While not explicitly addressed in prior research, many of the practices of 
inter-organizational learning studied to date act primarily to reduce inter-group 
and inter-organizational hostility  (i.e. manage the inherent identity conflict). 
These practices have tended to create, to varying degrees, the conditions 
outlined in the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; R. Brown, 2000). These include 
prolonged engagement involving some cooperative activity (e.g. Inkpen & Currall, 
2004); official and institutional support for the engagement (e.g. Mason & Leek, 
2008) and engagement between relatively power balanced practitioners and 
organizations (e.g. Kale & J. Anand, 2006). While originally aimed at the 
reduction of inter-racial hostility these practices support the kind of inter-group 
and inter-organizational exchange necessary for dialogue to occur. For example, 
Mason and Leek (2008) discuss the creation of „soft‟ mechanisms, such as 
individuals working together to develop a document with the expectation that they 
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would learn from each other. It is through ongoing discussion and shared actions 
(i.e. praxis) that shared understanding develops and mutual adjustment take 
place (Crossan et al., 1999). 
Dialogue as Bohm (1996) defines the term goes beyond typical notions of 
conversation and information exchange, to explore deeply held assumptions 
about expectations, meaning, and identity (Bohm, 1996, p. vii). Dialogue depends 
on the attention of the individuals involved and it must be sustained over time in 
order to surface the assumptions that are present in the group. Through 
recognizing these assumptions, individuals may gain new understanding of their 
thought processes and break out of the identity constraints that inhibit them.  For 
example, as discussed above, organizational identity can be thought of in terms 
of the organization‟s position within an established set of categories that define 
an industry, for example “we are an oil and gas company”. Identity change would 
occur in the context of dialogue that challenges the dominant expectations, 
meanings and scripts attached to identity, such as “oil companies and 
environmentalists are enemies”. The questions prompted by dialogue drive 
change by creating identity discrepant cues and novel interactions like, “oil 
companies and environmentalists can collaborate” and generate a sense of 
identity amongst dialogue participants, as in “oil companies and 
environmentalists care about the natural environment” (i.e. Rao et al., 2003). 
Practitioners can begin to understand the extent to which they are behaving 
automatically based on their existing interpretations. With such understanding 
Bohm (1996) suggests that defensive posturing can diminish and deep collective 
learning is then possible, although not assured. It is through interaction with 
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others that individuals are able to break out of beliefs and behaviours and Bohm 
(1996) suggests that perhaps the only way to fundamentally change meanings 
and expectations, such as those related to identity and conflict, is through 
dialogue. 
I proceed on the premise that repeated engagement between practitioners 
around some cooperative activity that has institutional support forms the basis for 
dialogue that will lead to inter-organizational learning. 
 
 
Figure 3-5: Repeated Engagement 
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3.3.5 Conditions 
Prior research has identified a range of conditions that favour inter-
organizational learning, problem solving processes, and moving from a 
stalemate. These may also apply to an organization‟s ability to learn in situations 
of conflict. There are conditions around the conflict source, conditions related to 
the organizations and conditions related to the individuals involved (see Figure 
3-6: Model of Identity, Conflict, & Inter-Organizational Learning). 
3.3.5.1 Conditions Related to the Conflict 
According to De Dreu and Gelfand (2008) and others conflict can arise from 
three major sources: mixed motive interdependencies or conflicts of interest; the 
need to develop and maintain a positive identity; and the need to hold socially 
validated and shared understandings. Hence conflicts arise from differences in 
individuals‟, groups‟, and organizations‟ interests, identity, or learning. 
A common assumption is that conflict is based on identity and is 
dysfunctional to inter-organizational learning because of the threat that it 
represents to the ego of others (e.g. A. Brown & Starkey, 2000). However, a 
more nuanced understanding of the combination of sources of conflict may have 
implications for inter-organizational learning (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). 
Research has shown that socio-cognitive conflict is beneficial and increases the 
quality of decisions (i.e. Amason, 1996). However, that may be the case only 
when identity conflicts have been addressed or at least reduced in some way. In 
a similar vein it is well established that when parties believe their goals are 
competitive (Deutsch, 1949) as in conflicts of interest, they do not engage 
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constructively and socio-cognitive conflict hinders team performance (Tjosvold, 
1998). I proceed on the premise that redirecting emphasis towards socio-
cognitive conflict and away from identity conflict or conflicts of interest is 
necessary for learning. 
3.3.5.2 Conditions Related to the Organizations 
In addition to the interactions discussed above, the capabilities of each of 
the organizations, as embodied in their practices, will impact their ability to learn 
from engagement. An organization‟s learning practices in general, including its 
learning routines, dominant logics, knowledge bases, and structure (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; P. Lane & Lubatkin, 1998), and especially its prior experience 
with inter-organizational learning, will all influence its capacity to “learn from the 
enemy”. Prior experience with a particular learning partner has an influence as 
well (Zollo et al., 2002). I proceed on the premise that an organization must have 
well developed and effective inter-organizational learning practices to learn from 
an organization with which it is in conflict. 
3.3.5.3 Conditions Related to the Individuals 
The capabilities of the individual practitioners involved are critical. 
Relationships between individual managers will determine much of what occurs 
in terms of inter-organizational interactions (Inkpen & Tsang, 2007) and in 
situations of conflict those relationships are likely to be cautious and tense. 
Therefore in addition to enjoying the support of an organization that is capable of 
learning, individuals must have confidence that the risks of working with hitherto 
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unfamiliar, and possibly hostile, individuals and groups outweigh the costs. In 
other words they must be motivated and optimistic that engaging with individuals 
from the other organizations will be constructive (Pruitt, 2005). I proceed on the 
premise that learning practitioners must be confident, motivated, and optimistic 
regarding the potential for inter-organizational learning. 
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Figure 3-6: Model of Conflict, Identity, & Inter-Organizational Learning 
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3.3.6 Summary 
My model suggests that individual actions in response to conflict are based 
on individual and collective identities and individual and collective learning and it 
is these actions that form the basis for inter-organizational learning in the 
presence of conflict.  Depending on their “repertoire” of identities and the stability 
of their organization‟s identity, individuals, and their counterparts in other 
organizations, may be able to tap into behaviours associated with a common 
social or role identity. This common identity provides common language and 
practices to guide their interaction, possibly highlighting the interest or socio-
cognitive aspects of the conflict. The likelihood that individuals will experiment 
and persist with new behaviours also depends on their organization‟s identity and 
their level of identification with it. If the individuals do persist with the new 
activities, they may be able to suspend their belief systems and explore new 
interpretations. This shift in interpretation surfaces assumptions and facilitates 
dialogue, and possibly the integration of new information, first by the individuals 
and then by the group (Bohm, 1996; Crossan et al., 1999). The integration of new 
information by the group makes inter-organizational learning possible, depending 
on the practices (i.e. receptiveness) of the organizations involved. Therefore, 
inter-organizational learning is an unusual case where individual to individual 
learning can ultimately influence the learning that occurs in each individual‟s 
respective organizations. It is the individuals and the social activities and 
practices, such as dialogue, through which they develop shared understandings 
that facilitate inter-organizational learning. 
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In this dissertation, I examine whether all of the premises and conditions 
described must hold for inter-organizational learning to occur. Moreover, I will 
look for patterns in the data to provide a more nuanced explanation of the 
activities (praxis) through which the paradoxical phenomena of “learning from the 
enemy” occurs. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
4.1  Research Strategy 
To explore the phenomena of “learning from the enemy” I followed Yin‟s 
(2009) methodology in selecting my research strategy and research design. Yin 
(2009) suggests that the choice of a research strategy hinges on three 
conditions: the type of research question, the extent of the researchers control 
over the behavioural events, and whether the events are contemporary or in the 
past (i.e. timing). 
Investigations of inter-organizational learning are usually concerned with 
contemporary events (condition three) in a setting where the researcher has no 
control of the behavioural events (condition two). In my study therefore the first 
condition, the type of research question, is the most important in determining the 
research strategy. According to Yin (2009) there are three broad categories of 
research questions: those that ask “how much or how many”, those that ask 
“what” (exploratory), and those that ask “why or how” (explanatory). 
The first type of question has been explored using surveys and archival 
research asking, for example, how much has been learned (e. g. Cockburn & 
Henderson, 1998)  or how much impact learning has had on financial 
performance (e.g. Zollo et al., 2002). Large scale multi-organizational surveys 
rely on proxy objective measures of inter-organizational learning (i.e. patent 
counts), often outside of the context where it has occurred; thus they provide only 
a broad indicator of successful inter-organizational learning outcomes and 
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processes. This study takes place in a high-conflict context. And while survey and 
archival research have suggested that inter-organizational learning can occur in 
the presence of high levels of conflict (Steensma et al., 2008), it has for the most 
part failed to adequately address the complete nature of the learning or the 
processes through which it has occurred. Indeed, one of the primary motivations 
for this dissertation is the gap in our understanding of the social and behavioural 
(the “what” and “how”) aspects of inter-organizational learning, caused by the 
prior reliance on survey and archival studies. 
Case studies are highly suitable for exploratory or explanatory purposes 
(i.e., “what”, “how” and “why” questions) when the phenomenon is current and 
situated in the organizational world, and the researcher has little control over 
events, as in the case of inter-organizational learning (Yin, 2009). Additionally, in 
research that explores the underlying dynamics of phenomena that play out over 
time, such as inter-organizational learning, case studies provide the ability to get 
closer to constructs and to illustrate relationships more directly (Siggelkow, 
2007).  This is in contrast to large sample work where the distance between 
conceptual constructs and measurable variables is often large and the true 
nature of the relationship (if one exists) unclear (Siggelkow, 2007).  An equally 
compelling argument for case studies is that they are well suited to understanding 
dynamic, complex individual and organizational phenomena involving intense 
human interaction, such as the practices related to inter-organizational learning in 
a conflict laden situation (G. Johnson et al., 2007). 
Case studies are conducted within a context by accessing people who are 
able to recollect events pertinent to the phenomena under study relatively 
82 
 
 
 
accurately, in addition to archival documents, and the researcher‟s observations. 
Therefore case studies allow the retention of the meaningful characteristics of 
real life events, such as individual life cycles, and organizational and managerial 
processes. Flexible iterative data collection and tabulation allow one to take 
advantage of emergent themes, sharpening construct definition, validity and 
measurability (Eisenhardt, 1989). Comparing data to theory from the literature, 
both confirming and contradictory, helps to build internal validity and raise the 
theoretical level. Unlike grounded theory or ethnography, case studies demand a 
prior grasp of relevant theoretical relationships to guide and delimit data 
collection efforts (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). 
In summary, while the case study method is comparable to other types of 
research strategies in its process of problem definition, design, data collection, 
data analysis, data composition, and reporting, it is uniquely appropriate for 
exploratory and explanatory studies such as this. The case study method 
explains links that are too complex for surveys, describes the rich context in 
which the phenomena occurred, illustrates the phenomena, and explores 
situations where the phenomena do not have clear outcomes (Yin, 2009). Hence, 
a case study research strategy was selected for this dissertation. In the next 
section I describe the rationale for my research design. 
4.2 Research Design 
The research design “is the logical sequence that connects the empirical 
data to a study‟s initial research questions and, ultimately, its conclusions” (Yin, 
2009, p. 26). The selection of a specific research design using case study rests 
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on the choice between single and multiple cases and depends on the number of 
units of analysis. I discuss each in turn. 
4.2.1 Single Cases 
According to Yin (2009) single cases are appropriate when theory is well 
formulated. While much is known about inter-organizational learning, a single 
case that meets most of the conditions necessary for inter-organizational learning 
has the potential to challenge or extend existing theory. Another rationale for a 
single case study is the case to be studied is extreme or revelatory. Inter-
organizational learning “between enemies” is a sufficiently infrequent and 
uncommon phenomenon that I believe a pertinent single case is worth 
documenting and analyzing (Yin, 2009). While multiple case studies provide a 
foundation for testing a theory, extreme single cases are particularly valuable in 
enabling researchers to focus in on the conceptual relationships proposed within 
an exceptional empirical setting (Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 2007; Yin, 2009). 
In addition, exceptional or unique cases hold the promise of special insights, 
especially regarding behaviours or practices (G. Johnson, et.al., 2007; Yin, 
2009). A final rationale for a single case study is the longitudinal case; studying 
the same single case at two or more intervals. My model suggests that certain 
conditions change over time therefore a longitudinal case study is necessary to 
reflect the anticipated changes (Yin, 2009). I believe that a multiple case design 
would be unlikely to generate additional insights sufficient to justify the added 
cost in time and resources required to find and investigate comparable cases, 
84 
 
 
 
when weighed against one well-chosen, unique and extreme case. Therefore I 
chose a single case design for this dissertation. 
4.2.2 Multiple Units of Analysis 
The unit of analysis defines what a “case” is about. Case studies have been 
conducted to investigate inter-organizational learning, identity, and conflict; and 
focusing on individuals, work groups, organizations, nations and others. In each 
study the definition of the unit of analysis and therefore the case is directly related 
to the initial research questions (Yin, 2009). The research questions posed in this 
dissertation focus on the behaviours associated with inter-organizational learning 
between organizations in conflict – namely the behaviours exhibited in the dyadic 
relationships between individuals and further, between collectives (groups or 
organizations). While these behavioural interactions are the main units of 
analysis, they necessarily incorporate subunits of analysis in an embedded 
design. Subunits of analysis here include the organizations, relevant sub-groups, 
and individuals. These subunits add opportunities for analysis across levels and 
particularly at the organizational level where practice becomes evident, 
enhancing the insights from this single case. The similarity to constructs 
investigated in previous research on learning and identity will allow me to build on 
prior literature (Yin, 2009). 
4.2.3 Plan for an Embedded Single Case Design 
Yin (1989) recommends the following steps for a single case design. 
1. Define and design: 
a. Develop theory: Chapters 2 and 3 
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b. Select case: Section 4.3 
c. Design data collection: Section 4.4 
2. Prepare, collect, and analyze: 
a. Conduct case study: Section 4.5 
b. Develop case narrative: Section 4.5.2 
3. Analyze and conclude: 
a. Draw conclusions: Chapter 5 
b. Relate conclusions to existing theory: Chapter 6 
c. Relate conclusions to new theory: Chapter 6 
d. Develop managerial implications: Chapter  7 
This dissertation follows these steps. Chapters 2 and 3 presented the 
theoretical grounding and development of my theoretical framework and what I 
expected to see in the data. The remainder of the current Chapter discusses 
steps 1.b. (case selection), 1.c. (data collection design), and step 2 (prepare, 
collect, and analyze) of the plan. 
4.3 Research Context and Case Selection 
I chose to study inter-organizational learning between “enemies” in the 
salmon farming industry in British Columbia. The waterways of British Columbia 
are highly politicized natural resources because of their impact on a host of social 
and economic phenomena, including the habitat of the culturally iconic wild 
salmon and the rights of First Nations. Almost from its inception, the salmon 
farming industry in British Columbia has been widely criticized for its salmon 
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growing practices. Salmon farming3 began in British Columbia in the 1970‟s and 
by the mid 1980s it grew rapidly. The commercial fishing industry, later joined by 
environmentalists, sports fishermen and First Nations, criticized the industry and 
the provincial government4  for what they viewed as the negative impact that 
salmon farming in open net cages5 had on the marine habitat. In particular, they 
were concerned about the possible spread of disease or parasites from farmed to 
wild fish, the possible genetic pollution of wild fish due to escapes of farmed fish, 
the effects of effluent from farms on the marine environment, and the effects on 
marine life of pharmaceuticals used on farmed fish.  
Opposition to the industry gained profile and momentum during the 1990‟s 
and its reputation deteriorated rapidly, as demonstrated by two government 
moratoriums and industry reviews, the passage of strict regulations, increasingly 
negative media coverage, the growing enmity of several First Nations, and 
increasingly sophisticated targeting by environmental groups (see Appendix A: 
Detailed Chronology of Events in the BC Salmon Farming Industry 1970 – 2009  
for summary). 
As a result of consolidation, in 2009 the industry is dominated by two 
Norwegian owned firms: Marine Harvest and Mainstream (Cermaq). For almost a 
decade these firms (and their precursors) have been directly challenged in the 
                                            
3
 Salmon farming, as practiced in BC, consisted of placing juvenile salmon (smolts) into large net 
cages in the ocean, feeding them fish meal for 18 to 24 months until they reached market weight, 
then harvesting and processing them. 
4
 The provincial government granted the fish farming licenses and the ocean tenures to 
companies.  The provincial and the federal government shared regulatory responsibility for the 
coastal area. 
5
 From the earliest days of the debate environmentalists supported growing salmon in closed 
containment systems. The industry claims that technology is not economically or environmentally 
viable. 
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media and the marketplace by the Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform 
(CAAR), originally a coalition of local environmental non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and First Nations6. While there have been instances of 
joint initiatives over the years, the stance of the firms, either directly or through 
the BC Salmon Farmers Association, was typically to deny, dismiss or in some 
way discredit CAAR‟s claims. 
Recently, however, there has been a change in the nature of the interaction 
between Marine Harvest and CAAR. They successfully negotiated the 
Framework for Dialogue (the Framework), an agreement to undertake five joint 
research projects. The two organizations have been interacting under its terms 
since early 2006. The first two projects undertaken under The Framework 
address the two most prominent issues: the impact of sea lice on the marine 
habitat and viability of closed containment systems. By way of contrast, 
Mainstream has made a distinct choice not to undertake joint initiatives with 
CAAR or any other NGOS, although globally the company does joint research 
with various educational and research organizations. This continued divergence 
in strategies, between Marine Harvest and Mainstream, seems to indicate that 
the Framework is not part of the evolution in the industry.  
I chose this particular context and the organizations involved precisely 
because it represents an extreme and unique case of organizations confronting 
conflict over time. This research context is further enriched by contrasting 
strategies adopted by different protagonists. It is very special in the sense of 
allowing me to gain insights that I do not expect other situations and 
                                            
6 
As of 2009 the First Nations had left CAAR. 
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organizations would be able to provide (G. Johnson et al., 2007; Yin, 2009). 
Additionally, by selecting this context of salmon farming in BC I was able to trace 
the inter-organizational dynamics and learning outcomes over time by comparing 
the data that I gathered with a prior data set, which I describe in the section 4.4.2 
Issues in Salmon Farming Data Set. 
Beginning in 2005, I participated in a study investigating issues in the global 
salmon farming industry. My exposure to the situation in BC raised a number of 
questions for me that were unrelated to the original premise of that study. Since 
2005 I have actively followed developments in the industry, in particular via the 
headlines in the daily Intrafish American Newsletter (Norges Handels- og 
Sjofartstidende, n.d.), a division of a Norwegian publishing company. Following 
Siggelkow (2007). I used my knowledge of the situation to motivate my own 
research questions. Then, drawing on the existing literature I developed 
theoretical relationships to describe the conditions and practices of inter-
organizational learning in situations of conflict. I have brought my deep 
understanding of this industry to bear at every stage of the design and 
development of my approach to this research. For example, my real time 
observations over an extended period give me an appreciation for the situation 
that enables me to focus on particular sequences of events rather than on the full 
narrative. The Framework is considered distinctive by all parties. This kind of 
voluntary shift in inter-organizational interaction and apparent learning is rare in 
protracted conflicts, and so I expected it would be an instructive case study of 
inter-organizational learning. According to Yin (2009) the quality of analysis is 
89 
 
 
 
enhanced if a researcher knows the subject matter from previous investigations 
and uses their “own prior expert knowledge” (2009, p. 161). 
In addition, the ability to compare panel data from the first year of the 
Framework to data gathered almost five years later provided an excellent 
opportunity to observe the dynamic evolution of the concepts under study, further 
develop my ideas, adding to the attractiveness of this case as a research context. 
The extended duration and depth of my involvement means my research can 
respond effectively to the repeated calls from senior scholars for more 
longitudinal studies. 
All of these reasons suggested the salmon farming industry in BC, and 
especially the negotiation and implementation of The Framework, as a good 
context for case study research on inter-organizational learning between 
“enemies” (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). 
4.4 Data Characteristics and Data Collection 
4.4.1 Data Characteristics 
The data collected in this research were qualitative. Qualitative data offer 
several strengths, ideally suited to my research questions. The focus is on a 
phenomenon that is naturally occurring, current and situated in the real world, 
and featuring “local groundedness … the data were collected in close proximity to 
a specific situation” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 10). The qualitative data enable 
thick descriptions and provide richness and offer potential to reveal complex 
processes. Also qualitative data are usually, and in this case actually were 
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collected over a sustained period, offering the opportunity to understand 
processes and probable causality (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
The internal validity of qualitative data is enhanced through triangulation, 
using multiple sources and types of data (Jick, 1979; Yin, 2009). This research 
benefited from all of these factors (See Table 4-1: Data Collection Sources). Data 
included newspaper articles, interview transcripts, company documents, 
websites, government and third party reports, and notes on observations. Equally 
important, the validity of the data benefited from my prolonged exposure to this 
industry, as I was able to triangulate against my own deep understanding of the 
research context developed over five years of observing it from a social science 
researcher‟s perspective. Because the salmon farming industry was and 
continues to be such a controversial topic in British Columbia, and because the 
issues were very intense and public, a significant amount and variety of public 
data is available. Moreover, members and observers of the industry showed a 
genuine interest in participating in this research, until a federal judicial inquiry was 
initiated in the fall of 2009. 
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Table 4-1: Data Collection Sources 
Archival Data Interviews Direct Observation 
Newspaper articles 
Websites 
Company documents (i.e. 
annual reports) 
Government and third 
party reports 
Individuals from the 
industry and the 
environmentalist 
community 
Multiple levels within 
each key organization 
Other stakeholders 
impacted by the conflict 
laden issues 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Facility and farm tours 
Interaction between 
parties and suppliers, 
local community or other 
stakeholders 
Visits to retail sites and 
hatcheries and salmon 
rivers 
 
4.4.2 Issues in Salmon Farming Data Set 
As mentioned previously, from 2005 to 2007 I actively participated in a study 
of social and strategic issues in the context of the global salmon farming industry. 
The data gathered for that study included a wide range of information on the 
perspectives of all of the key firms and relevant stakeholder groups as they relate 
to issues facing the industry. The data have not yet been analyzed for that 
ongoing research project, the scope of which has recently been expanded to 
include all major salmon farming jurisdictions. Given that, I have, with the 
permission of the lead researcher on that study, used the portion of that data set 
relating to the salmon farming industry in BC as the starting point for my analysis 
and data gathering. 
The data set includes 24 interviews, averaging 90 minutes in length, with a 
total of 28 people, comprising: executives of salmon farming companies; 
managers and members of environmental organizations and First Nations; 
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government officials; industry associations; and scientists/academics. I 
conducted 16 interviews, alone or with the lead researcher, speaking to 20 
people. In addition, I visited the Head Offices of both major global salmon farming 
companies and an international salmon farming association, and viewed salmon 
farms in Norway. We conducted the interviews, which were taped and transcribed 
by an independent transcription service, between December 2005 and 
September 2007 (see Table 4-2: Interviewees for the final roster and additional 
details of the interviewees). In all cases, we asked respondents open ended 
questions that allowed them to relate their stories of how particular situations and 
issues had evolved. Although we had created an interview protocol to steer the 
conversation (see Appendix B:  Interview Protocol 2005, 2006, 2007), often we 
did not strictly follow the guide to permit us to pursue respondents‟ tangential 
avenues of interest, as recommended by Rubin and Rubin (2005). The open-
ended nature of the interviews makes them amenable to analysis from a range of 
perspectives and therefore appropriate for inclusion in this dissertation. 
This prior data set also included a database of company, government, and 
stakeholder documents, and 821 newspaper articles that deal with aquaculture 
and salmon farming issues in BC, published between 1985 and 2007 in the 
Globe and Mail, the Vancouver Sun or the Victoria Times Colonist. 
4.4.3 Data Collection 
Following Yin‟s (2009) recommendation, my research strategy involved 
collecting and analyzing information from multiple sources, in my case interview 
transcripts, notes on observations, and archival data, aimed at corroborating the 
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same phenomenon. The data were collected in two phases. In the first phase, I 
collected recent media reports, government reports and archival material to 
update and expand the prior data set. These materials were then summarized, 
and an initial analysis was done, prior to going to the field. During the second 
phase I conducted semi-structured interviews with industry participants and 
observers. I spoke with key personnel within the organizations in the BC salmon 
farming industry, particularly those involved with the Framework, and visited their 
sites. These activities occurred from July to December 2009 following receipt of 
approval by the University of Western Ontario‟s Ethics Committee (Appendix C:  
Ethics Approval of Research Design). I will now describe each phase in more 
detail. 
Phase 1: I collected and analyzed archival data, including company 
documents, annual reports, newspaper articles, government reports and scientific 
research reports. I did this in order to understand the events surrounding the 
industry, the organizations‟ interaction with each other, and to observe industry 
participants‟ interpretations of the conflict, their learning, their identities and their 
and others‟ behaviour. 
I drew newspaper articles from the entire set of articles between January 
2007 and November 2009 in the Vancouver Sun, the Victoria Times Colonist, and 
the Globe and Mail, in order to update the existing data set. Subject search terms 
included “salmon farming”, “fish farming” and “aquaculture”. There were 265 
articles. Each article was thoroughly examined for information and the 
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perceptions of any parties relevant to my analysis7 (salmon farming industry 
members, environmentalists, First Nations, government, scientists etc.). Each 
article that was deemed to contain relevant content was summarized, arranged 
chronologically, and entered into the appropriate “bin” in NVivo 8 along with the 
more than 800 relevant articles published by the same newspapers prior to 
January 2007. 
In 2007 more than 3 years work by two separate government-appointed 
groups culminated in their much anticipated final reports and recommendations.  
From the Province of British Columbia website I was able to obtain a copy of the 
Report of the Special Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture (2007), the output 
of the most recent review conducted by the Legislative assembly of British 
Columbia. I obtained the British Columbia Salmon Forum Final Report and 
Recommendations (“BC Salmon Forum: Final Report and Recommendations to 
the Government of British Columbia,” 2009) , an independent body appointed by 
the Premier of British Columbia, from its website. These were combined with the 
government and third party reports in the existing data set and stored in the 
project files. Annual reports and company documents were accessed via 
company websites. 
In this research, where only a limited number of individuals were directly 
involved with the phenomena, the archival data was important because it helped 
to augment and verify interviewees‟ retrospective memories. In addition, reporting 
on one‟s own behaviour can be a difficult cognitive task, as one has to 
                                            
7
 Parties were considered relevant to the extent that they were a normal part of the organizational 
field, that is they interacted regularly with other field members regarding the issue domain 
(Hoffman, 1999). 
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understand the question, then recall relevant behaviour, and construct an 
answer, all the while editing it for social desirability, either consciously, or 
unconsciously (Schwarz & Oyserman, 2001). Additionally, particularly in 
situations of conflict, interviewees‟ answers can be profoundly influenced by 
questions, wording, format, and context, making triangulation from a variety of 
sources even more critical. My layered understanding and deep appreciation of 
the issues in the industry was especially crucial in this regard. 
In addition to the pre-interview archival data collection and updating of the 
existing data set from organizations‟ and government websites, data were also 
gathered on an opportunistic basis during the interviewing and site visit phase. 
Phase 2: In the second phase of data collection I combined interviewing 
with observation techniques in order to understand the behaviour, activities, and 
practices related to conflict, identity, and learning. I began by identifying key 
people to be interviewed. I compiled an initial list of potential interviewees using 
the Briefings Witness List from the Report of the Special Committee on 
Sustainable Aquaculture (2007, p. 51). I then cross referenced this with the list of 
interviewees from the existing data set. I focused on individuals that had acted as 
witnesses on behalf of Marine Harvest, CAAR, Mainstream and other issue-
related groups in the BC salmon farming industry, namely First Nations 
communities, other environmental groups, government, local suppliers to the 
industry, industry associations, and academics. A number of individuals at the 
key organizations such as Marine Harvest, CAAR, and the industry association 
were the same individuals that were interviewed in 2006 and 2007. 
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I first approached all potential interviewees via an e-mail which contained a 
short description of my research objectives, my methods, the potential benefits 
for the organization and individual, and the extent of their involvement should 
they agree to participate (see Appendix D: Note sent to Potential Participants). To 
cover all aspects of the proposed study I carefully maintained a balance of levels 
and organizational affiliations. Previous research on inter-organizational 
relationships has been criticized for over reliance on single respondents (Kumar, 
Stern, & J. Anderson, 1993). Hence, I held interviews with a range of people 
directly involved with the conflict and also with interested observers. I asked 
interviewees to provide additional references to expand the list in a network 
fashion. I strove for saturation by gathering data from as wide a variety of 
respondents as possible and as completely as possible to ensure that I fully 
understood the behaviours related to the relevant issues (G. Johnson et al., 
2007). I followed up with a phone call to provide more information and to set up a 
time to meet. In several cases the recipient of the e -mail forwarded it to a more 
appropriate person in their organization or recommended another individual 
during the follow-up phone call. See Table 4-2: Interviewees, below, for the final 
roster and additional details of interviewees. 
Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees at the beginning of 
every interview or workplace observation, using a consent form according to the 
University of Western Ontario‟s (2002) ethical guidelines (See Appendix E: Letter 
of Introduction & Informed Consent Form). Also at the beginning of each 
interview, I orally confirmed the expected time commitment and information 
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requirements, that respondents could choose not to answer any specific 
question, and that they could decline to participate further at any point. 
While individual retrospective interviews can be influenced by memory 
failure and attribution biases, they have been long established as an acceptable 
case study research tool (Yin, 2009). In this study retrospective narratives and 
self reports were important for determining how individuals identify themselves 
and their organizations, to understand how their behaviours were affected by 
their individual and organizational identities, and how identities were affected by 
inter-organizational interaction, and for finding out where and how new 
behaviours developed. 
To mitigate memory distortions I encouraged interviewees to provide a 
descriptive account focusing on the “what, when, and who” of actions to 
emphasize praxis (i.e. what they did). I de-emphasized my own or possible prior 
theories of “why” as I intended to extract that from the stories they told. To check 
for attribution bias, I compared statements to information in the media reports and 
reports from other respondents, and against my own knowledge of the situation. 
The semi-structured interviews were designed to follow from my research 
questions “How does an organization learn from another organization with which 
it is in conflict?” and “What is the role of identity in this learning?” In order to 
access information about elements in my model I grouped my questions around 
the major constructs; individual identity, organizational identity, learning, conflict, 
and activities related to inter-organizational interaction (see Appendix F:  
Interview Protocol 2009). In order to access both the praxis and the practices 
related to learning, identity and conflict, I used ethnographic interviewing 
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techniques and employed a mixture of what Spradley (1979) describes as grand 
tour and mini-tour questions, asking for more detail about how particular events 
raised by the respondent unfolded. Also following Spradley‟s recommendation, I 
asked for examples and paid particular attention to verifying the meanings 
attached to words and experiences. In particular I asked for stories that illustrated 
a point made by the interviewee. In all situations I was mindful to ask my 
questions in a way that the person could tell me the story, without telling me what 
I wanted to hear (C. Gersick, personal communication, 2010). 
Table 4-2: Interviewees 
Organization Level of 
Interviewee 
Interviews 
2005-2007 
Interviews 
2009 *same 
individual as 
in 05-07 
Marine Harvest 
(includes predecessor 
companies Stolt, 
Nutreco, PanFish) 
Corporate Executive 
Corporate manager 
Executive team 
(Canada) 
Sr. Manager 
Manager - site 
2 
1 
1 
 
2 
 
 
 
1* 
 
1*, 1 
1 
CAAR Organization Leader 
Member/Campaigner 
3 
3 
1*, 1 
Other 
environmentalists 
Regional Manager 
Area Manager 
 
 
1 
1 
First Nation Manager 1 1*, 1 
Government Provincial 
Federal 
1 
2 
1* 
1* 
Industry Associations Executive Director 2 1* 
Academic/Scientist Marine Biologists 2 1* 
Suppliers Service Providers  1 2 
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Organization Level of 
Interviewee 
Interviews 
2005-2007 
Interviews 
2009 *same 
individual as 
in 05-07 
Equipment Suppliers 1 1 
Industry Observers Community 
Members 
1 1 
Mainstream Corporate Executive 
Corporate Manager 
Sr. Mgr (Canada) 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
1 
Total Interviewees  28 19 
 
With the permission of the interviewees, I recorded all the interviews, with 
one exception and they were all transcribed by a third party. Two interviews were 
conducted and recorded by telephone, and all others in person. Transcripts were 
shared with a number of interviewees for verification. My individual interviews 
lasted between 50 and 150 minutes. Direct observation took place by way of 
accompanying Marine Harvest personnel and external stakeholders on a 5 hour 
farm tour; touring a pilot closed containment site; visiting the local BC offices of 
all key organizations; visiting retail locations; and visiting two salmon hatcheries 
and several salmon rivers during the fall 2009 Pink salmon and Chinook salmon 
runs. I created a case data base organizing the archival data, observations and 
transcripts into “bins” as recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) (See 
Table 4-3: High Level Data Structure). 
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Table 4-3: High Level Data Structure 
Time 
Period 
Prior to 2005 Late 2005- 
early 2007 
2007-2008 2009-2010 
 
 
Data 
sources 
 Interviews  Interviews 
Observations Observations 
Documents & Newspaper Articles 
 
 
All data and information has been kept strictly confidential. I have preserved 
confidentiality by using codes for identities in the database and interview 
transcripts, and by using pseudonyms in this dissertation as recommended by 
Pettigrew (1990). I have respected all interviewee requests to keep background 
information confidential and I have given due consideration to all of the 
respondent commentary that I received on my interpretation of the data. This has 
been particularly relevant as most of the respondents are located in the same 
geographic area, are aware of each other, and were understandably curious 
about each others‟ responses. This “external” control motivated me to maintain 
the highest standard of research ethics at all times. At the end of the study the 
results will be presented to the key respondents. 
4.5 Data Analysis 
4.5.1 Overview of Analytic Strategy 
Data analysis consisted of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence to address the initial premises of this research (Yin, 
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2009). In order to produce compelling analytical conclusions and rule out 
alternative interpretations I relied on accepted techniques for qualitative research 
(Corbin & A. L. Strauss, 2008; Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997; Miles & Huberman, 
1994; Yin, 2009). As Yin (2009) suggests, I used my research questions and 
premises to guide my analysis. The questions and premises shaped the data 
collection process and thus gave direction to the relevant analytical strategies. 
Given the explanatory nature of this research, the analytical techniques that I 
used are pattern matching, explanation building, and time series analysis (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2009). 
Pattern- matching logic compares an empirically based pattern with a 
theoretically predicted one. If the pattern coincides, the results help to strengthen 
the validity of the case study (Yin, 2009). In a single case study it is important to 
use the same data to rule out possible alternative explanations (i.e. threats to 
internal validity). Pattern matching is not a precise science and therefore I looked 
for “gross matches and mismatches” as per Yin‟s suggestion (2009, p. 141). 
Explanation building is another technique that I used in this study. As 
explained at the outset of Chapter 3, the practice based view attempts to provide 
the micro-level explanation for the macro-level assertions made by, in this case, 
organization learning theory, and organizational identity theory. An explanation is 
a stipulation of causal links between concepts. These stipulations were offered in 
Chapter 3 in the form of premises in support of a model. Therefore the key 
activity in this research is providing the data based evidence to support or reject 
these premises (causal links). According to Yin (2009) the explanation building in 
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a case study proceeds as a set of ideas that are revised and augmented and the 
final explanation is a result of a series of iterations: 
 An initial theoretical statement, in this case my model, is made about the 
social behaviour under study; 
 The findings of the case are compared against the model; 
 The model is revised; 
 The details of the case are compared against the revision; and 
 The theoretical statement or model is revised again; and compared to 
other cases, in this circumstance, in future research. 
In this sense the final explanation may not be fully stipulated at the outset of 
the study, but rather case study evidence is examined, theoretical positions are 
refined and the evidence is examined again from the new perspective.  Thus 
explanation building is a “special” iterative case of pattern matching (Yin, 2009, p. 
141). 
Finally, I conducted a time series analysis in order to follow the many 
patterns of behaviour suggested by my model. According to Yin, the more 
intricate the pattern, the more that the time series analysis will lay a “firm 
foundation for the conclusion of the study” (1989, p. 115). This analysis allowed 
me to examine “how” and “why” questions about the relationships of my key 
constructs as described by my premises. In this dissertation I suggest that inter-
organizational learning begins when practices associated with individual identities 
bridge across identity conflict allowing a shift in emphasis to the more functional 
socio-cognitive aspects of a conflict, without resolving the underlying conflict of 
interest. My time series analysis begins with the events leading to the first direct 
(in-person) engagement between salmon farmers and environmentalists in 
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February 2003 and traces the patterns in identity, learning outcomes, and conflict 
to November 2009 when a federal judicial inquiry into the Fraser River salmon 
run was announced. 
4.5.2 Preliminary Analysis 
As suggested by Langley (1999) and Yin (2009) and outlined below, my 
research analysis proceeded in multiple iterations as my data gathering 
progressed. Consistent with Langley‟s (1999) recommendations for process 
research, I took multiple approaches to the analysis. In the first stage, prior to 
conducting my interviews, I constructed chronological lists of key events, 
activities and interpretations of them, composed of ordered raw data (quotes from 
interviews, newspaper articles, documents and field notes) (See Appendix A: 
Detailed Chronology of Events in the BC Salmon Farming Industry, for a 
summary). I further sorted these data by organization and other meaningful 
categories such as industry and environmentalists. From this I composed a 37 
page narrative as the first level of abstraction from the data. This narrative 
highlighted the importance of relatively recent events to my research questions, 
in particular the ascent and dominance of two issues, sea lice and closed 
containment farming, and the subsequent negotiation and implementation of the 
Framework. 
My model stipulates that individual and organizational identities are 
associated with learning so I went to the existing data to verify this. Focusing on 
the two largest salmon farming companies, Marine Harvest and Mainstream, and 
the environmental group, CAAR, I used self referential statements to categorize 
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identity at both the individual and organizational levels. This analysis yielded 
descriptions of the organizational identities as well as individual identities (see 
Appendix G: Preliminary Analysis of Individual and Organizational Identities in the 
Industry). I then developed a narrative describing the development and 
implementation of the Framework up to 2007. 
I then identified organizational learning activities and outcomes that had 
occurred from the late 1990s to 2007, drawing primarily on the interview 
transcripts in the existing data set.  Again focusing on Marine Harvest, 
Mainstream, and CAAR, I used two indicators to identify learning outcomes: (1) 
evidence of changes to participant‟s existing knowledge about the situation or 
about the other parties; and (2) evidence of changes to participants‟ patterns of 
relating to each other and to other industry participants. Using the learning 
literature as a guide, learning practices were identified as activities that supported 
changes to either knowledge or behaviour (See Appendix H: Preliminary Analysis 
of Learning Activities and Outcomes).This analysis formed the foundation for my 
second stage of data gathering and analysis. 
As suggested by Glaser & Strauss (1967), I overlapped data analysis and 
data collection, making the data collection itself more flexible and rigorous. I kept 
field notes and a learning journal and I recorded my ongoing impressions in my 
learning journal as they occurred to me (Eisenhardt, 1989). I continually asked 
myself “what is happening here?‟ and “how does this differ from other 
responses?”. This helped me to speculate about emerging patterns and 
relationships and to identify significant topics, patterns, themes, logical 
inconsistencies and areas that need further exploration with respondents (Stiles, 
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1993). In particular I was looking for evidence that identity had been activated, 
with comments such as “we were looking for a new approach to the problem”. I 
was also looking for evidence of links between my main constructs; such as 
“when I put my science hat on I ...” which links an identity to an action. Because I 
took a flexible approach to collecting data I was able to add data sources and 
interview questions to probe emerging themes while following an overall 
theoretical framework proposed in this thesis. 
4.5.3 Data Coding 
At the conclusion of my data gathering all data was analyzed using an initial 
list of codes reflecting the constructs of the theoretical model I proposed in 
Chapter 3. All data coding was done using NVivo 8, including the initial 
categorization of the existing data set discussed in the preceding section. 
Organizations and respondents were coded into “cases”, components of the 
theoretical model were coded into “nodes”, the predicted relationships between 
the components, described by my premises, were coded into “relationships” and 
secondary data were coded into separate “free nodes”. The complete list of 
cases, nodes, and relationships is in Appendix I: Complete list of Final Nodes, 
Cases, and Relationships. 
“Nodes” represent the meta-constructs: conflict, learning, and identity. Each 
meta-construct includes the sub-constructs: individual and organizational or 
collective level. In addition, the conflict, learning, and identity meta-constructs 
include corresponding sub-constructs drawn from the prior literature and 
developed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  
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I began coding by reading and re-reading the interview transcripts and 
listening to the recordings and comparing them with the constructs and premises 
presented in Chapters 2 and 3. I was looking for patterns and recurrent themes, 
as per the pattern matching technique described above. As I worked through the 
transcripts I was capturing my thoughts and ideas in notes and memos in NVivo. 
I coded the data into preliminary sub-categories (Corbin & A. L. Strauss, 
2008) retaining all sub-categories proposed by my model. As themes emerged 
that had not been specified in my theoretical model I added nodes. These 
emergent nodes formed the basis for refinement and augmentation of my model, 
as discussed above. After coding was complete I proceeded with data mapping 
and analysis. 
4.5.4 Data Mapping 
I analyzed the data within “cases” and across “cases” to obtain a common 
pattern seen through multiple lenses (Eisenhardt, 1989). I did the data mapping 
and analysis in three stages. First, I identified and mapped the codified data for 
all organizations onto the conceptual model described in Chapter 3. In particular I 
looked for themes relating the major constructs of organizational identity, 
individual identities, conflict sources, individual learning, organizational learning, 
and inter-organizational learning. I also sought to further refine the set of 
contextual factors (i.e. conditions) that were found to be important and that had 
changed. I focused first on the constructs (i.e. the nouns) and then examined the 
processes and activities (i.e. the verbs) identified in my premises (C. Gersick, 
personal communication, 2010). 
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Second, I conducted an analysis of the organizations involved with the 
Framework by developing a set of narratives based on the learning constructs 
that provided the background about the organizations‟ learning activities and 
learning outcomes over time (See Appendix J: Learning Activities and Outcomes 
over Time). The purpose was to become intimately familiar with each 
organization to allow the unique patterns of each organization to emerge before 
analyzing the interactions. Two overarching learning trajectories emerged from 
this analysis: learning that impacted internal operations and learning that 
impacted inter-organizational relationships. These learning trajectories were 
further analyzed and sorted into time periods according to key strategic 
responses (i.e. extent of engagement) or a discernible shift in manager behaviour 
(Jarzabkowski, 2008). These narratives served as context for a higher order 
analysis related to my second research question regarding “how” organizations in 
conflict learn from one another. 
In the third stage, I focused on answering the research questions and 
refining my model by identifying conditions and activities that enabled 
organizations to bridge across conflict and tracing the relationship to inter-
organizational learning. Subsequent to identifying the time periods, I examined 
patterns in the relationships between the different constructs (Trochim, 1989). 
This analysis confirmed that under certain conditions common practices can help 
individuals interact despite conflict and that repeated engagement mediates the 
relationship between conflict and inter-organizational learning. To access 
practices and praxis and conduct this analysis required the use of analytical tools 
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amenable to the theoretical lens of the practice based view. I will describe them 
and my analytic process in the following two sections. 
4.5.5 Mapping of Statements into Practice and Praxis 
As described above, practice represents shared routines of behaviour, 
norms, procedures and artifacts, and can be considered as the product of 
learning (Crossan et al., 1999; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Gherardi, 2009). 
Practices are carried out within a framework of procedures and expectations; 
however the particular actions taken (praxis) are to some extent novel (Feldman 
& Pentland, 2003). Praxis refers to the actual activities that make up, in this case, 
the process of learning and may be operationalized at different levels and 
through interactions between levels (Jarzabkowski et al., 2007).  
It is inter-organizational learning practices that are often obtained in 
quantitative surveys, usually divorced from their context. This research attempted 
to uncover the actual activities or praxis supporting inter-organizational learning 
in a particular context (i.e. conflict) using qualitative methods. Ideally, actual inter-
organizational learning activities would be accessed through ethnographic 
methods, such as meeting observations (Yin, 2009) and methods specific to the 
practice based view (Balogun, A. S. Huff, & P. Johnson, 2003). Since the limited 
scope and duration of the doctoral dissertation process and the contentious 
nature of the topic prevented me from collecting large amounts of observational 
data, I employed additional analytic techniques to distil practice from the 
respondents‟ statements during interviews. 
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As discussed, I did, to the fullest extent possible, encourage my 
respondents to support their statements with “stories” as recommended in 
ethnographic interviewing (Spradley, 1979). Prior research has identified several 
aspects of a narrative or “story” which would serve as evidence that events did in 
fact take place (Auerbach, Trask, & Said, 1953). Details such as dates and 
quantities, and references to specific external events are the main signs. In 
addition Auberbach et al. (1953) distinguished between a “legend” and a 
“historical account”.  “A historical event … runs much more variously, 
contradictorily, and confusedly”, while the “legend arranges its material in a 
simple straightforward way” (Auerbach et al., 1953, pp. 19-20). In this context an 
organization‟s learning regarding the practices of engagement with the enemy 
would be recounted as “legend” whereas actual activities will sound more like 
“historical accounts” with details, dates, characters, and disrupted flows. 
Therefore to separate interview statements into practice (the product of learning) 
and praxis (actual behavior, i.e. the activities that make up the process of 
learning) I employed the following linguistic distinction (Zona, 2009). 
The practice constructs were assessed based primarily on the answers to 
general, normative, or open questions such as “How would you describe your 
organization‟s actions in response to conflict?” or “Describe how your 
organizations work together?” The praxis constructs were assessed based 
primarily in the evidential statements in response to questions such as “Can you 
give me an example that illustrates what you mean by that?” or “Where does it 
take place?” In addition, artifacts, including newspaper articles, government 
reviews, and annual reports, were examined for evidence of both practices 
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(institutionalized behaviour) and praxis (actual events). While my field work fell 
short of full length ethnography, these analysis techniques combined with the 
ethnographic interview techniques enabled me to distil a proxy of praxis in 
support of inter-organizational learning from the interview data. 
4.5.6 Role and Assessment of Activities 
According to the practice based view (Whittington, 2006) organizational 
learning (practice) becomes enacted (praxis) as a result of the activities that 
practitioners perform. These activities in turn have an impact on practice and on 
the practitioner (See Figure 3-1: A Framework for Analyzing Inter-Organizational 
Learning as Practice). I argue that understanding the activities that individuals 
enact when engaged, despite their conflict, can help us ascertain those activities 
that support inter-organizational learning more generally. 
To assess activities through which participants enact learning practices they 
were asked specifics about “How they worked together?” and “What they did in 
response to conflict?” for example. Although the assessments represent 
individual perceptions and not precise measures of such activities their relative 
frequency may serve as an approximation of their use and its shifts over repeated 
interaction. 
Following my data analysis relative to my proposed model, I coded patterns 
of manager and organizational behaviour related to identity or to conflict during 
each of the relevant time periods (determined in stage two) using a data 
reduction process (Corbin & A. L. Strauss, 2008). This process is often used by 
qualitative researchers (e.g. Maitlis, 2005) to move from descriptive codes to 
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more conceptually abstract codes. I generated codes describing what managers 
and the organizations did during the various time periods such as defending their 
position, attacking the other organization, sharing information, assessing risk, 
articulating needs, gathering information, negotiating process and so on. I then 
reduced these descriptive codes to interpretive clusters (Miles & Huberman, 
1994) according to whether they were similar or different in nature and intention. 
To do this I followed Jarzabkowski (2008) and asked myself two questions. “Is 
this code similar to that code?” helped in developing internally consistent clusters. 
“Are theses codes different from those codes?” helped in ensuring the clusters 
were distinct. The clusters were general in that each one appeared in multiple 
time periods and therefore indicated behaviour that could occur in any time 
period. 
I developed three main clusters which seemed to emerge sequentially. The 
first one involved a detachment or separation from aspects of the conflict or of 
their identities that were both problematic and fixed, such as shifting focus away 
from the conflict in values between salmon farming companies and 
environmentalists and toward their common knowledge gap (i.e. the impact of 
sea lice). I labeled this behaviour distancing to describe what both individual 
managers and organizations were doing prior and during engagement with each 
other. The second cluster, involved a matching of individuals and groups based 
on those aspects of their respective identities that were compatible particularly 
from a work practice or skill perspective. In this case, scientists were assigned to 
design and manage research projects and conflict professionals such as 
consultants and negotiators were tasked with managing the day to day 
112 
 
 
 
relationship as well as any non-science conflicts that emerged in the projects. I 
labeled this behaviour pairing to describe how individual practitioners engage. 
The third cluster dealt with setting the rules for a specific engagement, such as a 
research project, and involved negotiating both the procedures and the nature of 
the interaction using the language and protocols according to the compatible 
identities that had been paired for the engagement. I labeled this cluster rule 
setting. 
Finally, I compared the patterns in the nature of the interactions and the 
conflict over the same time periods. In the period under study I identified three 
cycles of distancing, pairing, and rule setting culminating in an experiment, 
overall reduction in targeting in the media, and an increase in the extent of 
experimentation. These patterns were not anticipated by my model but rather 
emerged from the data. 
4.6 Validity and Reliability 
To ensure quality, empirical research needs to demonstrate the requisite 
standards of validity and reliability for the methodology used. In qualitative 
research, the quality or threshold of acceptability is ensured by maintaining 
adequate standards for the research process itself. In particular, establishing 
reliability and validity in case studies requires careful attention to the stages of 
design, data collection and analysis (Yin, 2009). In this case study, I have relied 
on Yin‟s perspective on standards for validity and reliability (2009, p. 41). Yin‟s 
standards are widely used in academic research involving case studies and are 
well respected. Reliability is established by providing a data trail through a well-
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organized case database. All relevant archival material has been scanned, and 
with transcripts and notes, imported into an NVivo database. The intent is to 
produce a dataset that would permit another researcher to duplicate the analysis. 
Internal validity is established by the pattern-matching and explanation-
building steps of the data analysis, supported by a reflective learning journal and 
memos detailing the insights and relationships as they emerge from the data. 
Part of this effort is identifying and eliminating alternative explanations that might 
disconfirm emerging theoretical insights. As discussed previously, construct 
validity of the findings is established by using multiple sources of data wherever 
possible to triangulate; and by referring back to the chain of evidence in the 
database. In addition, key participants from the organizations were asked to 
review and comment on whether the findings are consistent with their view of 
their behaviours. In addition, I reviewed my findings with an uninvolved 
experienced researcher familiar with the industry and methods used.  Finally, the 
analytic generalizability of the findings to inter-organizational learning, conflict, 
and identity theories is articulated (Yin, 2009, p. 43). 
The reflective learning journal and notes are a key element of the data trail. I 
made notes and impressions to augment transcripts immediately following every 
meeting or discussion, and I reviewed recordings and notes together at the end 
of the day. My learning journal was kept in One Note and imported into NVivo. 
As described in this section, I used multiple data-gathering approaches to 
support and triangulate the findings. Interviews were the primary source of data, 
while newspaper articles and government and third party documents were 
important for understanding the context, issues and background of the 
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interviewees, and gaining alternative perspectives. As I analyzed the interviews, I 
consulted my field notes and the documents for additional confirmation of my 
findings. I was able to build the reliability and integrity of my data analysis by 
combining and triangulating these sources (Jick, 1979; Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Table 4-4: Study Validity and Reliability summarizes the steps that I have taken 
to ensure this dissertation‟s accuracy, replicability, and generalizability.
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Table 4-4: Study Validity and Reliability 
Standard Measures to be used in Case Method This Dissertation 
Construct validity Use multiple sources of evidence to achieve 
triangulation 
 
Establish chain of evidence 
 
 
Have key informants review draft case study 
report 
Used media reports, interviews, 
observations, archival data and third party 
reports. 
This chapter outlines the path taken from the 
initial research questions to the case study 
conclusions. Sources of evidence cited in 
Table 4.1. 
Preliminary findings were discussed with 
some respondents and conclusions were 
shared with key contacts. 
Internal Validity Do pattern matching 
Do explanation building 
Address rival explanation 
Do time series analysis 
Patterns were identified and matched over 
subsequent time periods. From this 
explanations were developed and compared 
to rival explanations as described in Chapter 
5. 
External validity Analytic generalization in single case studies  Findings are generalized to broader inter-
organizational learning theory in Chapter 6 
Reliability Develop case study database 
 
 
Establish chain of evidence 
The database was developed and is 
comprised of interview transcripts, media 
reports, third party reports, and other case 
study documents, summary reports. 
See above 
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS 
My model suggests that under certain conditions the identities and learning 
of the individuals engaged over a conflict and the identity and learning of their 
respective organizations will interact, impacting their behaviour and their inter-
organizational learning. Previous research has independently identified 
relationships between identity and conflict, conflict and learning, and learning and 
identity as well as several contextual factors that promote inter-organizational 
learning. In this research I examine these relationships within a context of an 
ongoing conflict to determine the role that identity plays in inter-organizational 
learning, across the individual and collective levels. In addition, I analyze the 
dynamics of these relationships over time to explain the social processes through 
which inter-organizational learning occurs and the conditions that favour its 
occurrence.  This chapter provides an overview of the findings of my research. 
The data are presented to refine, confirm, and challenge the five premises on 
which my model is based, and to illustrate its constructs and relationships with 
concrete empirical examples (Lawrence, 1999). I begin with an overview of the 
case study. 
5.1 The Case Study 
I studied the relationship between identity, conflict, and learning by 
examining an extreme case of learning between “enemies” in the salmon farming 
industry in British Columbia, Canada (BC). The industry was plagued with 
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conflict, reflected in government industry reviews, passage of strict regulations, 
increasingly negative media coverage, growing enmity of several First Nations, 
and increasingly sophisticated attacks by environmentalists, especially the 
Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform (CAAR). The typical response of the 
salmon farming companies, i.e., the industry norm, was to deny, dismiss or in 
some way discredit their critics and in particular CAAR‟s claims and to position 
themselves as economic saviours of coastal communities. 
By 2000 the industry was dominated by larger foreign owned firms, Stolt 
Sea Farms (Stolt), PanFish, Mainstream, and Marine Harvest. Marine Harvest, in 
contrast to the low profile adopted by Cermaq ASA and the other major firms, 
referred to itself as a socially responsible company and had publicized the extent 
of its investment in BC. This was consistent with the collaborative and 
environmentally responsible identity of its Dutch parent company, Nutreco. As 
Heikki a Nutreco corporate manager said “Dialogue is important to build trust ... 
you can only find a solution when you put different people with different 
backgrounds and different views of the world together... not the different 
disciplines within one company, but the NGOs and the government 
representatives and the scientists”. 
Stolt, a Norwegian firm and the largest salmon farming company globally, 
was described by managers as an accountable, ethical, private company 
engaged in “cooperative research and development on ecosystem principles” and 
in its 2003 annual report committed “to follow our own conscience and set our 
own high standards”. As one manager observed “Stolt was quieter … had a very 
118 
 
 
high level of accountability, very good ethics and very profitable … but no so out 
there and not so much into the social issues”. 
Members of CAAR describe the organization as a cooperative, logical, 
strategic organization, typified by this comment by Donna a CAAR leader, “We 
got together into a group and said, ... we have to make the sum greater than the 
individual parts... by having everybody pool all their information and work 
collaboratively we‟re able to take it (sea lice) ...  to being one of the most 
prominent environmental issues in BC”. In describing how CAAR develops a 
position, Harry (a senior CAAR member) said “it has to be based on science and 
it has to be rational and you can use a million different tactics to deliver that 
message, some people use irrational tactics but the message can still be 
rational.” 
These key organizations in the BC salmon farming industry all identified with 
deutero-learning processes (Schon, 1986) such as scientific research and 
development, and collaboration; this was evident in their public and private 
statements as well as in their behaviour. All organizations, including CAAR, 
participated in joint research initiatives with university and independent research 
institutes. All shared the common goal of identifying ways to make salmon 
farming more sustainable: the companies from a fish health and profitability 
perspective and CAAR from the perspective of minimizing damage to the marine 
environment. 
Over time, primarily as a result of actions by CAAR members, conflict over 
one issue came to dominate interactions between the salmon farming companies 
and their critics – the extent to which salmon farms amplified the affects of sea 
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lice on wild salmon. Each side of the debate supported their position with 
“science” and all claimed to be acting in the interest of marine habitat protection 
(Young & Matthews, 2010). In June 2004, under the threat of reactive and 
probably punitive regulation, two senior Stolt managers in Canada, both marine 
biologists by training, took action and hired a consultant to contact CAAR to 
negotiate an information sharing agreement. The Stolt managers were motivated 
to ensure forthcoming regulation was fair and supported by good research. This 
was a significant departure from industry and company norms, for while Stolt 
actively participated in collaborative research projects with universities and 
research institutes, it had not worked directly with environmental groups before 
anywhere in the world. Colin, one of the Stolt managers, described the intent of 
the initial contact as, “let‟s learn together, let‟s share information, let‟s be as 
transparent as we can be within the context of business and let‟s let the science 
complete its work so that we‟re basing any policy decision on good solid science.” 
Stolt‟s offer of greater transparency gave CAAR access to information 
hitherto unavailable to environmentalists. While CAAR members acknowledged 
Stolt‟s self interest in approaching them, they also recognized an opportunity to 
gain access to proprietary knowledge of salmon farming that might be used to 
advance their agenda. Harry, the head of CAAR‟s science committee, and an 
ecologist by training, describes CAAR‟s motivation to “hopefully pinpoint some 
common understandings around lack of information and embark on some 
increased level of analysis and some pure science work that would inform the 
debate.” 
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Stolt and CAAR agreed to share the cost of a professional mediator to 
facilitate their interactions, thus demonstrating their commitment to the process. 
With discussions proceeding in private, Stolt began posting sea-lice and water 
quality data on its web-site as “an educational opportunity for both researchers 
and the general public”, providing further evidence of their commitment to new 
behaviour. When Marine Harvest purchased Stolt in 2005, the private talks 
continued, culminating in the “Framework for Dialogue” agreement in January 
2006. (See Appendix K: Summary of the Framework for Dialogue) 
The individuals involved in developing The Framework possessed a range 
of common social and role identities, biologists predominantly, but also coastal 
community residents and environmental issue consultants. Each possessed a 
“repertoire of selves” but most importantly they were able to coalesce around the 
identity of “scientist” interested in protecting the marine habitat for salmon in BC. 
While this identity had hitherto differentiated them, the identity discrepant 
feedback from escalating environmentalist attacks, threats of punitive regulation, 
along with the acquisition by an organization identified with collaboration, created 
the organizational identity instability necessary for the Marine Harvest/Stolt 
representatives to activate different aspects of their scientist identity and 
consciously enact new behaviours. Also the presence of issue consultants 
allowed the “scientists” to delegate day to day administrative issues and to focus 
on the science based projects. By emphasizing the scientist identity in their 
interactions individuals could experiment with new cooperative behaviour without 
changing their beliefs. The identity of “scientist” also appeared to offer enough 
ambiguity to allow the individuals and organizations to agree on actions and 
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enough specificity to provide some guidance to the conduct of those actions i.e. 
experimental protocols. 
Critically, the individuals involved in the development of the agreement 
identified with the learning aspects of their organizational identity. For example 
Donna, described CAAR as “the best coalition I‟ve ever worked with in my life.  
It‟s phenomenal.  We‟ve met every two months for going on seven years, and 
always consensus... I always say it‟s an honour to work with that group.” In 
addition, the private development of the Framework agreement gave the 
individuals the safety, the support and the time to experiment with new 
behaviours, as opposed to merely complying with forced behavioural change. 
Once the Framework had been developed, the individuals and organizations 
held each other accountable to behave according to its stipulations, which were 
built around five scientific investigations. They had thus begun the process of 
moving away from using the end products of science as a weapon against each 
other to using the scientific process as the mechanism through which they could 
cooperatively pursue their own research agendas. “Science” continued to provide 
a neutral identity with which all parties (individuals and organizations) could 
identify and it facilitated the articulation of each organization‟s concerns and 
goals. By focusing on the projects, individuals directed their attention, with the 
help of a mediator, towards process and interaction and away from their opposing 
interests and value differences. The emphasis on scientific research also 
provided sufficient ambiguity to allow the group to agree on action while retaining 
whatever individual beliefs that were needed to reach consensus. 
122 
 
 
The Framework process between Marine Harvest and CAAR was 
enthusiastically supported by local institutions, in particular the local and 
provincial governments. 
PanFish acquired Marine Harvest in February 2006, becoming the world‟s 
largest salmon farming company. After several months of uncertainty with regard 
to its future direction, the company publicly declared its continued support of the 
Dialogue and subsequently consolidated all of its aquaculture operations under 
the name Marine Harvest promising to continue the practice of “leading the way 
with innovation and responsibility”. 
In just over a year, the level of trust and the nature of the interaction 
between the individuals involved and the organizations had changed as a result 
of the Framework. Moreover, knowledge about the sea lice issue appeared to 
have advanced due to the willingness of CAAR and Marine Harvest to work 
together and a peer reviewed article on sea lice incorporating Marine Harvest 
data was published in 2007. 
Over time, the Marine Harvest and CAAR personnel that negotiated the 
Framework became less directly involved in its implementation, and day to day 
project activities were assumed by scientists and issue consultants/managers 
from both organizations. In preparation for hiring contract researchers, scientists 
from both organizations worked together on an ad hoc basis to agree on project 
scope, terms of reference, timelines, selection criteria, proposal assessments and 
most critically a common list of preferred researchers. Simultaneously, an issue 
consultant working on behalf of Marine Harvest and a senior manager hired by 
CAAR, managed day to day aspects of the relationship such as budgets, 
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schedules, fee payments, miscommunications and breaches in communications 
protocols. 
Early in 2008, Marine Harvest representatives in the Framework, in 
conjunction with other functional areas within the company such as production 
and sales, developed a coordinated area management plan (CAMP) for the 
Broughton Archipelago. The proposed plan would provide data to compare sea 
lice infestation between a farm free corridor and a corridor with salmon farms. 
This plan directly addressed a hope that Harry, the head of CAAR‟s science 
committee had expressed in 2007. 
While Harry and the members of the CAAR negotiating committee were 
enthusiastic, several other members of CAAR were opposed to any plan that 
sanctioned salmon farming anywhere in the Broughton Archipelago. Their 
identities, as well as the identities of their organizations, were closely tied to the 
elimination of salmon farming in open net pens in the area. Condoning it, even for 
the purpose of gathering experimental data was just too inconsistent with what 
they deemed to be one of the central, distinctive and enduring aspects of their 
organizations. The CAAR organization fragmented and four member 
organizations withdrew, including the Raincoast Conservation Society and the 
First Nations.  
Marine Harvest and CAAR implemented CAMP together. In July 2009, the 
organizations made a joint press release, crediting their jointly managed and 
monitored program with reduced sea lice levels in the Broughton Archipelago 
(Lavoie, 2009). The program was characterized as a “rare” collaboration and 
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Colin of Marine Harvest called the announcement historic “in that it marks the first 
time that former adversaries have come forward in agreement." 
In summary, Stolt viewed itself as a collaborative research organization 
particularly within the aquaculture research and development community. 
However, Stolt was private and focused in their approach to consultation. They 
consulted directly and privately with organizations with recognized expertise, until 
the sea lice issue. The extent of the feedback around the sea lice issue prompted 
Stolt to behave differently and contact CAAR. Marine Harvest also viewed itself 
as a collaborative research organization. However, they consistently enacted 
their identity as a facilitator of dialogue, especially when confronted with a new 
situation or a problem. They interacted widely and publically in the industry, with 
government and with stakeholder groups. CAAR, in a similar vein, refers to itself 
as a collaborative organization that is able to navigate/negotiate difficult 
relationships and coordinate research. The alignment between key behavioural 
aspects of the organizational identities of Stolt and later Marine Harvest and 
CAAR supported and sustained experimental learning. Over time the 
organizations appear to have integrated some of their learning, at least with 
regard to this method of knowledge creation (peer reviewed articles, new joint 
venture pursuing further research).  What started out as experimental behaviour 
change that was undertaken without cognitive change (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995), 
appears to have prompted some cognitive change and a shift in identities. 
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5.2 Premise 1: Inter-Related  
The evidence from the salmon farming industry in BC shows that conflict, 
learning, and identity are related, in that one influences the formation of the 
others primarily through the activities of individuals (praxis) and through the 
routines of organizations (practice). While conflict is inter-related to identity and 
learning, it did not appear to be embedded in praxis and practice in the same 
way. Conflict appears to act as a stimulus and to influence identity and learning 
through praxis and practice. In other words the data showed that identity and 
learning are embedded in actions and that conflict influences their formation 
through the actions taken in response to conflict (see Figure 5-1: Conflict 
Influences Identity & Learning through Praxis & Practice). In the following 
sections I illustrate these relationships by describing an example of each in detail. 
 
Figure 5-1: Conflict Influences Identity & Learning through Praxis & 
Practice 
 
 
Individual  
Collective / 
Organization 
Practice 
Identity Learning 
Praxis 
Identity Learning 
Conflict 
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5.2.1 Praxis 
Every interviewee directly involved in the BC salmon farming industry as a 
company employee, an environmentalist, or as a government regulator, provided 
some evidence demonstrating how their learning and identity are reflected in their 
actions in response to conflict or how their actions in turn influence the conflict as 
well as their identity and learning. Their actions, when stimulated by conflict, 
expressed their identities or their learning or both and their actions in turn 
influenced their understanding of themselves and/or the situation. 
The account of a former biologist, researcher, First Nations liaison, and 
communications manager at Marine Harvest provides an example of these 
relationships. Lana has experienced the catalytic character of the conflict created 
by the environmental groups and First Nations on her learning (Argyris & Schon, 
1978): “They make my job easier.  Like if I want to do things better … it doesn‟t 
hurt to have that pressure.”  She recognizes that the tension created by the 
conflict provides impetus for her learning. 
In turn, Lana‟s learning, from her previous roles as a fish health biologist, 
and in research and production development, and environmental management 
within Marine Harvest, influences her actions with regard to conflict laden issues. 
In particular her role identity, as a technical staff member, compels her to 
categorize the aspects of the conflict that are based on misconceptions versus 
the issues that have been corroborated. In doing so she is able to separate the 
more identity based aspects of the conflict from the more socio-cognitive aspects: 
“… coming from that scientific biology background …  it has helped a lot for 
me.  I‟ve been able to really kind of navigate my way through a lot of the 
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myths and the misconceptions … as the industry becomes more and more 
sophisticated, it‟s more difficult, I need to have backup but I can speak to 
most topics with some degree of certainty” 
Lana‟s identity as a biologist, albeit a former biologist, is embedded in her 
efforts to separate “the myths and misconceptions” from the substantiated data 
related to the issues as well as her recognition that she may need back-up as 
science has advanced. In this way her learning is associated with her identity. 
Additionally, what Lana does not consider part of her identity influences her 
learning, in particular the “filter and mold” through which she views successful 
relationships, as evidenced by this comment: 
“And also too – and I‟ve said this in different First Nations communities and 
I‟ve said it internally, I‟m not really wedded to the white European man‟s 
idea of a business model.  I don‟t really have a lot of loyalty to that.” 
Lana‟s broad range of work experience, and the attendant learning, 
supports her identity as a boundary spanner. As she notes, “I build bridges”. 
Additionally, her social identity as a community member influences how and with 
whom she reaches out to. For example: 
“… my son goes to school with the son of the councilor who had opposed 
fish farming but when we see each other on the soccer field we can actually 
talk about it because we‟re there on the soccer field together.” 
Lana‟s identities as a community member and “soccer mom” are embedded 
in her civil behaviour toward the local councilor. In this way the conflict that might 
be  associated with her other identities does not influence this interaction. 
However, her courteous response to local opponents of salmon farming stands in 
sharp contrast to her response to people outside of her community that are 
opposed to salmon farming: 
128 
 
 
“… sports (fishermen), commercial (fishermen), First Nations … listening to 
those people or working with those people I can spend all day … But then I 
tell you, where I lose patience is for the flown in environmentalists, you 
know.  The 20-year-old that‟s never lived outside Kitslano, coming up here 
and ranting, you know. And those are the people that set the steam going 
off on top of my head. But for most people it‟s complicated.” 
This situation demonstrates how Lana‟s identity and learning inter-relate 
and are embedded in her actions (praxis) in response to conflict. As a member of 
a coastal community on Vancouver Island, she is mindful of the issues of her 
neighbours and “with those people I can spend all day”. She is respectful of their 
“passion” and open to addressing any issues that she can. However, as a coastal 
community member she loses patience with the “flown in environmentalists” 
which she stereotypes and dismisses as “the 20 year old that‟s never lived 
outside of Kitslano” (a fashionable area of metro Vancouver). Her identity and 
learning as a coastal community resident are expressed through her willingness 
to meet with other local residents and work through the complexity of the issues 
regardless of the conflict. Her identity and learning are also expressed through 
her unwillingness to spend time with or to acknowledge the position of outsiders 
to her community. In this way the actions through which she expresses her 
identity and learning, in turn influence the extent and what she is able to learn 
from others. 
Lana‟ experience demonstrates that identity and learning are embedded in 
praxis, and in turn influence praxis. Specifically, the actions taken in response to 
conflict by an individual practitioner that express her identity and learning, such 
as a community member‟s civility towards a neighbor, a biologist‟s need for 
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substantiated information on an issue, or a salmon farming employee‟s enmity 
toward environmentalists, influence her behaviour related to conflict. 
For representative quotes from a selection of interviewees, see: Table 5-1: 
Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Praxis. 
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Table 5-1: Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Praxis 
Individual 
Identity 
Identity & Learning 
Embedded in Praxis 
Praxis in Response to 
Conflict 
Biologist, salmon 
farmer, Former 
regulator 
“I visited relatives that in the 
1970s were growing salmon 
in fiords in Norway and I 
realized how similar it was 
to British Columbia and at 
that time I had an interest in 
wild salmon, wild salmon 
management, wild salmon 
biology and so I gravitated 
when I got back to British 
Columbia and I continued to 
work with wild salmon, both 
habitat and salmon biology. 
I found myself gravitating 
towards production, artificial 
production both for federal 
government hatcheries and 
later on into this industry.” 
“… my focus is on both 
doing and helping to 
manage the programs that 
are put in place to ensure 
that we are compliant with 
whatever regulations are 
currently in place but it‟s 
much larger than that 
because regulations are 
never enough …”   
“I‟m in my fifties.  If we were 
all starting in our twenties 
today, we wouldn‟t think twice 
about working with these 
people.  We would start 
working with them, with these 
groups at the outset rather 
than waiting until the 
animosity builds to a point.”  
“… that‟s human nature that 
you don‟t want to adopt and 
work with the other person 
who has a competing 
hypothesis; it‟s almost 
tantamount to saying oh, well, 
I don‟t even believe my 
hypothesis anymore.” 
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Individual 
Identity 
Identity & Learning 
Embedded in Praxis 
Praxis in Response to 
Conflict 
Biologist, 
communications 
manager, salmon 
farmer 
 
“… worked in research and 
production, salt water and 
fresh water, and then I kind 
of specialized into 
production support, being 
environmental management 
and working with … and it 
fell out that I had an affinity 
to work with people and 
also the communications 
part so I just kind of 
naturally started to gravitate 
towards that.” 
 “… but the getting there, 
the dialogue getting there 
was – I thought – 
refreshing.  It‟s why I like 
the job because it‟s more 
real.  You‟re not … you‟re 
actually having real 
interactions with people 
rather than kind of putting 
on … you sit down and put 
this mask on, you put that 
mask on, you go through 
this, this and this step.  And 
politically correct.  You 
know it‟s really awkward.” 
“It was so funny, you know, 
my daughter in kindergarten, 
her teacher asked her what 
her mom did for a living, she 
said my mom is a biologist.  
Oh so what does she do?  
She goes, “Well she builds 
bridges.”  Because at the 
dinner table I was talking to 
my husband saying, “We‟ve 
got to find a way to build a 
bridge between the wild and 
the farmed …” Isn‟t that 
funny?  She thought that‟s 
what I did for a living.  I build 
bridges.” 
“It‟s tough but actually most of 
the time I find that if you just 
don‟t take it personally and 
actually listen, if you actually 
sit there and listen to people 
it‟s not that bad… people are 
upset and they‟re angry but 
they‟re not upset and angry at 
me as a person.  There‟s very 
little personal insults that … 
that doesn‟t really happen.... 
It‟s quite respectful generally.” 
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Individual 
Identity 
Identity & Learning 
Embedded in Praxis 
Praxis in Response to 
Conflict 
Ecologist, 
Environmentalist 
 
“I‟m an ecologist … There‟s 
piece after piece after piece 
that builds your case, and 
your case has to be solid 
and it has to be based on 
science and it has to be 
rational and you can use a 
million different tactics to 
deliver that message...” 
“We rely on the Internet a 
heck of a lot to get the 
information out.  We do 
regular updates to people. 
When we go to give talks 
we get sign up sheets from 
people and we add them to 
an update list. When I 
published this paper I sent 
the media release out to 
about 1,000 people on my 
list.  Then those people will 
send it out.  So it‟s kind of a 
viral approach in getting 
information out.  And then 
there‟s some critical mass 
of information when people 
just say, you know there‟s 
no question anymore that 
there‟s problems here and 
we need to deal with these 
things… But we‟re trying to 
do it in a way that‟s 
information-based and 
accurate, and not just shrill.” 
“It‟s certainly the best 
coalition I‟ve ever been in. I 
mean in some of these 
coalitions there tends to be a 
bit of infighting in terms of 
publicity and funds. But it‟s 
like a sparrow at a pile of 
feed.  When you put all the 
feed in one small pile, there 
tends to be lots of fighting; 
when you spread it out and 
make sure there‟s enough 
food for everybody, there 
tends to be less fighting.” 
“They know that sometimes 
their support is a bit tenuous 
from government and they 
know that the science isn‟t on 
their side for a lot of these 
things too … they‟re focused 
on the bottom line, and when 
you say you‟ve got to spend 
more money to protect the 
environment it‟s a tough sell. I 
think genuinely a lot of these 
people believe on the level … 
the managers in Campbell 
River, for instance, believe 
these changes have to be 
made but they have to 
answer to their parent 
offices.” (empathy for salmon 
farmers) 
133 
 
Individual 
Identity 
Identity & Learning 
Embedded in Praxis 
Praxis in Response to 
Conflict 
Environmentalist, 
Strategist, 
Lawyer 
 
“… so, that‟s one of my jobs 
in this with the negotiating 
committee is to step back 
and say, ok, yes, that‟s a 
really important issue guys.  
Work it out because then 
we need to come back up to 
here and we need to talk 
about the closed 
containment funding or we 
need to talk about fallow 
routes for 2010.  So, let‟s 
stay focused on the big 
picture.”  
“ I don‟t really do the 
monitoring.  I‟m not a 
scientist, right, so that‟s 
where Harry from our 
negotiating team would 
meet with Stephanie a lot 
because Stephanie‟s the 
lead on that and, so, they 
actually kind of go up and 
do it and then we just get 
reports back.” 
“We‟ve had times where I‟ve 
definitely had to lash out 
when things aren‟t working… 
our meetings are sometimes 
small and sometimes it‟s all of 
us.  Like, today, I was 
meeting with Colin by phone.” 
“ My expertise would be more 
the... I have a good 
relationship with Colin... I tend 
to just take a different 
approach with him. So, he 
and I just have a good 
working relationship.  You 
know, one of the ways we 
play off is there‟s one person 
on the negotiating team who 
tends to just look at the 
downside of everything.  So, 
she can just nit-pick 
everything that could go 
wrong, where I‟m like, well, 
here‟s all the opportunity.  So, 
it balances well.  So, I just 
have a role because when I 
meet with him I don‟t say 
everything that can go wrong.  
I just say oh, ok...” 
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5.2.2 Practice  
All of the salmon farming and environmental organizations that I interviewed 
provided evidence demonstrating how their organizations‟ learning and identities 
are reflected in their practices: the frameworks of institutionalized procedures and 
expectations. Additionally, they provided evidence of how those practices guided 
the actions of individuals when they were stimulated by conflict. The data show 
that these actions subsequently influenced the conflict as well as the 
organization‟s identity and learning.  
The experiences of Mainstream and its parent company Cermaq ASA, a self 
described sustainable aquaculture company provides an example of these 
relationships. Cermaq, including Mainstream, is characterized by its focus on 
financial stability and its sense of responsibility to its shareholders and direct 
stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers, communities of operation). An 
industrial and until recently private company, Cermaq prides itself on being a 
leader in aquaculture operations and an innovator through the research done in 
its feed division, EWOS. 
Cermaq experienced the momentum that conflict can provide for learning 
when in 2003 it went in breach of the terms and conditions of its bank loans. This 
situation created conflict between Cermaq and its banks in that the bank‟s actions 
obstructed Cermaq from acting. This situation impelled Cermaq to focus attention 
on the very basics of operations and all geographic regions of the company 
successfully implemented new husbandry practices and monitoring practices. As 
Angus, a senior manager in BC describes: 
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“We made a decision that we would completely revamp our practices, 
starting with the very, very basics of husbandry and the way that we were 
going to grow our product…” 
 “… we know it down to the penny and we could take it even further than 
that … I could tell you to the half cent what it‟s costing us.  And even less.  
So we‟ve become very refined at our financial management.  We‟ve become 
very good at monitoring our costs, growing an exceptional good product…” 
When confronted with a financial crisis, Cermaq took action to improve and 
control its internal operations. These actions resulted in the institutionalization of 
procedures and processes that support ongoing learning and renewal. This 
demonstrates how Cermaq‟s learning in this situation was associated with its 
identity as a sustainable company and is embedded in its actions. Cermaq 
recognized that the urgency created by their financial crisis prompted them to 
change their behaviour and subsequently their beliefs in order to “regain their 
financial freedom”.  The conflict provided both the stimulus and the momentum 
for the organization‟s learning and for a concrete understanding of sustainability. 
Cermaq‟s vision of sustainability is rooted in its longstanding emphasis on 
financial and operational solidity (Cermaq, 2001). As Erling, the former Deputy 
CEO of Cermaq, states “of course, the prominent stakeholder is the 
shareholders.  And if you don‟t make money you‟re not sustainable, because then 
they‟ll go somewhere else”.  This notion is echoed in the comments of Angus and 
Karin, both senior managers in Mainstream, BC: 
“We take the long-term view and act responsibly ... sustainability also 
means running a profitable business, where we balance risks and 
opportunities based on our recognized strengths” 
“our focus, again is on the three pillars ... the environmental, the social and 
the economic – because they all have to work together … but we can‟t 
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forget about the economic because without that we don‟t have the other 
two.  So, we try and balance it … if you don‟t have the economics ... you‟re 
not going to be able to support the social or the environmental.” 
This central and enduring feature of the organization compels it to 
emphasize financial stability and to give most attention to those that impact its 
financial position. In this way Cermaq‟s identity influences its practice (actions) 
with regard to conflict situations. In particular, its identity as a financially 
sustainable organization means it does not expend effort on trying to persuade 
critics that do not impact its financial performance directly.  Having satisfied its 
shareholders and direct stakeholders, such as employees, customers, suppliers, 
and the communities where it operates, that it is sustainable, Cermaq does not 
feel obligated to directly engage with secondary stakeholders. As Erling 
describes: 
“what we‟re doing… we live by what we learn, and we communicate on what 
we do...  Then the NGOs … must judge themselves, where they think we 
are sustainable … because we (believe) from inside that our business is 
sustainable.” 
This approach is echoed by Angus, when discussing Mainstream Canada‟s 
ISO environmental certification: 
“I haven‟t put it in a press release, I haven‟t put it on any of our letterheads, 
boxes … I got asked that today at a management meeting and I said … “It‟s 
for us.  It‟s for you to know and be able to feel proud of the fact that you 
know that you have a certification at that level … We haven‟t flaunted it or 
haven‟t put it all over our boxes or anything like that.” … we‟re one step 
closer to our ultimate goal and that‟s to be … 100% sustainable.” 
Mainstream in BC approaches the conflict created by criticism from 
environmentalists in much the same way. Angus describes: 
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“… we keep a very low key, Mainstream.  We don‟t put our head in the 
press and we don‟t get ourselves out there and make a lot of statements.  
You don‟t hear commercials in the local TV about us.  That‟s not our job.  
Our job is to grow fish…” 
Cermaq‟s identity is embedded in its reluctance at both the corporate and 
the operating division level to take action via the media to persuade NGOs and 
other secondary stakeholders that they are sustainable and responsible. It is 
enough that its members and its direct stakeholders know that to be the case. In 
this way Cermaq‟s identity, and those it identifies as it legitimate stakeholders, 
influences its practice (actions) in response to conflict. 
Moreover, Cermaq‟s identity as a sustainable aquaculture company, as it 
defines the term, is supported by its learning in the form of processes, 
procedures, and expectations.  Erling, the former Deputy CEO, explains the 
learning activities that Cermaq undertook to further develop its practices beyond 
financial sustainability: 
“… all the managers in our company, meeting about 50 people worldwide, 
to, together, establish the foundation for our agriculture business… which 
ended up in something that we call our Passport for Sustainable 
Aquaculture, which established our values and how we look at our 
operations, as to the values for people and also for stakeholders, and how 
to manage by this … This passport was … given to every employee in the 
company.  And you will always find this posted in every operation that we 
have ...  So this is what we live by.” 
This situation demonstrates how Cermaq‟s identity and learning inter-relate 
and are embedded in its practice (actions). As an innovative company it is 
knowledgeable in planning processes and in change management techniques, as 
evidenced by the way it has disseminated the Passport for Sustainable 
Aquaculture through the organization. Cermaq‟s learning and identity as a 
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company that is responsive to its direct stakeholders (i.e. employees) is 
expressed through its practice of engaging with managers from all parts of the 
organization to determine its “values” and how to manage by those values. In the 
“Passport for Sustainability” Cermaq explicitly acknowledges the importance of 
employees, suppliers, customers, and communities to the sustainability of its 
business. Also the company specifies processes and expectations related to 
these relationships. The actions through which Cermaq elaborated its identity 
influenced both what it learned and the groups from which it was able to learn 
(i.e. direct stakeholders). 
The experience of Cermaq, including Mainstream, demonstrates that 
identity and learning are embedded in practice and in turn influence practice, 
when the organization responds to conflict. The actions taken by an organization, 
via the behaviour of it members, that express its organizational identity and 
learning, such as a financially sustainable organization‟s meticulous cost control, 
a responsive organization‟s attention to shareholders, or an innovative 
organizations engagement of diverse managers, in turn influence its behaviour 
related to conflict. 
For representative quotes from a selection of interviewees see: Table 5-2: 
Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Practice.
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Table 5-2: Evidence of Identity and Learning Embedded in Practice 
Organiz-
ation 
Identity & Learning Embedded in 
Practices 
Practices in Response to 
Conflict 
Marine 
Harvest 
“I think it was just a maturation 
process … We just didn‟t get it.  
And then when it hit us in the face 
then we reacted.  First we reacted 
by pushing back really hard and 
being outraged and indignant … 
and attacking the NGOs and 
attacking their credibility.  And then 
we saw ourselves as small 
community-based businesses and 
farmers and biologists, we didn‟t 
see ourselves as big international 
corporations… We thought you 
know people would just listen to 
us, they would just see.  Like I 
said, we‟re good people.  And we 
were naïve about that too.” Lana 
“Stolt Sea Farm … in the past was 
involved in the research and 
development that went into 
understanding the underpinnings 
of the ecosystem principles that 
were put under stress through the 
various kinds of impacts.  In order 
to determine where the thresholds 
of change would be that would 
help lead to the necessary controls 
in order to safeguard the 
environment” Colin 
“… everyone‟s got their different 
perspective, not just companies, 
but people within those companies 
that have influence on their 
communication plans or their 
stakeholder engagement.  
Everybody‟s got a different tactic.” 
Rob 
“And we have to get our act 
together and make sure that we 
innovate in the right way to 
ensure we have a sustainable 
business.  And we‟re still not 
there, but we are on the right 
track.  And whether we share 
that and acknowledge our 
willingness to do a better job 
and innovate from year to year 
to year, it is time to look for 
ways to cooperate with others. 
Heikki 
“On the basis of the dialogue, 
we moved into cooperation with 
others, the more consultative 
NGOs. This is also a very 
important, already in 2002 … 
We took this opportunity in 2002 
to share with stakeholders … 
we need to cooperate and work 
together to innovate, for the 
food security of this planet.  And 
the fact that fisheries has 
reached also its boundaries, we 
have to develop an aquaculture 
industry.  And we have to do it 
in a responsible way, and it has 
to be managed sustainably.  We 
need it.  So let‟s now work 
together, and that was a 
message that was finally 
appreciated by our 
stakeholders.  Not digging in 
deeper on the issues or bringing 
up other issues, or saying what 
are you talking about, but just 
acknowledging that there are 
some issues and we have to 
work together, we haven‟t 
solved anything yet, but this is a 
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Organiz-
ation 
Identity & Learning Embedded in 
Practices 
Practices in Response to 
Conflict 
dynamic industry, with lots of 
innovation, and every year we 
get better.” Heikki 
CAAR “So we invited the organizations 
that were interested in this issue, 
and we sat around for a year and 
worked out our plan to put in a 
major proposal to the Foundations 
to fund this coalition and these 
activities.  And it‟s become far 
more sophisticated since we sat 
down, I believe it was 2000 that we 
sat down for the first time.  And 
there‟s been a lot of changeover in 
terms of the membership – the 
people, not the organization.  But 
we initially had a one-year 
facilitated group of meetings to 
come up with a plan and our 
protocols and how we would 
operate and work together and 
what teams we‟d put together and 
all that stuff.” Harry 
“And CAAR is an incredible 
coalition.  I mean there‟s nine 
groups.  We work by consensus.  
We do our strategic planning as a 
unit together and we have a very 
strong commitment to the goals 
that we set out.  So when we then 
go and interact with the larger 
groups we stay very focused on 
those goals and on how the 
interaction with the larger 
international campaigns can either 
better fit or undermine those 
goals.” Donna 
“… we have, essentially a 
committee structure in CAAR …so 
we had initially a negotiating 
committee which was brokering the 
original framework agreement with 
Marine Harvest.  And now that 
““So CAAR as a coalition uses a 
range of means.  Some groups 
are more involved than others, 
but clearly we‟ve also used 
direct advertising that has a very 
hard-hitting value. Ads in the 
New York Times and Los 
Angeles Times, things like that. 
And of course we also have a 
broad list of supporters of the 
David Suzuki Foundation who 
we contact regularly through 
email lists and our website, and 
ask to take various actions, 
either with their local retailers or 
with their elected officials.” Gord 
“And so the relationships are 
collegial, most of the time.  
There are occasionally conflicts.  
But maintaining the open 
communication, bringing in 
outside facilitation when it‟s 
needed, and just sticking to the 
most important issues is really I 
suppose what you might call our 
approach.  Our strategy is to 
use the best information and the 
most effective groups to bolster 
each other rather than trip each 
other up.” Gord 
“Working and living in a fishing 
community, we have 
unbelievable support … from 
this whole community. I don‟t 
think you‟d see anyone in this 
community want to buy farmed 
salmon.” Donna 
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committee … continues to monitor 
the fulfillment of the agreement. 
And then there‟s a science 
committee working specifically on 
the sea lice issue, and then there‟s 
a closed containment committee 
working on the closed containment 
issue.” Gord 
Main-
stream/ 
Cermaq  
“People tend to link us with 
resource industries.  That‟s not the 
case.  We‟re farmers.  We‟re 
agriculture.  We have more in 
common with agriculture in terms 
of farming cattle or the whole 
husbandry issue ... I don‟t know 
where that came from, but we keep 
getting linked and compared.” 
Karin 
“We‟ve also identified what we call 
„local community acceptance‟ and 
that‟s very important – and 
different from the NGOs – that‟s 
the local impact. To make an 
example in BC, with the First 
Nations…  Very different 
perspectives.  Because when we 
look into local communities, it‟s 
very much about “how does this 
impact the local community?”” 
Erling 
“….  Another important thing is our 
R&D activities... I think in fact our 
R&D company is one of the 
biggest private research operations 
within the business. They also 
have the sustainability mission as 
the core value … ensuring us … to 
being able to handle further growth 
on sustainable premises.”Terje 
“I think there‟s two things we do 
(to influence stakeholders), we 
live by what we learn, and we 
communicate on what we do...  
Then the NGOs or the 
stakeholders must judge 
themselves, where they think 
we are sustainable ...  This is 
how we want to do it, and we 
will by communication, 
demonstrate that we are 
keeping to what we say.”   Erling 
“… gave us media exposure to 
the extent that we didn‟t have, 
didn‟t experience before, and 
that was a good change 
[laughter]. An education, 
learning, it was very good for 
learning.  I think that meant 
something to us about being 
aware on the communication 
side, because we came from a 
much more silent environment 
… agriculture… It was not very 
controversial at all, and we‟re 
not trained to handle these 
kinds of situations.” Erling 
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5.3 Premise 2: Multi-Level Impacts 
The data on the salmon farming industry in BC shows that in addition to 
being inter-related with each other within the individual level and collective level, 
conflict, learning, and identity are inter-related across the individual and collective 
levels via feedback and feed forward mechanisms (Crossan et al., 1999). I will 
define and illustrate feed forward and feedback processes next, and follow with 
evidence from the data showing them in action. 
5.3.1 Feed Forward Processes 
Feed forward processes allow praxis (actions) and new ideas to flow from 
the individual level to the collective level. Feed forward involves moving from 
interpreting to integrating – that is shifting from individual action and 
understanding to the collective level. Indeed the “real test of shared 
understanding is coherent action” (Crossan et al, 1999) and experimenting may 
aid in development of shared understanding (Zietsma et al., 2002). The salmon 
companies and environmentalists employed similar mechanisms to feed actions 
and ideas forward from individuals to groups both inside and outside their 
organizations. These mechanisms include: formal budgeting and planning 
processes, as well as less formal conversations and internal list-serves; and 
flexible organizational structures that encourage sharing across boundaries, such 
as the “group” of regional sustainability managers at Marine Harvest and the 
science committee within CAAR. 
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The major salmon farming companies and the primary environmental 
organization all provided evidence of praxis (individual actions) influencing 
collective understanding and practice (behaviour). See:  Table 5-3: Evidence of 
Praxis Influencing Practice  for representative quotations. 
Table 5-3: Evidence of Praxis Influencing Practice 
Organization Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of 
praxis on practice 
Marine 
Harvest 
“This is more or less my story … What I try to do is get as much 
documentation as possible from independent sources that will help 
to share our story with our stakeholders, because no one has to 
trust us as a company. We are never believed, but when the story 
is told by independent reliable sources about what aquaculture has 
to offer or that it is making progress in the right direction, or not, 
that can be really helpful.” Heikki 
CAAR “I started Living Oceans Society in 1998 … it was not necessarily 
started as an organization designed to (manage) the fish farming 
campaign but because we‟re here and it‟s the people over there 
like it and the people down there don‟t and we‟re sort of in the 
middle, plus my husband at the time was a salmon fisherman and it 
just became an issue that we couldn‟t not look at and so we got 
more involved in it as an organization. “ Donna 
“I do a lot of work within the coalition keeping people informed of 
where things stand with our projects with Marine Harvest.  I do 
some work on budgets and financing and just getting people into 
the field and making sure costs are covered and the money is in 
place.  I do a lot of back and forth between CAAR and the company 
because the company will have a face to face meeting, they‟ll make 
a suggestion.  The negotiating team can‟t sign-off on it on behalf of 
the whole coalition.  So, we‟ve got to go back and talk to our 
coalition partner groups and, you know, then back to the company.  
So, it‟s a lot of back and forth negotiation.” Moira 
Stolt “… the vice president of Stolt then went on to be the vice president 
of Marine Harvest after the first merger.  ... Justin was an enigma; 
I‟ll tell you that.  He was a very fascinating person to deal with … 
while it really, you know, often really disturbed him he realized that 
this engagement was important.  Like, that it was in his own best 
business interest to engage.  So, he was able to, sort of, get over 
that stuff.  Not so; he couldn‟t get over it.  He was able to make 
decisions that were not influenced...” Donald 
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Organization Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of 
praxis on practice 
Mainstream “Just a short while ago I was in a meeting with the managers for 
the east coast of the island, going over with them the costs, the 
need for clarity in all of their areas, that they need to clearly 
understand what the focus of the company is. What our long-term 
goals are. And those have not changed since last year.  We must 
strive in every area to look how we can better one, cost save – of 
course because we‟re always interested in making money…” 
Angus 
Government “… the director general for aquaculture management came into his 
job it‟ll be two years at the end of October.  And, he‟s really, I‟d say, 
pushed the need for greater interaction with the ENGOs8.  So, we 
have very regular meetings whenever he‟s out with the ENGOs.  
And, that‟s been a better relationship, better than adversarial.  We 
set up this thing where, you know, when he‟s, you know, we‟ll have 
the regular meetings, but when we‟re not around for the regular 
meetings, you know, if they want to phone me and ask me 
questions, you know, I‟m much more conducive to that kind of 
thing.  So, you know, it is about relationship building more than 
anything else.  And, I think that there‟s a lot to be said about the 
more time you spend with people and the more time you get to 
know people it just becomes a lot easier to communicate.  You 
know, it just breaks down some barriers.” Adrian 
 
The data from the salmon farming industry in BC shows that action taken by 
individuals influence collective and organizational practices. 
5.3.2 Feedback Processes 
What has already been learned, in this context an organization‟s practices 
related to conflict, learning, and the organization‟s identity, feeds back from the 
organization to individuals. It thus affects how people act as well as how they 
think (Crossan, et al, 1999). Feedback involves the influence of institutionalized 
practices on individuals intuiting new patterns or possibilities. To increase 
                                            
8
 ENGOs are environmental non-government organizations 
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productivity and exploit past learning the salmon companies shared data between 
jurisdictions and developed operating standards and procedures that were then 
closely monitored. They also developed worldwide positions on controversial 
issues and communicated widely internally and externally. Both the salmon 
farming companies and CAAR demonstrated their commitment to scientifically 
validated knowledge by allocating resources to research and development. 
Interestingly, the methods used by Marine Harvest and CAAR resulted in a broad 
range of research partners being drawn in. These included, in the case of Marine 
Harvest, suppliers such as Peruvian anchovy fishermen; and in the case of 
CAAR, promising graduate students and international environmental groups. 
Other salmon farming companies tended to allocate research resources to 
recognized research universities and institutes. 
The major salmon farming companies and CAAR provide a range of 
evidence showing the ways in which institutionalized practices influence 
individual actions and understanding (praxis). See:  Table 5-4: Evidence of 
Practice Influencing Praxis for representative quotations.   
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Table 5-4: Evidence of Practice Influencing Praxis 
Organiz-
ation 
Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of 
practice on praxis 
Marine 
Harvest 
 “… I had standards that I had developed.  Purchasing standards 
for Wegman‟s, a big grocery store… on our Chinook, and we were 
getting 25% premium …. It worked really well… I had the blessing 
from our corporate to do this – they thought it was a good project, 
they thought it was a good kind of cutting edge way to do things 
and it was a trend we would be moving towards – certification.” 
Lana 
“… our ISO 14001 management systems … quite a big part of 
them are stakeholder feedback in response to environmental 
impacts, perceived or actual … if these systems are going to work 
well you want to be responsive to the main issues of the day. “ 
Lana 
“… they (Head Office) do care, sure.  Everything we do here, my 
work, the R and D that I‟m involved with, the agreement that I‟ve 
explained to you, they all cost money… So it raises the unit value 
of every fish that we grow so the company is constantly looking at 
the cost of doing business in British Columbia…” Colin  
“… if you were to open a company here and only operate here 
you‟d still have to deal with the cost of the regulation and the cost 
of the social licence component and then that would raise your cost 
and you would have to factor that in.  So it matters to Holland in 
this case where the parent company is, but the other side of the 
coin … we‟re not avoiding this, we‟re dealing with it and we are 
dealing with it in a way that intends to solve the issues without 
adding additional costs … also they‟re aware that the product we 
grow in BC is some of the best product grown anywhere in the 
world … that‟s not lost on them at all.” Colin 
CAAR “We got together into a group and said, “you know what - we have 
to make the sum greater than the individual part,” that we had to 
work together to try to deal with it because …  we can‟t outspend 
them so we have to outthink them so in order to do that we need to 
have more people together. That‟s when we came together to form 
a coalition.” Donna 
“Well the dialogue agreement that we have with Marine Harvest 
certainly has created some policy changes within all the 
organizations, in that they have to give Marine Harvest a heads up 
on whether they‟re going to issue press releases. We are far more 
careful on what we say about industry.  I mean we can still be 
honest … but we can‟t say that Marine Harvest are a bunch of 
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ation 
Representative quotations demonstrating the influence of 
practice on praxis 
idiots and they‟re not listening to anybody.  That‟s not allowed in 
the dialogue agreement.” Harry 
“We have various committees.  A science committee, a markets 
team … we have an internal list serve that is used frequently.  It‟s 
not unusual to get 40 or 50 email messages from our colleagues a 
day.” Harry 
“… need to work within their business model … so if it‟s like, “you 
need to go to closed containment, that‟s not negotiable. How 
you‟re going to get there, we‟re willing to talk to you about that. OK, 
you can‟t do it tomorrow, can you do it in 2 years? What do you 
need to do it in 2 years? What if we go to government together to 
get help for you to do it in 2 years. Now let‟s be friends, now let‟s 
work together and find a way to do it.” So now when you start 
talking about a business model, you‟re talking their language. You 
can have a conversation with them.” Donna 
“… one of the things that we always try to maintain is our 
credibility.  We don‟t want to make outlandish statements.  We rely 
on the Internet a heck of a lot to get the information out.  We do 
regular updates to people.  When we go to give talks we get sign 
up sheets from people and we add them to an update list.” Harry 
Main-
stream 
“We need to be constantly assured that we are not polluting, we‟re 
not causing environmental damage, we‟re treating our people with 
respect, we have good welfare practices for our people as well as 
for our product.  We have a long-term vision, we‟re not here for the 
short-term, we‟re here for the long-term.” Angus  
“ISO then is a management tool.  As a deliberate, strategic 
management tool… “ Angus 
“The public will learn that the government – the regulatory 
agencies – do have the teeth and the authority and the willingness 
to not allow this industry to take the same course as the other 
industries before us.  Like logging or mining went for 50 years 
basically unchecked and a lot of damage was caused.  Now there‟s 
all kinds of reforms and rules in play...” Angus 
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The data show that an organization‟s practices (i.e. its routines, procedures, 
and collective understandings of identity) influence how individuals both seek and 
interpret signals from the environment and subsequently respond. In the next 
section I provide a detailed example of these processes. 
5.3.3 Feed Forward and Feedback Processes in Action 
The story of how the actions of individuals in Marine Harvest influenced 
policies and were in turn influenced by the policies and practices of the 
organization provides a graphic illustration of feedforward and feedback, as well 
as the role of identity and conflict in driving those processes. Heikki a senior 
corporate manager describes the initial shift from individual interpretation of 
social responsibility at Nutreco, the predecessor company of today‟s Marine 
Harvest, to the integration of those notions, and their subsequent 
institutionalization into practice: 
“There was a new chairman… who was, I think, much more than his 
predecessor, transparent, open to dialogue, aware of what social 
responsibility is… we had a fantastic meeting with the entire board, plus the 
food safety director, and the research directors and the business leaders; 
we had a whole day of what the issues are … of managing sustainability 
issues of aquaculture, and that was fantastic, because then we could decide 
upon what should be the rules for … our program for the coming years and 
our communications.” 
The new chairman, Woutt Dekker had come from BP, an early proponent of 
social responsibility and was a self described “socially responsible manager”, 
evidencing his learning and identity.  As a result of his interpretations and actions, 
such as initiating and sustaining discussions of social responsibility at the board 
level, Marine Harvest management came to a common understanding of the 
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meaning and relative importance (to them) of social responsibility, transparency, 
and openness. Dekker‟s praxis (initiating and sustaining discussions) acted 
through organizational practice (the board meetings) to alter learning (shared 
understanding) and identity (importance of social responsibility etc.).  This 
marked the beginning of Marine Harvest identifying itself as “open to dialogue” 
and “collaborative” and illustrates how individual interpretation of a new pattern in 
the external environment, such as  the emergence of social responsibility and 
stakeholder activism, becomes integrated with the interpretations of others, 
altering their understandings of the situation and their organization. This dynamic 
is affecting collective identity and organizational learning through practices. 
The senior managers at Marine Harvest demonstrated their common 
understanding (learning) by using that information to set corporate policy and 
establish procedures (practices) throughout the company to respond to 
stakeholder raised issues (praxis). In time they provided budget support to the 
regions (feedback from organizational learning). The organization took a 
leadership role (identity) in setting up and leading forums to exchange ideas and 
information on issues facing the aquaculture industry (practice), including a 
biennial international conference of stakeholders in Stavanger, Norway and 
numerous multi-party, multi-national initiatives involving participants ranging from 
politicians in the Hague to Peruvian anchovy fishermen to anti-aquaculture 
groups. This illustrates how learning and identity influence each other as well as 
practice, which in turn influences praxis, in this case in response to conflict from 
stakeholders. 
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Heikki, a corporate executive, shares what he believes is central to Marine 
Harvest‟s approach to the external environment: 
“you can only find a solution when you put different people with different 
backgrounds and different views of the world together because then you 
have the creative momentum to really start making a change and come up 
with the right solutions.  So not any longer the different disciplines within 
one company, but now the NGOs, and the government representatives, and 
the scientists … We have these different hats sitting around the table, and 
they‟re going to make a change.” 
The organizational identity of openness and collaboration and the practices 
that express that identity and the attendant learning endure and continue to be 
demonstrated thorough the actions of the company, in the face of and despite of 
continued conflict with stakeholders. The extent to which it endures is illustrated 
by the comments of Torgeir and Henriette, corporate managers in Marine 
Harvest, two years and three changes in ownership later: 
“I think that first of all, it‟s important to be in a dialogue so that the world 
around you can react when they think that you‟re doing something that they 
perceive as being wrong.  At the same time, I think it‟s very important that 
we are proactive in some processes, and try to step – or to be one step 
ahead in some areas.” 
“We find it important.  When we entered into the dialogue, we want to be 
part of the solution, we want to have discussions and to try to find solutions.  
It‟s challenging also to have good discussions and find solutions, when you 
have such different groups and different views.  That‟s of course a challenge 
to do that, but we find it‟s still important to be part of it.” 
Just as BP‟s practices in the 1990‟s supported Wout Dekker‟s recognition of 
the emerging importance of engaging with stakeholders, Marine Harvest‟s 
practices stemming from identify and learning show support for praxis that 
encourages the development of new insights and the  exploration of new ideas. 
Lana and Colin, senior managers in Marine Harvest Canada, describe, 
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respectively, how institutionalized practices within the organization have guided 
and supported them in praxis relative to their roles: 
“overall the company – not just me – was quite transparent, quite open … 
so that was the way we were.  And that helped.  It helped me … That was a 
corporate position.  And that position came from Europe.  They were big on 
social accountability, big on environmental accountability … they took 
leadership roles – Marine Harvest did internationally… They took leadership 
on that, and it was in all their … vision statements and all that sort of stuff so 
I could always hold that up when I got grief about spending money … we‟d 
say, “Well look it, I‟m just following your corporate strategy, right?”  And that 
was pretty hard to argue. So that helped me a lot because when your head 
corporate is doing that you can … I had the support”. 
“So, it‟s a lot easier for me to say, well, in line with corporate thinking we‟re 
working towards greater levels of sustainability.  So, if these studies that we 
do poke us in the eye a bit, well, that means we have to learn from that; we 
have to change…. there‟s no risk to me organizationally in Canada to 
undertake this.  It‟s not out of synchrony with the larger company.” 
In each situation the organization‟s identity of being “open to dialogue” and 
“collaborative” was expressed through practices, such as stakeholder 
engagement and other collaborative learning processes.  These practices 
allowed individuals to have intuitive insights and to take action (praxis), facilitating 
learning. Indeed the open, collaborative practices that have been institutionalized 
within Marine Harvest‟s structure encourage the development of new shared 
understandings, as Lana describes: 
“I had the opportunity – I was lucky - to go over to Europe quite a few times 
… to these high level … strategic planning (conferences) where they were 
looking ten years down the road and what the market would look like, and 
what consumers wanted to know.” 
So in this case what Marine Harvest has already learned as an organization 
encourages and supports the exploration of new learning. However the tension 
created when integrating new learning in the face of feedback from 
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institutionalized learning appears to remain, as evidenced by Lana‟s comment 
about “getting grief about spending money”. 
This leads to questions about the extent to which individuals impact 
organizational learning or does practice dominate praxis? I find that while the 
data show more than twice as many examples of practice influencing praxis, this 
does not necessarily indicate a constraint on the exploration of new ideas or 
actions.  The actions that instigated significant change, such as the initial contact 
of CAAR by Stolt or the acceptance of CAMP by CAAR, stemmed from praxis 
that deviated from established organizational and industry practices. Consistent 
with prior research, specific practices stemming from identity and learning can act 
as a catalyst for exploratory actions.  A comparison of the data from Marine 
Harvest and Mainstream on the extent to which practice influences praxis show 
that feedback can be supportive of exploratory activities not just activities that 
exploit or maintain the status quo. (See Table 5-5: Evidence Showing Exploration 
and Exploitation Influences). For example, the praxis of the individuals at Marine 
Harvest is consistent with and supported by the organization‟s identify as being 
interested in seeking solutions through collaboration and its established practice 
of engaging in dialogue. 
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Table 5-5: Evidence Showing Exploration and Exploitation Influences 
Organiz-
ation 
Feedback supporting 
exploration 
Feedback supporting 
exploitation 
Marine 
Harvest 
“They have a bit of a hands off 
way of operating with their 
business units in the sense that 
they recognize ... that they don‟t, 
from back in Norway, they don‟t 
understand all the political and 
social context.” Doug 
 “… you could not leave this in 
the court of the CEO or the 
communication department, 
because actually it is not their 
problem.  The issues are local to 
certain parts of the business.” 
Heikki 
“The company actually made a 
decision to do that and took a 
financial hit as a result.  They 
had more fish of a smaller size 
than what they would have 
ideally had for the market and 
that cost them money … at the 
end of the day when you rolled 
them all up it cost them some 
money.” Doug 
“… you‟re also risking the fact 
that the science that is going to 
be done over the next couple of 
years will identify that it‟s an 
issue, it‟s a major issue with 
major changes.  And, we‟re 
prepared to do that.  It‟s a real 
risk.  Now, I would say they‟re 
risking the same as well – the 
NGO groups – that it might 
identify that there‟s no difference 
or the difference is so minimal 
that the management 
procedures you have in place 
now address those risks.” Rob 
“There is an influence in terms 
of budgets and things like that 
for sure.  You know, annual 
budgets are approved by the 
corporation, the parent 
company.” Doug 
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Organiz-
ation 
Feedback supporting 
exploration 
Feedback supporting 
exploitation 
Mainstream “… we collaborate with different 
parts of the world whether it be 
Scotland or Chile.  We learn 
from each other‟s mistakes ... 
we all have head offices in 
different countries. So, we‟re 
able to learn from those 
experiences.  We do a lot of 
networking on a global basis.  
People come from all around the 
world to attend different 
conferences.  I was just in 
Norway at a conference.” Karin  
“Our focus in this company is 
sustainable aquaculture… That 
drives everything. And, the key 
thing that we‟ve done is our 
certification.  We are ISO 
certified in our environmental 
management systems for all 
our companies… We‟re also 
currently working on our 
occupational health and safety 
ISO certification, our quality 
management systems… And 
then, we‟ll move forward into 
the food safety certification … 
for us the value in certification 
is A) being third party audited, 
right and also, B) just to use it 
as a management tool so that 
all across our company we 
have the same standards so 
that nobody can say, farm A 
does this; farm B does this.  We 
have the same policies and 
procedures and high standards 
in all of our operations.  And, 
that‟s a really good 
management tool and it‟s a 
good way to show people that 
this is what we do.  And, we 
know what we do all across the 
company.” Karin 
“… the other stakeholder group 
that we‟re working on now is 
internal.... the website will be 
good for that.  The newsletter, 
we‟re working on our second 
edition. And, we will be doing 
some brochures ... as we get 
bigger we‟ve got to keep people 
informed.” Karin 
“This passport was printed and 
given to every employee in the 
company.  And you will always 
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Organiz-
ation 
Feedback supporting 
exploration 
Feedback supporting 
exploitation 
find this posted in every 
operation that we have, and in 
any office you‟ll find this poster.  
So this is what we live by.  To 
follow-up on the promises or 
directions we gave here, we 
established what we called the 
Cermaq (Mainstream) 
Sustainability Team, which was 
working to make this passport 
live in the organization … Then 
we formed this team and we 
also formed these six areas....” 
Erling 
 
The data from the salmon farming industry in BC show that while practices 
stemming from organizational identity and the organizations‟ learning do 
influence praxis more frequently than the reverse, that does not necessarily 
indicate that there is relatively more emphasis on exploitation of existing 
knowledge. The nature of the organization‟s learning combined with the unique, 
and enduring characteristics that make up its identity form and inform the 
practices which may, as in the case of Marine Harvest, promote and support 
experimentation and exploration. 
5.4 Premise 3: Individual Engagement: Practitioners-Praxis-
Practice 
In the previous section, I described feedback and feed forward cycles within 
some of the organizations in the BC salmon farming industry. These cycles led to 
changes in the behaviour of individuals - specifically, interactions and eventual 
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engagement (praxis) between individual practitioners on different sides of the 
conflict. 
The impetus for experimentation with new behaviour came from 
destabilizing feedback: external signals that contradicted practitioners‟ 
understandings of the situation, of themselves, and of their organizations (D. 
Gioia et al., 2000). The predominant signals were ongoing criticism of the 
industry, shifting priorities of philanthropic organizations and funding agencies, 
and contradictory research findings on aquaculture impacts. As well as inducing 
dissonance that drove individuals to action, these signals created uncertainty 
within the organizations. This condition of uncertainty had the effect of freeing 
individuals from the influence of established organizational practices, permitting 
and encouraging action in the form of experimentation. Indeed, repeated changes 
in the ownership of Marine Harvest created further uncertainty around 
organizational identity and practice, providing more latitude to the initiating 
individuals and sustaining ongoing experimentation. 
Departing from conventional, institutionalized practice, practitioners made 
direct contact across organizational boundaries. Having done so, they were able 
to tap into shared identities relevant to the conflict. Amongst these were aspects 
of being a scientist, a professional facilitator or negotiator, and community 
membership. These shared identities sustained ongoing interaction. Moreover, 
aspects of the organizational identities of CAAR and the post-merger Marine 
Harvest were directly supportive of experimentation, encouraging new activities 
and the exploration of new ideas as the engagement developed. Hence highly 
experimental praxis of the individuals, engaging with „enemies‟ across 
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organizational boundaries, was influenced by both individual and member 
organizations‟ identities and learning, and permitted by conditions of uncertainty. 
These practitioners subsequently became the catalysts for change and learning 
within their home organizations, through feed forward and organizational 
integration of their praxis and learning (see Figure 5-2: Individual Engagement: 
Practitioners-Praxis-Practice). I will now outline the data that describes these 
processes. 
 
 
 
Organization 1 
Praxis 
Identity Learning 
feedback /              
feed-forward 
Organization 2 
feedback /              
feed-forward 
   Conflict 
Practice 
Identity Learning 
Practice 
Identity Learning 
Praxis 
Identity Learning 
Practitioner 
Engagement 
Figure 5-2: Individual Engagement: Practitioners-Praxis-Practice 
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5.4.1 First Contact: Destabilizing Feedback  
In both Marine Harvest and CAAR, signals from the environment loosened 
the hold that their respective organizational identities placed on individual actions. 
CAAR was formed at the direction of three major US foundations, with the 
primary objective of raising public awareness of the impact of salmon farming 
with a view to reforming the industry. CAAR soon established itself as a vocal 
critic of the industry with its active and well structured campaigns, including 
provocative ads targeting consumers in the New York Times and Los Angeles 
Times and its website www.farmedanddangerous.com. Donna, from CAAR, 
describes with some satisfaction creating a “nightmare for the industry”: 
“Well the sea lice one – I hate saying this – has benefited us in terms that it 
gave us a very clear message we can take to the public, we got the public 
very upset about salmon farming… When you see any fish covered in sea 
lice and they‟re dying, the public just grabs on to that.  And that‟s not to say 
that‟s more important than some of the other issues but it … helped us 
articulate our concerns better and reach our audience better, and it‟s been a 
real nightmare for the industry” 
After several years of successfully challenging the BC salmon farming 
industry in its major markets, the direction from one of CAAR‟s major funders 
shifted. There was a general directive that the issues had been sufficiently raised 
and it was time to start looking for solutions. Doug confirms the funders‟ feedback 
to CAAR: 
“ (they) wanted to see some kind of rapprochement between the 
environmental organizations they were funding and the salmon farming 
industry because from the point of view of the philanthropic organizations 
their goals are not going to be achieved if people aren‟t talking to each 
other.”  
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While CAAR had created an organizational identity of an activist, critic, and 
advocate, that identity was now in conflict with the feedback from one of its major 
funders. In addition all of its inter-organizational learning and experience with 
salmon farmers was indirect and critical. This pressure from funders to look for 
opportunities to develop solutions to the issues with salmon farming encouraged 
individuals within CAAR to be open to new behaviour. 
It was Justin, the general manager of Stolt in BC (later merged with Marine 
Harvest) who initiated direct contact with CAAR. At that time Stolt was recognized 
as the global industry leader in terms of sales, profitability and operations. In 
Canada it was ISO 14001 certified. While Stolt was recognized as a superior 
operator it was not as focused as Marine Harvest was on promoting its social and 
environmental performance globally. It viewed environmental compliance to be 
the responsibility of the company and it was accountable to the regulators not the 
activists. The company‟s view of its responsibility is illustrated by this statement in 
its 2003 annual report: 
“There has been much in the press lately about environmental and quality 
issues in aquaculture. These issues have been the focus of extensive media 
coverage and public debate. Indeed, the number of lobbyists and activists 
with positions on aquaculture is startling. As an aquaculture business, there 
is nothing we can say or do to satisfy all of these interested parties. What 
we can do, however, is to adhere rigorously to all regulations governing our 
industry and to follow our own conscience and set our own high standard. 
Farmed fish is an excellent source of healthy protein, and it is our 
responsibility and commitment to meet high standards of husbandry and 
care for the environment.” (Stolt-Neilsen SA, 2003) 
This passage illustrates Stolt‟s organizational identity of a successful, 
science-based, responsible producer of a sustainable food product, as well as 
how that identity manifests in its behaviour. It acknowledges activists and 
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lobbyists only to say it does not believe it is responsible for responding to their 
concerns directly. It responds to regulations and is committed to meeting high 
standards of operation. 
There was a serious discrepancy between these internal beliefs and 
external perceptions of the organization in BC. A scientific board established by 
the federal government to monitor BC salmon stocks suggested that sea lice from 
Stolt‟s farms in the Broughton Archipelago risked doing “irreparable harm” to wild 
pink salmon runs (C. Wilson, 2002). Moreover environmentalists, including 
Alexandra Morton, an independent biologist and environmentalist called for “other 
interested stakeholders -- fishermen, environmentalists, First Nations and the 
public “to apply pressure for changes to Stolt‟s salmon farming operations in that 
area” (Read, 2002).  Finally, a number of well publicized negative articles from 
peer reviewed science journals prompted agitation for more stringent regulation 
in BC. 
Science is the primary language of the conflict around salmon farming 
(Young & Matthews, 2010). Aquaculture has been the subject of extensive 
scientific investigation for more than 20 years in Canada and much longer in 
Norway, in an effort to improve the economic and environmental performance of 
the industry. This generation of knowledge has served to fuel the conflicts rather 
than defuse them because of the extent of the disagreement amongst scientists 
and so called experts in aquaculture. Justin, general manager of Stolt 
summarized his company‟s and the industry‟s position when he said "In a perfect 
world, if we had all the science … but the fact of the matter is … the science is by 
no means conclusive." (Read, 2002). The disagreements between the pro-
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industry scientists and the pro-environmental scientists include the impact on 
human health of consuming farmed salmon, and the impact of salmon farming on 
the environment and hence on wild salmon and other marine species. While 
Justin said that Stolt prefers “… a careful study of sea lice and the development 
and implementation of a sea lice control plan” (Read, 2002), the persistence of 
the conflict induced him to reevaluate his understandings. It was in this context 
that Justin began to consider a new approach. Thus providing evidence of how 
threats to organizational identity cause individuals to reconsider their actions (D. 
Gioia et al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). 
In addition to destabilizing feedback from the environment, a series of 
changes in ownership at Stolt/Marine Harvest placed its organizational identity 
and expectations in a flux. Discussions between Stolt and CAAR had been 
underway for eight months when Marine Harvest purchased Stolt, and 
subsequently spun it off as a separately listed company. Then in early 2006 
Marine Harvest was purchased by PanFish. Throughout this period Colin and 
Doug continued the discussions with the CAAR negotiating team, despite the 
replacement of Justin as the head of Marine Harvest‟s operations in BC. Donna 
of CAAR describes Colin‟s behaviour: 
“This is our second merger in a year … we‟re getting pretty good at it.  Colin 
(of Marine Harvest) … basically says, “look, until they tell me otherwise, I 
continue to act as if it was business as usual.”  And so the only thing is we 
can‟t get his time because he‟s so busy handling merger issues … – there‟s 
been a few times that we‟ve been a little bit unsure if we would go ahead 
with this, we didn‟t know about the merger but in no way has he threatened 
us or used it over our head …” 
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During the changes in ownership the acceptance and continuance of the 
engagement with CAAR was not certain (See: Table 5-6: Impact of Mergers 
Activity on Practice and Praxis). At the time of the last acquisition, Angus, a 
senior manager at Mainstream Canada predicted that “Pan‟s (PanFish) going to 
come in, they‟re going to squish that agreement … between Marine and CAAR 
because they‟ll say, “It‟s got nothing to do with us.  We bought the company ...  
We‟re Pan not Marine.” 
Despite the uncertainty created by the mergers, Colin in his role of 
environmental manager at Marine Harvest and scientist, continued to discuss the 
possibility of a joint research initiative with CAAR. He also continued to position 
the benefits of pursuing the engagement internally. As Donald, the mediator, 
observed: “I think by the time they got to PanFish there was probably already a 
sense that the engagement was yielding benefits.” The uncertainty regarding 
organizational practices introduced by the mergers gave Colin considerable 
discretion regarding the pursuit of the Framework. That he continued to engage 
with CAAR without official sanction illustrates the influence that he had gained on 
the practice of the new organization. In turn, Colin strongly identified with Marine 
Harvest‟s (and its predecessor companies) organizational identity as a company 
that is accountable and that adheres to scientific process, as evidenced by his 
comment: 
“… this is why I‟m pretty proud to work for Marine Harvest is that globally 
they say, guess what, we can‟t really say we‟re sustainable.  Yeah, well, in 
all measures, but we‟re working towards that.  We‟re recognizing that we 
have some problems and we‟re willing to change, but we feel we have a 
high level of value to offer the public and the world I guess in terms of... If 
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you grow fish so that not all the wild fish have to be taken out ...then there‟s 
an environmental value to that.” 
These aspects of Marine Harvest‟s organizational identity supported Colin in 
his experimentation by giving the engagement with the “enemy” a scientific 
context and describing his praxis in terms of the process of scientific discovery. 
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Table 5-6: Impact of Mergers Activity on Practice and Praxis 
Individuals Representative Quotes Regarding the Impact of Mergers 
Donna - 
CAAR 
“I don‟t know if I could say that this Marine Harvest would have 
been willing to go down this road if it hadn‟t started with the other 
one. But, aside from that, because we‟ve had consistency in terms 
of people being there - the issue is when there‟s a merger we lose 
their attention; we totally lose them. And, really things are all up in 
the air until the merger is complete because quite often they don‟t 
know what their jobs are going to be…. they have no idea if the 
new company‟s going to back this approach and this work that 
we‟re doing. ... That‟s the biggest hurdle.  And, once we get 
through that it‟s usually just business as usual after that.” 
Moira - 
CAAR 
“… there was initially some concern that the change of ownership 
and the dynamic would really affect, you know, the limited 
progress that had been made in the discussion, but Marine 
Harvest when they took over seemed amenable to continuing.  
And then, PanFish and Marine Harvest merged and there was still 
an openness to continuing.” 
Donald – 
Mediator 
“... when Stolt and Marine Harvest integrated …  there‟s an issue 
in terms of which … management team or which management 
philosophy or direction was likely to prevail.  And, you know, had it 
been the original Marine Harvest I‟m not certain whether this 
engagement would still be going.” 
“I think that after the PanFish merger … once again it was … a 
period of time in terms of where was the leadership going to be.  
… the first question … is the leadership in the new organization 
going to be supportive of the ongoing engagement?  And, so, 
you‟ve got a time period while that gets sorted out.  But, then 
there‟s also the time period where it takes for the new organization 
to begin to …  institutionally accept it because then you‟ve got 
folks that have come from both organizations … just because the 
leader thinks something‟s a good idea doesn‟t mean everybody 
else thinks it‟s a good idea.  So, there‟s that period of adjustment 
as well.” 
Angus - 
Mainstream 
“…We know that then CAAR is going to take up the fight again.” 
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5.4.2 Experimentation: Altered Praxis  
As the largest operator in BC, Stolt was the most vulnerable to the conflict 
over sea lice. In keeping with its identity as a science based company, Stolt 
Canada‟s leadership was very motivated to ensure that at the least any 
forthcoming regulation was supported by good research. As mentioned in the 
previous section, they began to consider ways to accomplish that. Justin, who 
had a degree in Marine Biology and almost 40 years experience of working in 
commercial fishing, fisheries development, and salmon farming, was instrumental 
( Campbell River Salmon Foundation, 2010). Donald, the mediator, describes 
Justin‟s process: 
“I think he (Justin) thought that the folks in CAAR were sort of evil or 
something, but he did understand ...  And while it really... disturbed him he 
realized that this engagement was important.  Like, that it was in his own 
best business interest to engage.  So, he was able to, sort of, get over that 
stuff.  Not so; he couldn‟t get over it.  He was able to make decisions that 
were not influenced (by it) ...” 
Despite the ongoing conflict between CAAR and Stolt, Justin was able to 
intuit a new pattern emerging in the environment and interpret the need for new 
behaviour. To aid his interpretation of the situation he actively sought guidance 
from independent sources outside of Stolt and the salmon farming industry, Doug 
and Donald. These individuals had advisory roles in other environmental conflicts 
in BC, were residents of Vancouver Island and were familiar with both the 
situation and the individuals involved. Doug, a consultant specializing in issues 
management, gave his synopsis of Justin and Stolt‟s situation: 
“… Most of the public debate over the years has been a debate 
characterized by conflict and struggle… I said you really need to try and 
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enter into some kind of a structured dialog with the environmental groups.  
You can‟t continue the practice of the sparring press releases … And, the 
company understood that.  I mean, one of the reasons they came to me was 
because they were at a loss.” 
Justin recognized the significant threat of restrictive legislation and the state 
of the knowledge around the sea lice issue. This activated his role identities of 
corporate manager and scientist and prompted him to take action (i.e. contacting 
Doug). So it was that Justin had Doug contact the main spokesperson for CAAR, 
Donna, a lawyer and a resident of one of the islands in the Broughton 
Archipelago.  According to Colin, the senior Stolt manager who managed the 
engagement, the intent was to “buy time” that would allow “science to do its 
work.” As Colin says: 
“… we need to have a time out before all that policy gets articulated in which 
the rest of the research can be done to determine … the significance of the 
effect of the sea lice… So let‟s learn together, let‟s share information, let‟s 
be as transparent as we can be within the context of business and let‟s let 
the science complete its work so that we‟re basing any policy decision on 
good solid science.” 
As scientists, both Justin and Colin were able to understand the significance 
of direct access to fish farming data to the scientists within CAAR‟s member 
organizations. They would be the first environmental group in the world to have 
this access. Their identity as scientists enabled them to understand the interests 
of the other party and make an offer that would be considered credible and 
intriguing. This action was also consistent with their role identity as company 
managers protecting the interests of the firm. 
CAAR was motivated in part by the shift in the direction from their funders to 
focus less on raising awareness and promoting conflict and more on working 
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towards a solution. They were also motivated, as a science based organization, 
by the prospect of access to operational data. Scott of CAAR explains, “… we 
finally decided we‟re beating our heads against the wall, fighting against the 
industry and not getting anywhere.  And the initial meeting was set up… to see if 
we can get over (that)”. 
This action represented a significant departure from past practices in 
Stolt/Marine Harvest, CAAR, and indeed the industry. Donald, the mediator, 
explains: 
“nobody in the salmon farming industry until that point in time had … 
decided that there was value in talking with people from the environmental 
community.  And, I think, in fact, most people thought that … it was an 
outrageous betrayal to consider doing that.  And then, similarly, you get very 
similar sentiments among the ENGO coalition as well.  It‟s quite remarkable 
… the industrial interests … the interests that are representing civil society 
… their internal issues, their dynamics, they‟re mirror images of each other” 
The data show that how, in the face of destabilizing feedback from the 
environment, individuals‟ social and role identities and learning influence their 
interpretations of the situation and their praxis, prompting experimentation. 
5.4.3 Influence of Common Identities: Practitioners - Praxis  
The individuals involved in the Framework had a range of social and role 
identities However, there were three identities that became most relevant to the 
learning between the organizations; scientist, issue manager, and coastal 
community resident. CAAR‟s team was made up of a lawyer, a PhD in ecology, a 
biologist/science advocate, the Executive Director of a union sponsored 
foundation, and a First Nations marine/fisheries representative. Two of these 
individuals lived in the Broughton Archipelago. Donna, of CAAR, says “… we 
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bring a multi-talented group of people to these negotiations with industry”. The 
Marine Harvest team included Justin, a marine biologist by training and the head 
of the BC operation, Colin a biologist with a life time of working with salmon and 
salmon issues, and Doug, an issues consultant skilled in conflict management. 
All were residents of Vancouver Island. 
5.4.3.1 Scientist 
Despite the various controversies all of the individuals could agree on the 
need for greater understanding of the impact of aquaculture on the marine 
environment. As a result, the importance of the identity of “scientist” interested in 
protecting the marine habitat for salmon in BC was elevated and activated and 
came to permeate the activities related to the Framework (See: Table 5-7: 
Evidence of Scientist Identity for representative quotes showing activations of the 
identity of scientist). Even individuals whose internal roles gave them limited 
exposure to science or the scientific methods talked in terms of control groups 
and experimentation. The comments by Rob, the senior public relations manager 
at Marine Harvest, give an example of the extent to which the language and 
structure around scientific experimentation, specifically the need for a control 
group, had permeated the organization: 
“Now, the question is how would it be different if we didn‟t engage, if we 
hadn‟t have reached out to CAAR … Well, how would it be different?  We 
don‟t have a control so we don‟t know … some companies might say that, 
you know, not engaging and simply working with the sixty percent that are 
undecided leaving the twenty percent wackos alone, you‟d never know.  . 
You don‟t have control.  I wish I had another BC somewhere and, you know, 
kind of tried out a different method.” 
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Table 5-7: Evidence of Scientist Identity 
Organization Representative Quotes  
Marine 
Harvest 
“We agree that there‟s concern around this.  We agree that we 
can constantly change the way we grow fish.  We don‟t agree that 
your  (CAAR‟s) concerns are necessarily valid, yet we do agree 
that we‟ll probably be changing the way we grow fish because 
we‟ve been changing the way we grow fish and mitigating 
concerns as long as we‟ve been growing fish.” Colin 
“Our contention is that it‟s never been proven that sea lice are 
entirely produced by the farms because we know that they were 
always there before the farms were there and they‟ll be there 
after the farms leave.  So, we felt a good way to test whether that 
was the case or not was to set this management up and if it‟s a 
benefit and it shows that the sea lice are highly reduced in those 
fallow zones, then it‟s something that we would, you know, 
continue to do… like the control route and then the test groups.” 
Colin  
“If you were talking about sea lice... pink salmon interactions with 
sea lice in the Broughton Archipelago, we have a good handle on 
that.  If you‟re talking about are there affects on sockeye salmon, 
we don‟t have a great handle on that.  I personally as a biologist – 
I‟ve worked with wild fish for many years – I have trouble 
believing that sockeye would be at the risk that pink salmon 
would be at just because of their size … but, that doesn‟t mean 
that it‟s not something that should be addressed ... I‟m not 
comfortable with saying that I have enough information to say I 
just dismiss that.  I‟m not saying I‟m dismissing other people‟s 
concerns.  It‟s like, ok, should this be... We should put some effort 
into this.  Who are the right people to address this?” Stephanie 
CAAR “…So in the broad, robust pattern of management of pathology … 
These are fairly broad patterns… salmon farming is unique in 
terms of some of the biological issues. But it‟s not unique in terms 
of these patterns that keep repeating and the social patterns. And 
how individual choice is really important in effecting you know 
government and industry.  And so it‟s not unique in that aspect 
just in terms of the biological and ecological side I think.  And 
situational side and the geography and things like that.” Harry 
“Then we then go and interact with the larger groups we stay very 
focused on those goals and on how the interaction with the larger 
international campaigns can either better fit or undermine those 
goals.  And because they‟re very strongly based in the scientific 
issues of the day, we‟re not just going out saying, “We want it this 
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Organization Representative Quotes  
way because this is our campaign and you‟ve got to do it this 
way,” but we‟re very clear about how the process can work better 
if we coordinate and how we‟re none of us going to get what we 
need out of this if we don‟t.  And so the relationships are collegial, 
most of the time.” Gord 
“… we have such a strong science component and we have 
individuals that are very hardcore scientists who have 
expectations around things. And, if their needs aren‟t met, it‟s 
really hard for us to get things through the coalition. So, we have 
a strong demand on the scientific rigor of things…” Donna 
 
 
The role of scientist also helped to establish common concerns, if not 
beliefs, and helped in establishing credibility as the following comment by Scott of 
CAAR about Colin of Marine Harvest illustrates: 
“… there‟s still that lack of trust with Marine Harvest … but the guy that 
negotiated was a marine biologist too – they were concerned … it benefited 
both of us.  We‟re finally getting the actual truth about things.” 
It is telling that while Scott states he had a “lack of trust with Marine 
Harvest” this was mitigated by the fact that a marine biologist, Colin, was 
representing the organization. Colin‟s credibility and shared concern about 
getting “the actual truth about things” allayed some of Scott‟s mistrust. Hence, the 
contextual factors in the BC salmon farming industry rendered the identity of 
scientist more meaningful to the individuals involved than other identities, such as 
activists or salmon farmers. 
Contextual factors also increased the importance of the practices and 
protocols shared by that identity. In this case the gaps in scientific knowledge on 
sea lice, the contradictory results from prior research and the need to do properly 
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controlled studies all directed the individual‟s attention toward the actions they 
could jointly take to address those concerns. In focusing on the socio-cognitive 
aspects of the conflict the individuals not only activated the identity of scientist, in 
particular biologist, they also elevated the importance of the practices and 
protocols that were accepted as “good science”. Individuals from both 
organizations recognized the importance of employing common practices and of 
being prepared to accept the outcomes that resulted. As Gord, of CAAR, a MA in 
Marine Biology said: 
 “The rationale for us, I‟d say, was to construct a series of research 
proposals that were done jointly so that there could no longer be this sort of 
„he said, she said‟ around the issues.  Two areas, sea lice and closed 
containment economic viability, are the main areas of research.” 
Coincident with agreeing on what constituted “good science”, the individuals 
in the Framework distanced themselves from the outcomes of prior research on 
sea lice impacts. The apparently contradictory results cited by the industry and by 
the environmentalists had played a major part in creating and sustaining identity 
conflict. The individuals involved in the Framework focused instead on the 
research projects they would undertake together and the practices and protocols 
they would use in the work.  As Stephanie, a biologist at Marine Harvest and 
Harry, a PhD in ecology from CAAR said respectively: 
“we saw this early on that there are these two groups of researchers.  
There‟s those who the environmental movement tends to vet or stand 
behind.  And then, there‟s this other group -  and they seem to not be 
sharing information; they seem to be polarized.  And, so, that was one of the 
key things for our company was to say, well, can‟t we learn from each 
other.” 
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“… because they‟re very strongly based in the scientific issues of the day, 
we‟re not just going out saying, “We want it this way because this is our 
campaign and you‟ve got to do it this way,” but we‟re very clear about how 
the process can work better if we coordinate and how we‟re none of us 
going to get what we need out of this if we don‟t.” 
This emphasis on the practices that they shared had a dramatic impact on 
their ability to work together and allowed them to distance themselves from the 
issues that had created conflict in the past. As Donald, the mediator, describes: 
“And, what‟s absolutely remarkable is when you can actually get them 
(CAAR and Marine Harvest) talking scientist to scientist it‟s like something 
transforms in the room, like, in a positive sense.  You know, and when it 
actually comes down to things like protocols and stuff like that, that‟s a piece 
of cake...  if you get them down to talking about ...  for example, what would 
be the proper, you know, ...  protocol around this particular experiment ... 
they‟re really good at it.” 
The individuals involved had moved away from using the end products of 
science as a weapon against each other to using the scientific process as the 
mechanism through which they could cooperate. Science provided a neutral and 
honourable identity with which all parties could identify. It also provided sufficient 
ambiguity to allow the group to reach consensus on the necessity of joint action, 
while retaining differing individual beliefs (Eisenberg, 1984). 
5.4.3.2 Issue manager 
In addition to five scientific research projects, the Framework agreement 
included communications and conflict management protocols. This context of 
ongoing conflict elevated the importance of individuals that were not strongly 
identified with either of the conflicting organizations and therefore were not 
vulnerable to the same defensive responses to identity conflict as Marine Harvest 
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or CAAR members. Also the behaviour associated with the identity of issue 
consultant/manager was vital to the inter-organizational learning process. Doug 
and Donald in particular played pivotal roles in helping the individuals involved 
experiment with new behaviour, and then interpret and integrate new 
understandings. 
Doug was well known to the leaders of CAAR, and his identity as a neutral 
and knowledgeable boundary spanner, coupled with his “temporary” identification 
with Marine Harvest, was critical to the influence he had on the process. As 
Donna, of CAAR describes: 
“I‟ve known Doug for a long time … He … plays the role of advising 
companies on how to work with environmental groups … he has an insight 
into the environmental community that a lot of other industry folks don‟t 
have... the value he plays ... is usually something along the lines of (saying) 
they‟re not going to go away, so ignoring them is not a solution.” 
Despite both parties‟ confidence in Doug, he reports that “from the time I 
first started talking to my client and to the environmental groups it probably took 
six months to get to the point where people actually decided to sit down face to 
face and give this a whirl”. While both organizations were motivated to try a new 
approach, they accepted that they needed help from someone outside the 
situation to engage constructively. Their agreement to use Donald as a mediator 
was their first act of integration. Doug explains: 
“I knew it was going to take mediation to be able to make any progress.  So, 
they agreed to that.  I also said that to the environmental groups... you`re 
not going to make any headway here if you don`t have mediation.  So, they 
agreed to that ... Donald was a known quantity in the environmental 
community.  So, it wasn‟t really a big problem for them to support using him 
… with Marine Harvest … I was able to explain the role of the mediator to 
them and the value of using mediation you know, we weren‟t going to sit 
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down at a table some day at a hotel in Port McNeill and have a kum-ba-ya 
moment and everybody was going to be happy … So, they accepted the 
idea of using mediation and the cost of mediation would be split between 
CAAR and between Marine Harvest.” 
As a result of the “shuttle diplomacy” of Doug, the individuals from Marine 
Harvest and CAAR interpreted the needs of the situation in a new way, which 
then prompted the development of a shared understanding of the value of 
mediation. The act of hiring Donald and especially the agreement to split the cost 
of his fees 50/50 between the two organizations was a coherent collective action, 
the best indication of integration of new understanding (Crossan et al., 1999). 
CAAR subsequently hired Moira, an activist/issue manager whose long and 
varied experience included anti-war protests, as well as involvement in forestry, 
mining, and marine issues. Subsequently Doug and Moira handled all of the day 
to day issues and minor conflicts. This left Harry, from CAAR, and Stephanie, of 
Marine Harvest, and others to focus on moving the science projects forward, and 
Donna, from CAAR, and Colin, from Marine Harvest, to focus on larger 
relationship issues. In this way the individuals with expertise in science worked 
on the science issues and delegated all of the “conflictual” matters to those 
individuals skilled in conflict and issues management. Donna describes the way 
conflicts within the Framework were handled: 
“If there‟s a scrimmage, it‟s usually Doug that contacts us.  See, Colin 
doesn‟t do that.  … He will.  He will if he‟s not happy with where it‟s going 
and we‟ll get an email from him.  But usually ... Doug does the more day to 
day, here this is a problem … And, you know, Moira and Doug will talk 
about it and they‟ll work it out “ 
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In this way the individuals whose identities are least likely to be threatened 
by the other‟s perspective are tasked with developing shared understanding and 
taking or recommending action. 
5.4.3.3 Community Resident 
The individuals involved with the Framework were able to empathize with 
each other by focusing on their common residence in BC. They were also able to 
separate the people from their positions, further diffusing the identity based 
conflict that had been characteristic of earlier, albeit indirect, interactions. These 
comments by Harry and Donna of CAAR illustrate this process: 
“I can only imagine some of the things that they have to deal with … it must 
be tough, and we do know its tough.  You know, they‟re nice people, we go 
out with people that are fish health technicians to the farms.  They‟re nice 
people that are community members in Campbell River and things like that.  
So they‟re people for one thing…. I think genuinely a lot of these people … 
the managers in Campbell River, for instance, believe these changes have 
to be made but they have to answer to their parent offices.” 
“one of the things that I‟ve learned so much from this whole thing is that 
when you‟re arguing with your opponent, people assume you actually can‟t 
sit in a room together.  It‟s quite funny because people always say, “wow, 
you can‟t actually have Donna and Colin from Marine Harvest in a room 
together,” and I‟d be like, “I can sit in a room with them, I can have dinner 
with them,” I don‟t care, they‟re very nice people they just have different 
beliefs.” 
They no longer viewed each other as just salmon farmers or just 
environmentalists but as people with common concerns, in many cases, and with 
different pressures on them. 
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5.4.4 Impact of Organizational Identities: Practice - Praxis 
Both CAAR and Marine Harvest, as it emerged post mergers, had 
organizational identities that supported and indeed promoted exploration and 
experimentation. CAAR clearly identified itself as a strategic environmental 
organization focused on one issue, salmon farming. Donna, of CAAR, describes 
the process of arriving at their purpose: 
“... when we started the question was - are we trying to stop salmon farming 
altogether, or are we trying to reform it.  That was a huge question, and I 
think one of the successes around our coalition is that we actually took the 
time to answer that question, and to build consensus around it” 
Its creation via a year of facilitated sessions resulted in firmly established 
collaborative practices by which its members were able to interpret and integrate 
new information. These facilitated sessions also inculcated its senior members 
with the skill to collaborate across organizational boundaries and across 
disciplines. Every CAAR member interviewed in 2006-2007 expressed their pride 
and excitement to be part of CAAR and their strong identification with the group. 
As Donna enthused “… it‟s a phenomenal group of people.  I always say it‟s an 
honour to work with that group.” 
The combination of Stolt‟s organizational identity as an ethical, accountable, 
industry leader with Marine Harvest‟s identity as a collaborative, innovative and 
socially responsible company resulted in an organization well equipped to learn 
from a variety of sources. The disciplined practices related to both operations and 
interaction that Stolt had developed provided the structures and systems to 
interpret and integrate the information brought into the organization via the 
177 
 
 
facilitated multi-party initiatives that Marine Harvest had become known for 
organizing. 
Both CAAR and Marine Harvest identified themselves as collaborative, and 
had long histories of joint scientific research initiatives with universities, research 
institutes, and independent research organizations. Indeed while negotiating the 
Framework CAAR also appealed directly to Marine Harvest‟s organizational 
identity as a collaborative organization. Scott, of CAAR, describes CAAR‟s 
approach: 
“… a lot of people said, “Well you can be the first company.  If we do this, 
you‟ll be the first one and you‟ll be recognized for this.”  So it was pushed 
along those lines.  Why not be the first not only in BC or the country but in 
other areas too.  To be the first ones to do this, this and this.  And they are 
the first company that worked with enviros in this country or even in America 
too … working on science and monitoring… “ 
Both organizations came from a strong science base and considered 
science to be the foundation of their credibility. Ironically it seems that their roots 
in science helped them to realize that their longer term goals while apparently in 
direct conflict were dependent on the public‟s confidence in them. In the case of 
CAAR their funders also recognized and supported this notion. In Marine 
Harvest‟s case, access to sites for growth and expansion depended on their 
social license to operate as demonstrated by government granted site licenses. 
Therefore they recognized that the “contested science” that they each had been 
promoting was damaging their position and they needed to work together to re-
establish and maintain their credibility. As Doug, a consultant to Marine Harvest, 
noted: 
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“You can‟t continue the practice of the sparring press releases and that sort 
of thing … the company understood that …” 
In contrast to Marine Harvest, Mainstream identified itself as a sustainable 
organization, with financial sustainability the first consideration. The company had 
developed highly disciplined and effective operating processes internally and had 
implemented them internationally. Activities that could not be linked to financial 
performance or to one of the six main areas of sustainability articulated in the 
overall strategic plan were neither encouraged nor supported. This approach had 
been very successful and as a result Mainstream management took great pride in 
the approach they took to their business, even to the extent of considering 
themselves a model for the industry. Mainstream also had a long history of joint 
scientific research initiatives with universities, research institutes, independent 
research organizations, and primary stakeholder groups. However, Mainstream, 
characterized learning as a key contributor to its competitive advantage, and saw 
knowledge as an asset to be developed and then exploited. Mainstream 
appeared to be as skilled at learning across boundaries as Marine Harvest. 
However the way that it identified itself (i.e. as a business first, and then as a 
competitive salmon farming company) seems to have limited the organizations 
from which it could learn. Colin, of Marine Harvest, describes the situation in 
2009: 
“… there‟s a different level of experience between different companies in 
relation to the conflict laden piece of this.  Everyone‟s aware of the conflict.  
Different companies have approached trying to find solutions ... They‟ve 
come at it from different points.  So … why has Marine Harvest chosen a 
different approach than other people … we laughed a little bit whether 
there‟s been any learning and I think I mentioned to you that here we are 
several years down the road and Marine Harvest is still the only company 
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that uses the approach of meeting with and talking to and trying to engage 
with some of the critics, you know, to put it in a nice way … The other 
companies avoid it if at all possible.  Sometimes they can‟t because 
meetings are arranged between government and ourselves and sometimes 
they involve the environmental groups ... That‟s about the only time I see 
those folks…” 
The practices of Mainstream have resulted in a very different approach to 
CAAR and to environmental groups in general and as a result have limited their 
opportunities to learn from them. Indeed, managers at Mainstream do not believe 
that they can learn anything that is of use to their business from the NGO 
community. 
5.4.5 Feed Forward: Praxis-Practice 
Senior managers at Stolt/Marine Harvest (Justin and Colin) actively sought 
information from new sources, Doug, a consultant, and Donald, a mediator. The 
managers had sufficient influence within Stolt/Marine Harvest to experiment by 
having Doug contact Donna, of CAAR, with an offer to engage in collaborative 
research. Donna was open to responding to this new behaviour and to jointly 
developing a common interpretation with the other CAAR members to bring them 
into the dialogue, engaging with Stolt/Marine Harvest directly. By activating and 
emphasizing behaviours consistent with their shared identities as scientists, 
facilitators, and/or community residents, individuals from Marine Harvest and 
CAAR were able to experiment with new cooperative behaviour in their direct 
interactions, without changing their beliefs. This experimental praxis was 
consistent with some of the fundamental behaviours through which their 
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respective organizational identities were expressed, especially collaboration and 
the practices and protocols of scientific experimentation. 
Curiously, these new behaviours were inconsistent with the primary 
activities of the two organizations, which perpetuated their underlying conflict of 
interest. CAAR continued to campaign against salmon farming, although CAAR 
had committed to warning Marine Harvest. Donna from CAAR described the shift 
in CAAR‟s activity relative to Marine Harvest: 
“We are in the business of campaigning and they‟re in the business of 
raising fish…. so we are continuing with the markets campaign, but we don‟t 
name Marine Harvest … That‟s fine, they‟ve done something, they‟ve done 
more than anyone else, so they‟ve gotten something from us...” 
Similarly, Marine Harvest continued to farm salmon in open net cages as 
before. This created tension and introduced caution into interaction between 
individuals. Colin of Marine Harvest described his perspective and hopes for the 
engagement in this way: 
“It‟s about intention to replace some of the rhetoric with actual fact, it‟s about 
industry doing some positive change and on the other side, the 
environmental groups also changing the way they talk about industry and 
agreeing that there can be some other end points beside wholesale removal 
of the industry from BC.” 
Both groups described themselves as cautiously optimistic about the 
outcomes that were likely as a result of their engagement around specific 
research projects. However, the underlying resource conflict and the residual 
identity conflict were never far from the surface.  Donna, of CAAR, viewed the 
shift as a quid pro quo for Marine Harvest sharing data and Colin, of Marine 
Harvest, wanted the environmental groups to change the way they characterize 
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the industry. Their statements revealed their beliefs about both themselves and 
the other organization and showed how little they had changed despite their 
agreement to collaborate. The following comment from Lana, a manager at 
Marine Harvest, provides a perspective on the beliefs of individuals on both sides 
of the Framework: 
“It‟s a marriage of convenience.  We‟re both getting something out of it 
because they have to demonstrate to their funders that they‟re working on 
solutions… and when we get into a dialogue with them we said, “OK now 
you‟ve got to tone down the rhetoric, you‟ve got to give us some breathing 
space here and stop attacking our markets” and everything.  So it‟s a deal 
with the devil on both sides.  I mean I‟m sure they think of us as the devil.” 
The data show that identity and learning served as filters through which 
individuals from both Marine Harvest/Stolt and CAAR made sense of feedback. 
Destabilizing feedback, which consists of signals from the environment that were 
inconsistent with their understandings, prompted a different interpretation of the 
situation, activating different aspects of identity and learning. Individuals at 
Marine Harvest experimented with new activities. While new to this situation and 
interaction, these activities corresponded to practices associated with the 
individuals‟ social and role identities. The interaction between the identities and 
learning of the individuals involved and the organizational identities and learning 
of Marine Harvest and CAAR encouraged the individual‟s experimentation.  In 
summary, individuals‟ praxis in response to destabilizing feedback is related not 
only to their understanding of the conflict but also to their identities, their learning, 
and to the learning and identities of the groups and organizations with which they 
identify. These are conditions for productive engagement between individuals. 
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5.5 Premise 4: Repeated Engagement: Inter-Organizational 
Learning 
The data from the BC salmon farming industry show how through repeated 
engagement (praxis) to develop and implement collaborative research projects, 
the individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR, two relatively power balanced 
organizations, explored and in some cases altered their assumptions about one 
another and themselves and their organizations. Their repeated engagement 
resulted in new interpretations of the conflict, of the nature of their identities, and 
of those aspects of their own and their organizations‟ identities that are most 
salient in this situation. They have also advanced scientific understanding of the 
impact of sea lice. Finally, there is evidence that some of the learning by 
individuals has been integrated into the practices of their respective 
organizations, demonstrating inter-organizational learning. 
The new interpretations by the individuals directly involved in the 
Framework generated a stream of outcomes that captured the attention of both 
organizations, prompting integration at the group and organization level. These 
outcomes culminated in the two organizations agreeing to a number of 
increasingly complex and challenging collaborative activities, i.e. experiments. 
Beginning with The Framework agreement itself, followed by the negotiation of 
common research terms of reference and a common roster of scientists, and 
most recently with the development and implementation of CAMP, the shared 
understanding of the individuals from each organization has formed the 
foundation for the increasingly comprehensive integration and collective learning 
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not only between them but also between their respective organizations. Table 
5-8: Impact of Repeated Engagement - provides an overview of how the 
elements unfolded. 
Similar to research on collaborative joint learning initiatives between 
organizations with compatible activities and goals (e.g. Mason & Leek, 2008), 
there is evidence that inter-organizational learning became feasible once the 
individuals involved in the Framework began to generate outcomes that were 
apparent not only to their respective organizations, but to the regulators and 
general public as well. Thus, their prolonged engagement around a series of 
cooperative activities, combined with their relatively balanced power and ongoing 
institutional support for their engagement created the conditions for individuals 
from Marine Harvest and CAAR to engage in dialogue (Bohm, 1996). 
A comparative analysis of the nature of the engagement between 
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR at different times revealed similar 
patterns of behaviour. In this section I use the data to define and illustrate each 
element of the theoretical premise introduced in Section 3.3.4: Repeated 
Engagement. I present data on the conditions for dialogue, examples of dialogue, 
and the inter-organizational learning outcomes of dialogue, including altered 
organizational practices and meanings.
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Table 5-8: Impact of Repeated Engagement 
  Repeated Engagement 
  2003-2006 2006 - 2007 2008 - 2009 
Stages  Gathering info, assessing 
risk/return, committing to 
work together 
Getting going, learning to 
interact under the  agreed 
terms  
Getting serious, new 
behaviours and beliefs 
colliding with old, jointly 
managing research 
Dialogue Practitioners Two balanced teams based 
on opposing organization 
and role identities  
 
General Manager (scientist) 
Manager (scientist) 
Consultant  
 
Executive Director (lawyer)  
2 Scientists, Union 
Executive 
Pairs of “representatives”, 
based on common 
identities 
 
Manager: Executive 
Director  
Scientist: Scientist  
Consultant: 
Manager/Activist 
 
Pairs representing their 
combined /common identities 
as well as their organizations‟ 
 
Manager: Executive Director   
Scientist: Scientist  
Consultant: Manager/Activist 
PR: Manager/Activist 
 
Scientists: External Scientists  
 
Praxis Sought information from 
new sources (consultant, 
mediator) and engaged in 
new behaviours  
“Shuttle diplomacy”  
Mediated meetings 
Negotiated terms of 
Regular mediated 
meetings  
Interacted directly, e-mail, 
phone  
Developed terms of 
reference and criteria for 
scientists  
Managed projects 
Negotiated terms for CAMP 
Changed operations - fallow 
a migration route  
Monitored & treated sea lice  
Engaged in “Skirmishes” 
“Scrimmages” 
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  Repeated Engagement 
  2003-2006 2006 - 2007 2008 - 2009 
engagement, process, 
protocols 
Assumptions  
recognized 
and 
explored 
Value in working together 
Organizational similarities 
Interdependence re. public 
acceptance 
Science is neutral 
Importance of integrity of 
output  
Working together means 
adjustment 
Reform vs. Eliminate 
Action vs. Analysis 
Learning Practice Agreement to negotiate  
Shared sea lice data on-line 
Framework for Dialogue  
Neutral language 
Hired mediator, consultant, 
biologist & manager/activist  
Support through annual 
budget 
Project hierarchy & 
structure 
Tasks assigned to 
“specialists” 
Roster of “acceptable” 
scientists 
Joint public presentations 
and submissions 
CAAR members decrease 
Sub-contract research  
CAMP implemented quickly  
Policy to engage 
Acknowledge sea lice risk  
Continued financial, social, 
structural support  
Marine Harvest‟s global 
Sustainability managers meet 
with CAAR 
Lobby jointly  
Shifted 
meanings 
Value and information to be 
gained by cooperating 
We are similar 
We are interdependent 
Science is not neutral 
Cooperation enhances 
integrity  
 
“more than about sea lice” 
“it‟s the right thing to do. You 
need to engage …” 
“Respect costs you nothing” 
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5.5.1 Conditions for Dialogue 
The balance of power, the structures and mechanisms that facilitated 
repeated engagement and the ongoing institutional support for their engagement 
created conditions that enabled individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR to 
engage in dialogue. In this section I present data to illustrate each. 
5.5.1.1 Balance of Power 
For practitioners to have the kind of interactions necessary for dialogue to 
occur, the relative power of themselves and their organizations must be 
balanced.  While Marine Harvest and CAAR each claimed to be at a power 
disadvantage relative to the other, by 2004 they were comparatively well 
balanced. The anti-salmon farming articles in scientific journals in 2003 and 2004, 
the increase in charges for regulatory violations by salmon farming companies, a 
recent class action suit, and particularly the recent confirmation by an 
independent research body of the impact of sea lice in the Broughton Archipelago 
had raised the profile and influence of CAAR while simultaneously diminishing 
that of Stolt and other salmon farmers. Stolt/Marine Harvest believed there was a 
real threat of punitive legislation being rushed through in order to quell public 
fear.  
For CAAR‟s part they had taken deliberate action to at least partially offset 
what they viewed as a power and resource imbalance.  Donna describes CAAR‟s 
approach: 
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“because the salmon farming companies are multi- national corporations ... 
we can‟t outspend them so we have to outthink them ... It was by having 
everybody pool all their information and work collaboratively we‟re able to 
take it (sea lice) ...  to being one of the most prominent environmental 
issues in BC” 
This re-balancing of the power relationships set the conditions for both 
parties to establish dialogue (Bohm, 1996). Consequently when Doug, the 
consultant, contacted them on behalf of Stolt, with an offer to share sea lice data, 
the response from Donna and the executives of the CAAR member organizations 
was cautiously positive. Donna described the situation: 
“They were tired of being targeted in the media all the time.  They said it 
affected their morale… people recognize they‟re the targets and somebody 
in Stolt made a decision –...  Justin the head of Stolt Canada – that: “Let‟s 
try and approach these people who are criticizing us and also targeting us in 
the markets.” 
In addition to trusting Doug, the individuals‟ within CAAR felt they 
understood the motives of the head of Stolt Canada. They believed that their 
market campaigns had negatively affected the demand for BC salmon and the 
morale of salmon farm employees. While power had become more balanced 
between CAAR and Marine Harvest, it appeared at this time that the conflict was 
well entrenched and firmly based in identity differences and resource competition. 
Another significant shift in relative power occurred in 2008 as a result of the 
negotiation of CAMP in 2008. Marine Harvest through its proposal of an 
experiment (CAMP) addressed not only one of CAAR‟s primary concerns but also 
its own commitment to adaptive management.  However it challenged the salient 
identity of a number of CAAR members. They could not support any form of 
salmon farming in the Broughton Archipelago, even if it advanced scientific 
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understanding and so four organizations left the coalition. The reduction in CAAR 
members, subsequent to the negotiation of CAMP provides an example of how 
power was re-balanced coincident with a shift and re-confirmation of CAAR‟s 
organizational identity as a science based organization. 
As a result of the CAMP negotiation, CAAR confirmed its commitment to 
working with Marine Harvest to improve industry practices and in doing so 
increased its power with the industry as opposed to its power over the industry 
(Parker-Follett, 2003).   Post 2008, CAAR members included well known, well 
funded, and for the most part clearly science based organizations, such as the 
David Suzuki Foundation, the Georgia Strait Alliance, the Living Oceans Society, 
the T. Buck Suzuki Foundation, and the Watershed Watch Salmon Society. Their 
credibility, along with their less (relative to some former CAAR member 
organizations) controversial profiles served to enhance CAAR‟s power to 
influence industry practices via participation in experiments. The organizations 
that left CAAR, such as the First Nations, retained and confirmed their 
organizational identities in opposition to salmon farming and some returned to 
adversarial practices intended to increase power “over” industry (Parker-Follett, 
2003). 
The practitioners involved in the Framework were able to have the kind of 
interactions necessary for dialogue, because the relative power of themselves 
and their organizations was balanced. While the nature of their relative power 
shifted over the course of their interactions, along with the salient aspects of their 
organizational identities, these shifts maintained or enhanced the power balance, 
enabling further and deeper dialogue. 
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5.5.1.2 The Structures and Mechanisms of Repeated Engagement 
Beginning in 2004, practitioners from CAAR and Marine Harvest have 
engaged with one another repeatedly around an increasingly complex roster of 
activities. These activities began with the negotiation of the terms of their 
interaction and the research initiatives that they would undertake, and expanded 
to include the development of terms of reference for specific research projects 
and a common roster of contract researchers, the negotiation and implementation 
of CAMP, which included the sub-contracting and ongoing project management 
of research, and finally joint presentations and lobbying. 
Early interactions, praxis, were structured and formal and facilitated by a 
mediator. Initial discussions about the possibility of joint research took place over 
a period of twelve months in a series of meetings between the issues consultant 
and two senior managers from Stolt and the four to five member negotiating team 
from CAAR. Doug, the consultant to Stolt/Marine Harvest, explains the basic 
structure and activities of the meetings: 
“There were obviously ground rules for the meetings…. they would take 
place usually at a minimum for half a day and not infrequently for a full day.  
I can only recall once or twice where we … required actually meeting a 
couple of consecutive days ... there‟s the typical kind of tools that you bring 
to it.  You try to find neutral locations for meetings … We‟ve had some of 
our meetings, our full group meetings at Marine Harvest‟s office in Campbell 
River … other times it‟s … in a hotel … one of the key negotiations … 
actually took place in Sointula in the community hall there.” 
According to Doug the regular meetings provided a venue “to talk in a 
structured way more frequently… because that‟s helpful; it avoids 
misunderstandings and misapprehensions.” The repeated meetings provide 
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strong evidence of the sustained attention of the individuals involved. The 
meetings provided individuals with additional information to interpret as well as a 
forum to come to a shared understanding. 
As the relationship developed and particularly after the Framework 
agreement had been signed late in 2005 the number of practitioners involved 
from each organization increased and roles became more specialized. Donna, of 
CAAR, explains: 
“driving all those projects there are subcommittees and working teams … 
The negotiating team members are certainly responsible for ... making sure 
projects are moving forward and ensuring that the funding is in place and … 
ensuring that all of the details of those projects are agreed to by both 
parties,” 
The core group of eight individuals held formal meetings with an agenda 
and mediator at least four times a year and more often if necessary. It was in 
these meetings that the majority of decisions regarding the Framework would be 
made. However there were always informal conversations via e-mail and 
telephone going on amongst a larger group regarding the projects. Colin, of 
Marine Harvest, talks about the range of people involved in the projects: 
“…there are elements of the Coastal Alliance that I never speak directly to; 
that‟s true.  There‟s probably two or three or four in Living Oceans I never 
speak to and many more in David Suzuki … it‟s fairly concentrated, that 
group of, what, eight, seven/eight people are the core of the relationship and 
the Framework.” 
Colin, of Marine Harvest, and Donna, of CAAR, were most active in 
managing the overall relationship, while Moira, an experienced activist/issue 
manager hired by CAAR, and Doug, a consultant to Marine Harvest, managed 
issues that arose “day to day”. Stephanie, a registered professional biologist, with 
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experience in the oil and gas industry, the tar sands, mining, and forestry, was 
added to the Marine Harvest team to share responsibility with Harry of CAAR for 
managing and monitoring the actual projects, which involved several other 
individuals from the CAAR member organizations. This delegation of 
responsibility indicates a somewhat greater level of mutual understanding and 
alignment between the organizations. Stephanie‟s and Donna‟s comments, 
respectively, illustrate the mutual commitment to following “good science”: 
“… that‟s the philosophy here is recognizing that we don‟t understand it all, 
but we are responsible to make sure that we‟re taking good management 
steps to deal with issues when they arise.  And, what that means to me is to 
get some good science around it and data and understanding as to what the 
issue is and isn‟t. “ 
“Within CAAR for example we do have a science team of experts.  It‟s 
headed up by a PhD.  We have biologists on the team.  And, they‟ll work 
directly with Marine Harvest‟s science folks or biologists on the details, the, 
you know, really specific methodology for the research or analysis.  And, so, 
then, you know, it kind of devolves to those teams to sort out all those 
details.  And then, when they‟ve reached agreement, then that comes back 
to the negotiating team and the company…” 
As mentioned above the responsibility for putting together the program for 
joint research was delegated to Stephanie, of Marine Harvest, and Harry, of 
CAAR, individuals whose identities were rooted in scientific research and 
environmental protection. 
Beginning with the initial contact in 2004, individuals from Marine Harvest 
and CAAR repeatedly engaged with one another around increasingly complex, 
increasingly cooperative, and increasingly interdependent activities. These 
activities activated common identities and the practices related to those identities 
and provided the individuals with opportunities to experiment with new actions 
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(praxis) and subsequently with new interpretations of the results of those actions. 
Over time the scope of the dialogue expanded as the number of individuals 
involved in the engagement increased and the new interpretations developed 
within the Framework group were introduced into the two organizations. 
5.5.1.3 Institutional Support 
The joint research initiatives undertaken by Marine Harvest and CAAR 
received strong institutional support from the provincial and to a lesser extent 
federal governments. The provincial government‟s Cabinet Minister for 
aquaculture described the agreement as a “breakthrough” and stated that he was 
“very, very pleased” that the salmon farming industry and the environmentalists 
had agreed “to work together and develop a plan to allow for … sustainable 
aquaculture” (Simpson, 2006). Although not formally part of the agreement, the 
provincial government provided both financial and administrative support to it on 
specific licensing and regulatory issues, and in supporting some of the research. 
Subsequent provincial governments continued to publically praise the 
cooperative work of Marine Harvest and CAAR and they were invited to make a 
joint presentation to the Special Legislative Committee on Sustainable 
Aquaculture in 2007. 
While support from government regulators was strong, the announcement of 
the Framework agreement in 2006 took both the salmon farming industry and the 
anti-salmon farming groups by surprise and both Marine Harvest and CAAR were 
criticized by their peers and accused of “consorting with the enemy”. This 
criticism has continued. 
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Institutional support for the Framework within Marine Harvest has survived 
mergers in both 2005 and 2006. Colin confirmed that while “…some of the 
personalities and names have changed … but the overall company‟s commitment 
to improving sustainability and to transparency and information has remained 
constant.” 
Despite criticism from their peers, corporate and government support of 
Marine Harvest and CAARs joint research has been public and persistent. This 
official and institutional support for their engagement appears to have 
encouraged its continuation and to have sustained it, financially as well as 
socially, during periods of mutual adjustment. 
5.5.2 Dialogue 
By sustaining their attention, the development and implementation of the 
Framework provided the individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR with 
opportunities to explore their assumptions about expectations, meaning, and 
identity. Through their conversations and information exchanges, the individuals 
were able to recognize assumptions and gain new understanding of the extent to 
which their praxis was influenced by their and their organizations‟ learning, 
identities, and their practices. Over repeated interactions, praxis influenced 
practices within the Framework group and their dialogue deepened. In 
subsequent interactions even deeper assumptions were explored, leading to 
further shifts in praxis and ultimately practice. There is evidence that individuals‟ 
interpretations of the conflict and identity shifted as well, demonstrating learning.  
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In this section I provide evidence from three key episodes of individuals 
exploring and recognizing the impact of their assumptions, and the resulting shifts 
in behaviour and meanings related to identity, learning, and conflict. I present 
data on the individual and collective learning in the next section, 5.5.3, Outcome 
of Dialogue: Learning. 
5.5.2.1  Exploring Assumptions Rooted in Expectations around 
Conflict 
By initiating direct interaction, individuals within Marine Harvest/Stolt 
challenged existing practices and expectations in the BC salmon farming industry 
about how to respond to conflict. This change in approach demonstrated their 
recognition that while CAAR operated from a different logic that was not going to 
change, it might be possible for them to work together. Colin, of Marine Harvest, 
states that they had “learned that this is a very well organized, well funded, 
determined group … and that they are not easily ended or dissuaded.” 
Recognizing that CAAR‟s approach to the conflict appeared unlikely to change, 
individuals at Marine Harvest altered their praxis. 
Marine Harvest/Stolt‟s original offer of greater transparency and operational 
data gave CAAR access to information hitherto unavailable to environmentalists 
in any salmon farming jurisdiction in the world. This prompted members of CAAR 
to question their assumptions about the value of collaborating with a salmon 
farming company. While CAAR acknowledged Stolt‟s self interest in approaching 
them, they also recognized an opportunity to gain access to proprietary 
knowledge of salmon farming that might be used to advance both scientific 
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understanding and their specific agenda. Gord, a biologist and science advocate, 
from CAAR describes: 
“… a lot of the data that the farms have about their operations was seen to 
be confidential, so we had to try to create a forum and an agreement that 
would open up the analysis, hopefully pinpoint some common 
understandings around lack of information ...” 
“One of the advantages that we‟ll have in this agreement is that we‟ll have 
detailed information on the cost structure of the industry” 
Hence, individuals from CAAR recognized an opportunity that was compelling 
enough for them to reconsider some of their firmly held assumptions about 
working with “the enemy”. 
Perceptions between the individuals involved in the Framework continued to 
shift as they continued to interact. The following comment made by Donna, of 
CAAR, is illustrative, “I say we‟ve learned to mutually respect each other for the 
work.  My understanding of the complexity of managing salmon farms has gone 
way up… it is way harder than anyone would think.” Through the ongoing 
discussions prior to coming to an agreement the individuals from Marine Harvest 
also continued to adjust their assumptions about CAAR‟s actions and recognize 
the extent of the similarity between the expectations placed on each organization. 
As Colin, of Marine Harvest, notes: 
“… those groups (CAAR) are businesses and in order to attract investment 
in their business they have to have a campaign; they have to loudly 
proclaim what it is they‟re trying to change.  If they get to the point where 
they say, well, our work is done, then they don‟t attract any more 
investment…” 
Through their ongoing interaction in negotiating the Framework the 
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR came to recognize and question 
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some of their assumptions regarding their organizations‟ response to the conflict, 
and in particular the similarities of the challenges facing them and the potential 
value of working together. They both came to realize that there might be an 
opportunity to advance their own agendas by collaborating. Marine Harvest 
could, in effect, buy time for research to be conducted on sea lice. While CAAR 
would have access to proprietary data to increase the integrity of its positions. 
Both organizations sought to build credibility in the eyes of the broader 
community. CAAR sought credibility with their funders and Marine Harvest with 
the regulators and legislators. By agreeing to conduct collaborative research 
projects they were able to alter praxis even while retaining many of their 
assumptions about their own and the other‟s identity. 
5.5.2.2 Exploring Assumptions Rooted in a Common Identity 
The process of selecting independent researchers to conduct their first joint 
research project surfaced assumptions rooted in individuals‟ common identity of 
scientist and the meanings and expectations related to that identity. As discussed 
in prior sections, the common identity of scientist allowed individuals to bridge 
identity based conflict to focus on the socio-cognitive aspects of the sea lice 
controversy. However, selecting the researchers to carry out the work raised 
deeply held assumptions about the neutrality of science and scientists. This task 
provided the Framework group with an opportunity to assess what was really 
important to them in terms of both their own identity and the identity of their 
contract researchers. The interaction around this task resulted in the group 
reaching a common understanding of their requirements and expectations of 
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research and then explicitly integrating that understanding into their group 
process and into their future work. 
A group of researchers from Simon Fraser University that were strongly 
associated with environmental activism and advocacy responded to the first 
Request for Proposal. Marine Harvest did what Doug referred to as an “emotional 
gut check” as to whether or not they could work with them. Despite the pre-
existing conflict between these researchers and the industry, the Framework 
group awarded them the project, confident that their integrity as scientists would 
mitigate any personal positions. They came “within striking distance” of starting 
the work before it all fell apart, ostensibly over challenges to protocols, as Doug 
describes: 
“I mean, there‟s people at Marine Harvest that understand this stuff pretty 
well… they‟ve got good scientific credentials themselves.  And, we ended 
up in a negotiation with the, you know, Marine Harvest, CAAR and Rutledge 
(the lead researcher)” 
Following this protracted and unsuccessful attempt to initiate a project, the 
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR realized that they needed to be 
cognizant of, what individuals describe as, “the science versus advocacy” tension 
in the scientific community. The group came to recognize how that plays out and 
what it means in terms of getting to solid, reliable information. While “the science 
versus advocacy” tension was not news to the individuals, it did surface 
expectations around the role of science and scientists within the group. Doug, a 
consultant to Marine Harvest, goes on to explain: 
“... we learned quite a lesson… it is probably important to try and find people 
who don‟t bring baggage with them out of the research community...  And, 
198 
 
 
we actually put together a list of criteria that you would check and see – you 
know, is the person respected by their peers?  Are they published?  Has 
their work been put into practice?  Is it informed, et cetera et cetera?  And, 
we also realized we needed to make sure … that we‟d perhaps targeted 
them more to people that we understood were the experts in the field.” 
The assumptions surfaced during their first attempt at selecting researchers 
led to a dialogue about the expectations of research and eventually to a shared 
understanding. Stephanie of Marine Harvest described the outcome of that 
process: 
“So, it‟s better to structure a project such that you can collaborate, which is 
a challenge … scoping it according to the objectives of the project not 
necessarily the overall objective of salmon farming is inherently good or 
salmon farming is inherently bad.” 
They specified clear selection criteria and then based on those criteria they 
jointly developed a list of scientists as possible recipients of future Requests for 
Proposal. 
As a result of their sustained interaction with each other individuals in the 
Framework group were able to gain a deeper understanding of their expectations 
and meanings related to the identity of scientist, in this case the neutrality of 
science. They came to realize that the credibility of their joint research would be 
irreparably damaged if it was seen to favour either industry or environmentalists. 
They used this realization to articulate practices to guide future praxis. Through 
this process the individuals in the Framework group from both CAAR and Marine 
Harvest affirmed the meaning that they collectively attached to the identity of 
scientist (i.e. neutrality) and through their praxis established practices to ensure 
their expectations were understood. 
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5.5.2.3 Exploring Assumptions Rooted in Individual and 
Organizational Identity 
Marine Harvest‟s offer to work with CAAR to develop a coordinated area 
management plan (CAMP) for the Broughton Archipelago was a significant 
departure from past practice and the biggest challenge to both internal and 
external expectations to date. The discussions around CAMP caused individuals 
to confront the meanings that they attached to certain activities, like salmon 
farming in the Broughton, as well as to aspects of their individual and 
organizational identities. These interactions also challenged expectations 
regarding learning, and in particular what constitutes “good science” and the 
extent of individuals‟ and organizational commitment to experimental learning. 
The interaction between individuals in the Framework group and between 
individuals within CAAR resulted in a re-configuration of CAAR and an affirmation 
of its identity as an organization committed to reforming aquaculture and learning 
via the scientific method (i.e. experimentation). Marine Harvest affirmed its 
commitment to adaptive management and its identity as an organization based 
on science, albeit a slightly more action based proactive approach to science. 
By taking the fish out of a number of farms every other year, as part of 
CAMP, Marine Harvest could create a farm free migration corridor for wild 
salmon, which could then be compared with corridors with salmon farms – a true 
experiment. This suggestion was positively received and according to Donna of 
CAAR “would be a substantial breakthrough.” The negotiations on the plan took 
two consecutive days of mediated meetings. Donna describes CAAR‟s intentions 
200 
 
 
in agreeing to CAMP, “...we are trying to see what we can achieve by working 
with the industry at this time.  And we‟re going to stay the course for a while at 
least to see whether we can achieve some significant gains.” 
However to do this presented major challenges to some environmental 
groups and First Nations within the CAAR organization. The specific area 
suggested for the migratory corridor, the Tribune-Fife, was often referred to as 
“ground zero” for the sea lice debate. Certain environmental groups and First 
Nations wanted all farms taken out of this area and would not even consider any 
plan that implied otherwise, such as having farms fallow every other year. 
The prospect of being seen to support salmon farming in any way in the 
Tribune-Fife corridor challenged and activated individual and organizational 
identities within CAAR. This area represented such a key part of the identity of 
individuals, such as Alexandra Morton (who had done much of her research in 
that area) and several First Nations leaders, as well as the organizations they 
represented that the defensiveness provoked was insurmountable. The MTTC, 
which was made up of 4 First Nations in the area, and Raincoast Research, 
Alexandra Morton‟s group withdrew from CAAR over the CAMP amendments. As 
Donna of CAAR notes: 
“We had a few hurdles where … the staff of the organizations said, no, we 
can‟t ever support this. And, we‟ve had to work through that and say, well, 
you kind of agreed to the strategy when you signed on … So, now it‟s 
playing out and I‟m sorry you didn‟t understand this is how it‟s going to play 
out.” 
The sustained attention and prolonged negotiation between individuals at 
multiple levels of the CAAR organizations surfaced a number of assumptions 
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about the meanings attached to places, like the Tribune-Fife corridor, to activities 
like salmon farming, and to processes such as gathering experimental data. The 
exploration of these assumptions and the process of developing a shared 
understanding prompted some individuals to withdraw their organizations from 
CAAR. 
The apparently greater willingness to truly experiment represents a shift in 
some individuals approach to “science”. For example, Marine Harvest had 
entered into the Framework hoping to “buy time” ostensibly to allow “science to 
do its work”. Colin summarizes Marine Harvest‟ research practices and the 
meaning that he and the organization attached to “good science work”: 
“… but it‟s getting the patience and doing the good work, which is slow... 
Science is slower.  Monitoring takes time.  And then, you have to look at the 
patterns in the data and figure out what to do. So, that‟s the challenge. 
We‟re just never able to get all the information quick enough to deal with the 
conflict as effectively as we could.” 
Despite his acknowledgement that “science is slow” Colin and the managers 
at Marine Harvest undertook some major changes to their operations via CAMP 
and as Colin says, “…this was maybe done before we had all the scientific 
information, which is still going on…” The decision by the organization to move 
before it “had all of the information” is a significant shift in behaviour and 
demonstrates a subtle shift in the meaning Colin and Marine Harvest attached to 
“good science”. 
Through the negotiation of CAMP the individuals from Marine Harvest and 
CAAR surfaced deeply held assumptions about their identities and their 
organizations‟ identities in the context of their joint research. Through their 
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dialogue they gained a deeper and common understanding of the adjustments 
each of them needed to make to support their ongoing collaboration.  
Through the process of negotiating CAMP the individuals from both CAAR 
and Marine Harvest affirmed the meaning that they collectively attached to their 
relationship and through their praxis established practices to ensure their 
expectations were understood. As a result of the CAMP negotiation and their 
subsequent adjustments, CAAR and Marine Harvest confirmed their 
organizational commitment to working together to improve industry practices. 
Their actions affirmed both organizations‟ identity as science-based and focused 
on solving problems, while shifting the meaning each associated with “good 
science”. 
5.5.3 Outcome of Dialogue: Learning 
Interpreting is a social activity that affords motivated individuals the 
opportunity to introduce their learning, in this case from the practices developed 
in the Framework group, into the feed forward processes within their 
organization. Hence the shared understandings and collective actions of the 
Framework group prompted processes of interpretation and internal experiments 
in the two organizations. Even as the dialogue and level of shared understanding 
continued to develop between the individuals involved with the Framework, 
changes in their respective organizations‟ practices, such as the signing of the 
Framework agreement and later the implementation of CAMP, provide strong 
evidence that individuals‟ learning has influenced their organizational learning. In 
this section I provide evidence of changes to practices and to meaning, learning, 
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at the individual and organizational level resulting from the praxis of individuals 
from Marine Harvest and CAAR. 
5.5.3.1 Individual Learning 
As a result of their repeated engagement individuals from both Marine 
Harvest and CAAR appear to have altered their beliefs around a number of key 
aspects of their identity and the conflict (See Table 5-9: Evidence of Individual 
Learning for representative quotes). 
There is evidence of changes in individuals‟ conflict responses and 
practices. At the beginning of their interaction individuals were reluctant to even 
meet. When they did meet, after six months of communicating through a third 
party, all interactions were mediated and tightly controlled and between a small 
group of senior practitioners. Over time interaction has become less formal, more 
varied, and involves a wider range of people from multiple levels of both 
organizations. 
Whereas in the beginning the emphasis was on negotiating terms to 
manage their identity differences, it had shifted to understanding and closing the 
gaps in knowledge around sea lice and closed containment systems i.e. to socio-
cognitive conflict. Individuals have come to realize that collaborating does not 
mean agreeing on everything. Indeed it appears that individuals now make more 
“strategic use” of conflict to achieve specific goals, such as letting people vent or 
playing “good cop – bad cop” to raise awareness of an issue. While the conflict 
professionals handle the inevitable day to day conflicts or “skirmishes”. In general 
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engaging with “the enemy” does not represent the threat to identity that it did in 
the beginning of their relationship. 
While individuals‟ social and role identities have remained stable, the 
behaviour by which they express their identities and the aspects of their identities 
that are most salient appear to have shifted. This is most notable in the way that 
key individuals express their common identity of scientist. Early in their 
relationship the identity of scientist seemed to signify “expert” and resulted in 
“dueling press releases” and the defense of generally adversarial positions. 
Through their interaction, the identity of scientist has come to signify 
responsibility for disciplined data gathering and analysis. As stated previously, it 
has shifted to the process of science as opposed to the outcomes of science. 
Also, through their interaction individuals have come to a common understanding 
of their similarities; in terms of the constituencies they each must manage and 
their mutual commitment to protecting the marine habitat. 
Over repeated interactions, the dialogue within the Framework group 
deepened. In subsequent interactions even deeper assumptions were explored, 
leading to further shifts in praxis and ultimately to changes in individual practice 
relative to the conflict and their identities, demonstrating learning. 
Table 5-9: Evidence of Individual Learning 
Individual level learning: Representative quotations 
 
Conflict  “… so, we‟ve known these people for a long time…. we used to 
be in greater conflict and now we just disagree, but we still meet 
together. And, that gave us a completely different relationship.” 
Donna 
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Individual level learning: Representative quotations 
 
“ …they were saying they‟re not facts.  That‟s I think why we‟re 
trying to work together because we don‟t agree on the facts.  And, 
so, they‟ve got their knickers in a knot … Moira and Doug will talk 
about it and they‟ll work it out and they‟ll probably amend the 
communications framework or something.  And, so, part of it‟s an 
emotional thing ...  the heat‟s on and he‟s taking it out on us. And, 
so, you kind of have to... ride the storm a bit …  if there‟s really 
huge issues like we‟re walking away from the dialogue, we bring in 
our mediator and he would call a meeting.” Donna 
“I think we didn‟t handle it right at the beginning either.  We were 
too dismissive and there was this cavalier attitude that we had a 
right to farm there, we had our licenses, we were a business.  
Darn it, people needed our money, didn‟t you want to see 
investments?  It was very paternalistic, business, the economy, 
this is good for you…” Lana 
Identity “for the last year and a half every week or two I‟ve been working 
with stakeholders, but really it‟s the general public.  I‟ve been 
visiting chamber groups, Rotary groups. And, they seem to be a 
good mix of business people and what not.  And, I‟ve gone up and 
down the island speaking with those groups... “ Rob  
 “But we‟re trying to do it in a way that‟s information-based and 
accurate, and not just shrill.  And again it takes you a long time to 
earn credibility and only an instant to lose it.  And so we‟re very 
careful about that as well.” Harry 
“… the first thing we had to do was to acknowledge that 
everybody who‟s out there doing some work has a valid piece 
to...to contribute.  If you‟re going to stand on a position that certain 
people are simply not doing work that‟s worth recognizing, then 
you‟re never going to be able to include their information ... And, 
that happens.” Stephanie 
“… there‟s no risk to me organizationally in Canada to undertake 
this.” Colin 
 “I‟m out there with all the other salmon farmers looking at it 
wondering if I‟m a nut, you know, because it‟s a risk.  Right?  And, 
but, I think that you can‟t stick your head in the sand.” Stephanie 
Learning 
(process) 
“I‟d probably let all these little things slip by.  So, that‟s why to me 
a team has to have all diverse people on it to make sure 
everything gets picked up” Donna 
“It‟s harder to convince your colleagues of a strategy than it can 
be to convince your opponents…” Donna 
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Individual level learning: Representative quotations 
 
“I‟m just saying that I think it‟s the right way to go.  I can‟t translate 
that into money.” Stephanie 
“… another one that I‟ve worked on...  it‟s looking at clam beach 
contamination in the Broughton Archipelago.  … I do the same 
process with everybody.  It‟s basically, what is your issue?  What‟s 
your concern? Let‟s scope it effectively. Are you worried about this 
and not this? Like, what‟s in? What‟s out?“ Stephanie 
 
5.5.3.2 Organizational Learning 
In July 2009, after just over 5 years of engagement, Marine Harvest and 
CAAR made a joint press release, crediting their jointly managed and monitored 
fish farm management program with reduced sea lice levels in the Broughton 
Archipelago (Lavoie, 2009). The notion that a salmon farming company and 
environmentalists could work together was novel in 2004. After years of repeated 
engagement Marine Harvest and CAAR regard direct engagement as the only 
way to resolve differences in understanding. This is a distinct shift in the practice 
of both organizations, and appears to stem directly from the praxis of the key 
individuals. Colin, of Marine Harvest, and Donna, of CAAR, give the perspective 
of the two organizations: 
“…the only way to affect any positive outcome is through engagement and 
working with these folks…. it should be clear to everybody in this industry by 
now that those groups are not going away.  They are in fact part of the 
fabric of our culture ... people look to environmental groups to sound the 
warning bell as do I.  So, they‟re not going to go away.  So, trying to avoid 
them or defend against them or destroy them or whatever is not going to 
happen.  So, can you find ways to work with them within the environment of 
conflict?” 
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“… I don‟t know what the alternative would be to get to a solution ... I guess 
the best way to frame it is no matter what you do at some point you have to 
sit down and talk with your opponent even if it‟s for them to stop doing what 
they‟re doing, … So, you negotiate no matter what.” 
Concurrent with this fundamental shift in their behaviour toward one another 
over the period of negotiating and implementing the Framework, there is 
evidence of a shift in the meanings that are attached to Marine Harvest and 
CAAR‟s identities and to the conflict between them. While neither organization 
has dramatically changed the characteristics that it claims are central, enduring, 
and unique, i.e. its identity, the actions through which each expresses those 
characteristics have shifted and the action which each takes in response to 
conflict have changed. 
For example, Marine Harvest and CAAR still identify themselves as 
collaborative organizations; however the range of organizations they view as 
legitimate collaborators has expanded. This may be as a result of the benefits 
derived from their joint research. Contrary to the practice in the industry prior to 
2004, everyone involved with the Framework agrees that their engagement with 
“the enemy” has value. As Stephanie, of Marine Harvest, says “You know, we‟ve 
learned that continuing to be engaged has value although it also puts you at risk 
in that you have to share more about your company.” This statement illustrates a 
fundamental shift in the belief that the organizations had – that is “the value of 
engaging with “the enemy” outweighs the risks”. As Rob, of Marine Harvest 
explains: 
“… if a stakeholder is identified or a stakeholder approaches us, we‟re 
interested in engaging …. that‟s our policy is to engage.  We‟re not going to 
sit back … There is one fellow in particular ... he also has the website „Save 
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our Salmon‟...  It doesn‟t bring any balance to the subject whatsoever.  So, 
we‟re a little stunned … but, you know, just next week we‟re meeting with 
him and touring him out to the farm and that‟s what we need to do, 
understand him a little more. His heart‟s in the right place, but…” 
Marine Harvest‟s plan to meet with the philanthropist behind “Save our 
Salmon”, an especially strident activist group, to discuss funding for a project, is a 
further example of how the shift in meanings attached to being a collaborative 
organization has resulted in a shift in their response to conflict. 
Marine Harvest and CAAR have undertaken to jointly approach both levels 
of government which has had the effect of aligning their identities. Moira, of 
CAAR,  describes their joint efforts with regard to closed containment  as “… 
another area where we and Marine Harvest are going to be pushing the 
government very hard… we did meet with … the provincial minister jointly with 
Marine Harvest”. In addition, they have made a number of joint presentations on 
their collaborative research including to the Special Legislative Committee on 
Sustainable Aquaculture, and to the World Wildlife Foundations international 
multi-party Salmon Aquaculture Dialogue. They have also presented their 
opposing views together in the same session to regional district councils 
regarding zoning changes, and to a conference of travel writers. 
This public alignment has separated them to a certain extent from their 
peers. Colin of Marine Harvest explains: 
 “My colleagues view me as a traitor if you will....  someone who‟s willing to 
sit down with the enemy.  And, on the other side of the coin they (CAAR) 
say that they have the same kinds of problems.” 
Donna of CAAR shared similar reactions from peers in the environmental 
movement: 
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“...  I imagine if I was in Marine Harvest... I‟m sure Colin has been hit with, 
you know, what the heck are you doing working with those (people)? ... 
there are some other NGO‟s out there or individuals who say that we 
shouldn‟t be so nice in terms of how we work with industry.  We should be 
more critical ...” 
Aligning with each other publically and over time is distinctive in their 
respective peer groups and thus their joint activity has shifted their respective 
organizational identities. Over time each organization has come to see their 
collaboration as part of how they do things. 
Both, Marine Harvest and CAAR continue to identify themselves as 
organizations rooted in science. Indeed, in both organizations the logic and 
language of experimentation and the scientific method has diffused, with lawyers 
and public relations people regularly talking about comparing performance to a 
control group. The two organizations jointly and separately emphasize adherence 
to the appropriate and valid scientific practices and protocols. Donna of CAAR 
states her organization‟s requirements: 
“… we have individuals that are very hardcore scientists who have 
expectations around things … So, we have a strong demand on the 
scientific rigor of things.” 
The re-configuration of CAAR after the CAMP negotiation affirmed its 
organizational commitment to the scientific method and articulated the practices 
that entails. Rigorous experimental design and execution is what Marine Harvest 
and CAAR collectively understand to be “good science”. 
By 2009 both Marine Harvest and CAAR showed evidence of changed 
beliefs as well as changed behaviours, related to their conflict. Both organizations 
and indeed the broader community have learned more about the impact and 
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dynamics of sea lice.  Marine Harvest has changed its treatment of the parasite in 
response to this information and CAAR has sponsored research based on farm 
operating data and adjusted its materials according to that research. Marine 
Harvest has learned that fallowing farms for a season may be “better for 
business” and CAAR has learned about the complexity of salmon farming.  
Marine Harvest has a better appreciation for how the environmental movement 
works and does not react to every statement. Finally, both organizations have 
seen value in being more transparent about their activities. Marine Harvest 
recognizes that transparency decreases suspicion. Marine Harvest created the 
role of Communications Manager, part of whose responsibility is to connect with 
stakeholders and the general public. As Stephanie, of Marine Harvest says: 
“… you can‟t stick your head in the sand.  We‟re here.  We want to stay on 
the coast forever.  And, the only way to do that is to be credible.  And, if you 
have issues, you have to find out what they are and deal with it.” 
Marine Harvest now hosts public tours on one of its farms and regularly has 
students from the University of Vancouver Island monitoring its farm operations. 
CAAR recognizes that giving Marine Harvest warning of their actions generally 
elevates the tone of the public debate because it allows them to give more 
thoughtful answers and not “a knee jerk response”. 
Both organizations continue to speak against the actions of the other in the 
press. This is in breach of their agreement and in the past these kinds of 
statements usually prompted defensive responses, via press release or letters to 
the editor.  While both organizations continue to breach their agreement, the 
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responses have been much less defensive.  As Rob of Marine Harvest and 
Donna of CAAR explain: 
“We both breach the communication protocols.  I will sit here and tell you 
that they breach it ten times more than we breach it, but they have multiple 
members that all speak.  Really we have one or two … we‟re held quite 
accountable to what we say, but, you know, I‟ll have to be fair and say that 
we both push it...” 
“We‟ve had times where I‟ve definitely had to lash out when things aren‟t 
working… Like, today, I was meeting with Colin by phone.  We had some 
issues we needed to talk about.  We have pretty much open door access, 
right.  So, I can phone him … like, we just put out some information.  They 
say we didn‟t follow the communications protocol.  They get their knickers in 
a knot.  We, kind of, push back.  So, there‟s all these little scrimmages that 
happen all the time.  And, to me, the deal is you navigate through those 
scrimmages while you‟re keeping on track with the overall direction…” 
Rather than issue a “dueling press release” as had been the past practice, 
now the individuals involved contact one another directly and hold them 
accountable for their behaviour. Interestingly both Marine Harvest and CAAR 
acknowledge their own culpability and recognize the risk it poses to the overall 
relationship. 
While both Marine Harvest and CAAR show evidence of having learned as 
a result of their engagement, their fundamental conflict over the use of the marine 
resources remains. They have been able to shift much of their activity to 
resolving the differences in knowledge of the issues, while downplaying the 
problematic practices of each other.  Donna sums up CAAR‟s position after more 
than six years of repeated engagement with Marine Harvest: 
“We‟re willing to have a conversation with industry … even if we don‟t agree 
with them and we try and play quietly, but we don‟t give up our positions.  
As a friend of mine once said, you know, respect costs you nothing … you 
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can go in there and talk to your enemy with respect … it doesn‟t mean 
you‟re giving up.” 
In the BC salmon farming industry repeated engagement between 
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR, two relatively power balanced 
organizations, allowed them to explore and to alter assumptions about one 
another, themselves and their organizations. Their repeated engagement 
resulted in new interpretations of the conflict, of the nature of their identities, and 
of those aspects of their own and their organizations‟ identities that are most 
salient in this situation. They also advanced scientific understanding of the impact 
of sea lice. Finally, some of the learning by individuals has been integrated into 
the practices in their respective organizations, demonstrating inter-organizational 
learning. See Table 5-10: Evidence of Inter-organizational Learning for 
representative quotations. 
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Table 5-10: Evidence of Inter-organizational Learning 
Organizational learning: Representative quotations 
 Marine Harvest CAAR 
Conflict “… we acknowledge that there is a 
risk.  We didn‟t acknowledge that 
in 2003... I know internally we 
knew sea lice was a risk because 
we were trying to manage them in 
the 90‟s.” Colin 
“… what I can see … is an 
acceptance from the company... 
this just isn‟t about sea lice.” Rob 
“…can‟t we learn from each other. 
Can‟t we get over whatever‟s 
keeping us separate, knowing that 
that‟s kind of a bit naive because of 
the way science works ... we have 
persevered on trying to bring some 
of the researchers together that 
don‟t normally work together.  And, 
we‟re having some success in 
doing that.” Stephanie 
 “…. obviously, we don‟t see eye 
to eye …. We know each other.  
It‟s all quite civilized, but we 
have quite different, you know, 
diametrically opposed views on 
some issues.” Moira 
“… we couldn‟t get information 
from them(Mainstream) 
because they didn‟t trust us.  
And, it made a difference having 
Marine Harvest there because 
they would say, no, it‟s ok.  You 
can do this ... it still was not the 
same and we never really got 
agreement on some stuff.” 
Donna 
Identity “… it‟s a lot easier for me to say, 
well, in line with corporate thinking 
we‟re working towards greater 
levels of sustainability.  So, if these 
studies that we do poke us in the 
eye a bit, well, that means we have 
to learn from that; we have to 
change…” Colin 
“… that‟s the philosophy here is 
recognizing that we don‟t 
understand it all, but we are 
responsible to make sure that 
we‟re taking good management 
steps to deal with issues when 
they arise.  And, what that means 
to me is to get some good science 
around it and data and 
understanding as to what the issue 
is and isn‟t. And then, whatever 
those results show then we make 
“… our fallback has always 
been even if we can‟t get 
government to change we do as 
much as we can just with 
industry...” Donna 
“… some other NGO‟s out there 
or individuals who say that we 
shouldn‟t be so nice … We 
should be more critical ...  do 
more legal actions.  But we are 
trying to see what we can 
achieve by working with the 
industry at this time.” Harry 
“… I would say, well, it‟s not 
about trust you guys.  It‟s never 
about trust.  so, if you measure 
success not by their view of the 
world and what science they‟re 
willing to accept, but by how the 
industry is being managed or 
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Organizational learning: Representative quotations 
management decisions after 
them.” Stephanie 
the environment‟s being 
impacted, then you have a 
much higher chance of 
success.” Donna 
Learning  “There have been some gains in 
terms of management strategies 
trying to adapt, adaptive 
management strategies ... 
Adaptive management is basically 
incorporating experimental design 
into management to try and 
elucidate whether the management 
action is yielding the effects that 
you want.” Vince 
“You have to acknowledge the fact 
that this person‟s brought up and is 
committed to a certain data set, 
issue, et cetera.  And, so, that can‟t 
be denied.  So, it‟s better to 
structure a project such that you 
can collaborate, which is a 
challenge.” Stephanie 
“… we became much more aware 
of the sea lice dynamic.  And, so, 
we‟re much more aggressive in 
dealing with it than we were 
previously…. there‟s a different 
and deeper understanding of 
what‟s actually going on.” Colin 
“We‟ve committed to trial a closed 
containment again…. let‟s do it 
collaboratively this time…. I mean 
you learn so much … we showed 
how the system financially 
performed and how it performed 
with production and we showed 
how the conventional system did, 
but … didn‟t do … a good job of 
comparing … we‟d do it 
collaboratively …  then we would 
have … key indicators that we 
thought were important 
collaboratively.” Lana 
“... it was a major breakthrough 
for us to be able to go out on 
their farms and count sea lice.  I 
don‟t want to minimize that.  It 
was a major breakthrough.  It 
was them saying, “OK we admit 
that we‟re not transparent.  
People need to understand 
what‟s going on on our farms.” 
Harry 
“ … a press release went out 
today … They knew all about 
that before it went out, they 
were completely briefed on it 
and prepared and everything, 
and that‟s a whole different style 
of working relationship for us.” 
Harry 
“In the old days, we‟d keep it all 
very secret … we‟d catch them 
off guard and so this gives them 
an opportunity to think through 
the information and respond. 
Some people would say that 
that‟s a bad thing because it 
gives them a chance to give 
their answers but … their 
answers don‟t change that 
much.” Donna 
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5.6 Premise 5: Conditions 
A number of the key conditions that favour inter-organizational learning are 
present in the salmon farming industry in British Columbia. There is evidence that 
the combination of sources of conflict between the two organizations, the 
experience and capabilities or practices of the Marine Harvest and CAAR 
organizations, and the experience and capabilities of the individuals directly 
involved all supported inter-organizational learning. I will now present data to 
illustrate each set of conditions in the following sections.  
5.6.1 Conditions Related to the Conflict 
The source of conflict between salmon farming companies and 
environmentalists began as a conflict of interests over how to best manage the 
coastal water resources in BC and over time had degenerated into a conflict over 
values and identity. This description given in 2005 by Heikki, a corporate 
manager of Marine Harvest, evocatively describes salmon farmers‟ perception of 
the conflict: 
“The symbolism of salmon is like the swimming panda bear of Canada.  For 
us fish farmers, Canada is really tough … Sometimes it literally starts at the 
border.  The guy from Customs asks what kind of business are you in and 
you say salmon farming and he says “ooooh”, as if you are an arms dealer.” 
“Canada has the biggest anti salmon farming emotional sentiment … We try 
to build relationships, but it is really tough.  The pressure mostly comes from 
the NGO community. But there is an enormous awareness among the 
Canadian population and the values have spread so much, that it affects the 
markets.” 
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In what the press had termed “The War in the Water” (C. Wilson, 2003), the 
practice of each of the opposing “sides” was to claim the moral high ground with 
environmentalists emphasizing the protection of wild salmon and the marine 
habitat and the companies stressing their economic contribution to coastal 
communities and the provincial economy in general. 
Notwithstanding its provocative statements, since its creation, CAAR had 
framed its conflict with the industry in terms of differences in understanding of the 
impact of raising salmon in open net cages. However their actions tended to cast 
the salmon farming companies‟ actions and intentions in a negative light. Their 
website www.farmedanddangerous.com is but one example of how CAAR casts 
aspersions on salmon farmers‟ integrity. 
The connection between collapse of the pink salmon run in the Broughton 
Archipelago in 2001 and sea lice from the salmon farms shifted the conflict by 
drawing attention to the gap in the scientific research on sea lice. Late in 2002 
the Pacific Fisheries Resource Council concluded that sea lice from the salmon 
farms contributed to the collapse and recommended fallowing farms in migration 
corridors during the out migration. In February 2003 the University of British 
Columbia hosted an international workshop to examine sea lice research marking 
the first time industry, government, First Nations, scientists and non-government 
organizations had met on a topic of scientific research (Richards, 2003). While 
the industry and environmentalists, including CAAR, continued to take actions to 
develop and maintain a positive identity, the recognition of the differences in the 
understanding about the impact of sea lice on the marine habitat and wild salmon 
(socio-cognitive conflict) appeared to have an impact on salmon farming 
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companies. As this comment by Margaret of the BC Salmon Farmers Association 
illustrates: 
" We've always abided by the regulations that are in place now, and would 
like to work collaboratively to figure out what the best approach is … a lot of 
work needs to be done around the interaction of farmed and wild 
salmon.”(Read, 2003) 
The identity framing and the emotions it provoked are described by Lana, of 
Marine Harvest: 
“First we reacted by pushing back really hard and being outraged and 
indignant and going for the … and attacking the NGOs and attacking their 
credibility.  And then we saw ourselves as small community-based 
businesses and farmers and biologists, we didn‟t see ourselves as big 
international corporations.  And the NGOs painted us like that.  And we 
didn‟t see that.  We thought you know people would just listen to us, they 
would just see.  Like I said, we‟re good people.  And we were naïve about 
that too.” 
Managers came to realize that this approach, particularly when used to 
respond to the sea lice issue, proved to be a “fatal error”, as Colin of Marine 
Harvest said: 
“We agree that there‟s concern around this.  We agree that we can 
constantly change the way we grow fish.  We don‟t agree that your concerns 
are necessarily valid, yet we do agree that we‟ll probably be changing the 
way we grow fish because we‟ve been changing the way we grow fish in 
mitigating concerns as long as we‟ve been growing fish.  So let‟s learn 
together...” 
Subsequent to Marine Harvest and CAAR engaging with one another 
directly in joint research, the socio-cognitive aspects of their conflict has become 
a more important driver of behaviour. There has been vacillation between identity 
conflict and conflicts in knowledge especially when either party breaks the 
communication protocols of their agreement. Conflict based on identity was 
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instrumental in the fragmentation of CAAR in 2008. Certain individuals and 
organizations were so identified with the goal of removing salmon farms from the 
Tribune-Fife area that they could not participate in the CAMP experiment. 
However, it seems that by either addressing or distancing themselves from the 
facets of their identities that are different and focusing on the practices of 
identities that they share the individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR have 
been able to access the productive problem solving features of socio-cognitive 
conflict.  They have done this even while their beliefs about the underlying 
resource conflict have remained unchanged (see Table 5-11: Sources of the 
Conflict). 
Table 5-11: Sources of the Conflict 
Conflict 
Source 
Representative quotations 
Resources or 
Conflicts of 
Interest 
“I think historically the relationship generally starts out on 
points of conflict around company practices, their impact 
on the ecosystem and species and concerns around the 
need for change among concerned citizens, environmental 
groups, et cetera …” Donald 
“Just because you removed the fish from the water is it 
improvement if you have now increased your energy 
usage to the point where you‟re taking localized impacts 
and trading them for global impacts.  So, yeah, you‟ve got 
some poop under the ocean under conventional net pens.  
Yes, there is the risk of sea lice transfer both to and from, 
but if you essentially solve those local impacts, move them 
up to land and create global impacts, where‟s your energy 
coming from?  What‟s your source of energy?” Rob 
Socio-
cognitive 
Conflict  
“Unfortunately there is a lack of scientific knowledge in 
some areas.  We are quite concerned that there are some 
research gaps here that need to be filled.  That‟s also 
something that you find when you have this dialogue; you 
can actually better identify these research gaps and 
hopefully agree where we need to do more research.  We 
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are taking part in local dialogues, in Canada we‟re taking 
part in local dialogues, also elsewhere in the world, and 
we‟re also part of the World Wildlife Fund -led salmon 
aquaculture dialogue – where most of the North 
American/Canadian NGOs are participating.” Torgeir  
Identity 
Conflict  
“I think working with environmental groups that simply their 
goal is to remove open net cages from BC. I struggle 
because I don‟t think we have a common goal … their 
messaging has not changed from the time that we met 
with them originally.  It was “we don‟t believe in 
conventional salmon farming”.  It‟s almost to the point 
where they don‟t believe in salmon farming because it‟s a 
carnivore …  So, it was close containment‟s the answer 
and that‟s where we‟re going to get to ... to the point where 
if we were managing sea lice so well that we knew it was 
zero impact, it still wouldn‟t appease them… So, it‟s 
difficult.” Rob 
 
5.6.2 Conditions Related to the Organizations 
Each of the organizations involved in the Framework were complex 
organizations with complex and highly developed learning processes and 
practices. CAAR and Marine Harvest (and its predecessor companies) each had 
established learning practices which, while relatively new, were robust enough to 
endure despite repeated mergers in the case of Marine Harvest and personnel 
changes in the case of CAAR. 
Internal learning practices in both Stolt/Marine Harvest and CAAR primarily 
took the form of ongoing collaborative activities between organizational groups. 
Stolt was arguably the salmon farming organization most adept at learning as it 
was the most profitable in the industry, was considered by its peers to have the 
best run operations and the highest ethics. The firm was also adept at inter-
organizational learning, albeit with like minded science-based organizations, as it 
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actively participated in collaborative research and development projects with 
universities and research institutes. In the case of Marine Harvest, scientists and 
production mangers from various regions and divisions regularly collaborate on 
operational research and development, by sharing data and methods as well as 
through joint initiatives. For example, in September of 2009 the Directors of 
Sustainability for each of Marine Harvest‟s regions met for a week in Campbell 
River to exchange best practices, assess progress to date, and plan future 
sustainability initiatives. The development of Marine Harvest‟s sustainability 
reporting has provided a focal point for much of this activity and has sustained it 
(the activities) through the recent mergers.  
In the case of CAAR, internal learning practices take the form of regular 
internal meetings, committee work, and regular and systematized 
communications between the member organizations focusing on strategy 
development, market analysis, and consumer and community development and 
outreach. As Harry, of CAAR, explains: 
“We have full coalition meetings every two months.  We have various 
committees.  A science committee, a markets team, that are in regular 
contact.  But we have an internal list serve that is used frequently.  It‟s not 
unusual to get 40 or 50 email messages from our colleagues a day….”  
These disciplined learning practices are an expression of CAAR‟s organizational 
identity as a strategic, issue focused ENGO.  
Perhaps most significantly for inter-organizational learning, the practices of 
each organization had been informed by extensive prior experience with learning 
across organizational boundaries. Marine Harvest had worked extensively with 
universities, independent and private research institutes and governments on 
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research projects related to marine ecosystem management, fish husbandry, and 
marine biology. As Colin, of Marine Harvest, describes: 
“(Marine Harvest) was involved in the research and development ... And it‟s 
not always that we‟re doing that independently we‟re usually doing that as a 
group of companies or doing that with the federal or provincial government 
or with an academic institution.” 
These initiatives primarily took the form of contract or co-managed research 
projects between organizations with similar logics and knowledge bases, i.e. 
science-based research or commercial organizations. 
In addition, the company consulted with customers, supply chain members, 
regional governments, the financial community, NGOs, and other stakeholders. 
For example, in 1996 Marine Harvest began a biennial international conference, 
Aquavision, to build relationships and to discuss the challenges in the industry. 
Heikki, of Nutreco, Marine Harvest‟s parent company at the time, explains the 
intent: 
“Having a dialogue to build trust is really important ... we invite our business 
partners, our customers, the financial community, NGOs, media, financial 
analysts, to discuss the big challenges for our industry ...” 
These cross boundary initiatives had established precedents and mechanisms for 
collaboration with “like minded” organizations, primarily related to Marine 
Harvest‟s core business (aquaculture) and for information exchanges with a 
broader range of stakeholders, including conferences, and facilitated multi-party 
initiatives. However, Marine Harvest Canada‟s negotiations with the Kitasoo First 
Nation prompted a greater level of commitment to working not only across 
borders but also across dominant logics. 
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Since 1997 the landmark Delgamuukw case, which established the rights of 
First Nation consultation for activities on their traditional territories, First Nations 
had significant involvement in all fish farm licensing. Two years prior to the ruling 
Marine Harvest had established a cooperative relationship with the Kitasoo First 
Nation in Klemtu. The BC operation had developed some collaborative skills from 
consulting with other regions within Marine Harvest, however through the process 
of consultation with First Nations it developed skills in working with diverse 
groups and across historically adversarial organizational and cultural boundaries, 
albeit toward a shared goal. Certain individuals and groups within Marine Harvest 
Canada recognized the difference in these types of collaborations, Particularly 
Lana who had been directly involved with First Nation consultation over the 
years: 
“… people talk about the three legged stool of sustainability, the social, the 
environmental and all that, but I say, this is really a new way of doing 
business… if we‟re going to make it work here we have to kind of embrace it 
… We all want profitability. It‟s just a different path to get there”. 
Through its relationship with the Kitasoo Marine Harvest also developed 
internal learning practices. As a result of the significant discussions that went on 
internally prior to the Delgamuukw ruling, Marine Harvest changed the way that it 
managed farm licenses in First Nations‟ territory, two years prior to this change 
being required by law. As Lana describes: 
“… the first partnership we had – in Klemtu … I took it right to Holland - and 
Norway.  To explain and present what we were doing and then when the … 
CEO of the international company was here and we spent a lot of energy 
explaining to him why this was a good move.  Why doing this agreement, 
why putting tenures in their name was actually a good move, why that was a 
security of operations, why this was the future in BC, why this was going to 
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be a real bottleneck for us for expansion unless we found a way to work with 
First Nations, right?  On their terms!  We were going to spend way more 
energy fighting it than if we put some energy into figuring out how to make it 
work.” 
CAAR‟s operating procedures, and indeed its very existence was the result 
of a year of negotiations between independent ENGOs (i.e. across organizational 
boundaries). Donna of CAAR notes that while the people have changed, the 
organization and practices of CAAR have remained: 
“… it was 2000 that we sat down for the first time.  And there‟s been a lot of 
changeover in terms of the membership – the people, not the organization.  
But we initially had a one-year facilitated group of meetings to come up with 
a plan and our protocols and how we would operate and work together and 
what teams we‟d put together and all that stuff.” 
This experience had allowed CAAR to establish practices to coordinate and 
collaborate among its member organizations as well as between the key 
individuals involved in the organization. 
5.6.3 Conditions Related to the Practitioners 
The individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR that negotiated the 
Framework were ready to experiment with new behaviours but for different 
reasons. Justin and Colin from Stolt/Marine Harvest were concerned that the 
government would rush in restrictive legislation in order to demonstrate to an 
increasingly alarmed public that they were taking appropriate action. They had 
also come to realize that CAAR was likely to persist in its quest for closed 
containment and further attempts to discredit them (CAAR) would probably reflect 
badly on the company. They became slightly more optimistic about engaging with 
CAAR once they had sought help from Doug, a credible third party with 
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experience in similar situations. Doug was able to provide them with a clear 
process and established practices from other contexts which further increased 
their confidence and prompted them to ask Doug to contact CAAR with an offer 
to do joint research. 
The response from Donna and the executives of the CAAR member 
organizations to the initial contact from Stolt/Marine Harvest was optimistic. They 
had confidence in Doug from other conflicts and saw the fact that Stolt/Marine 
Harvest hired him and not one of several other well known consultants as a very 
positive sign. In addition to trusting Doug, CAAR trusted Stolt‟s motives because 
they believed that their market campaigns had negatively affected the demand for 
BC salmon and the morale of salmon farm employees. 
Also, for several of CAAR‟s scientist members the prospect of having 
access to operational data from salmon farms far outweighed the risks and efforts 
involved in collaborating with the company. Finally, Scott along with CAAR‟s 
major funders recognized that while their tactics had produced lots of awareness 
there had been limited change and that perhaps it was time to try a new 
approach. 
In summary, Justin and Colin from Marine Harvest were ready to engage 
with CAAR because they were motivated by the threat of punitive legislation, and 
the cost in terms of public support of continued conflict. They were optimistic 
about the outcome of engaging with CAAR because of guidance they received 
from Doug. Donna, Scott, Harry, and Gord of CAAR were ready to engage with 
Marine Harvest because they were motivated by the suggestion of their major 
funders, and by the opportunity to conduct research on actual operating salmon 
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farms. They were optimistic because they perceived that Marine Harvest had 
been affected by their campaigns and that by hiring Doug they were ready to truly 
engage. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
6.1 Overview 
In this research I focused on uncovering the role of identity in inter-
organizational learning between organizations in conflict and the conditions under 
which such learning is more likely to occur. In addition, I explored how individuals 
and organizations balance the dysfunctional processes that arise when identity 
based conflict persists with the more functional problem solving processes 
associated with resolving a gap in knowledge, a socio-cognitive conflict. 
Managing this delicate balance is critical for firms, as they are increasingly 
expected to engage with and integrate perspectives from different sectors (Hart & 
Sharma, 2004; Rothman & Friedman, 2001) in order to “anticipate and respond to 
impending threats, conduct experiments, (and) engage in continuing innovation” 
(Argyris & Schon, 1996, p. xvii). 
This research explored the relationship between identity, conflict, and inter-
organizational learning, using the theoretical lens of the practice-based view. The 
practice-based view contains three elements, practice, praxis and practitioners 
(Whittington, 2006). Practice represents the prior collective and individual 
learning, including aspects of identity that guide activity, such as shared routines, 
norms, and procedures, that can be altered depending on the situation in which 
they are used (Orlikowski, 1996; Seidl, 2007).  Praxis refers to the actual 
activities and behaviour that individuals undertake in situations in response to 
stimuli, in this case conflict. Practitioners are those who perform praxis, and they 
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can be organizational leaders, managers, or external agents such as consultants 
because what they actually do in situations of conflict affects an organization‟s 
learning. These three elements combine to form inter-organizational learning. 
I proposed a multi-level model of inter-organizational learning consisting of 
three meta-constructs, identity, conflict, and learning, and based on five premises 
each of which is rooted in existing theory. I put forward that each meta-construct 
is embedded in behaviour at the individual and collective levels and each is 
interrelated to the others. Change in each meta-construct is anchored in 
feedback and feed forward cycles through the activities (praxis) of individuals and 
the practices of organizations. In this dissertation I suggest that there are 
necessary conditions related to each meta-construct for inter-organizational 
learning to occur between “enemies”.  Therefore, a model of inter-organizational 
learning should consider all three meta-constructs. 
The empirical work in this dissertation was guided by two research 
questions. First, what is the role of identity in organizational learning between 
organizations in conflict? Second, how does an organization learn from another 
organization with which it is in conflict? 
Using a single case study approach, which is appropriate to answer “how” 
and “why” questions asked against a backdrop of existing theory (Yin, 2009), I 
studied the salmon farming industry in BC. Historically this has been an industry 
embroiled in conflict with environmentalists. The salmon farming industry in BC 
represented a fruitful setting for studying inter-organizational learning given the 
industry has been under intense pressure from both shareholders and 
stakeholders to improve economic and environmental performance respectively. 
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Recently a joint learning initiative has begun between the largest salmon farming 
company and a coalition of environmental organizations and First Nations. In 
contrast, the second largest salmon farming company has actively chosen not to 
interact with any ENGOs. Using interviews, archival data, newspaper articles, 
and observations, I collected a rich data set that allowed me to compare the 
findings of the case with my model of inter-organizational learning, i.e. my initial 
theoretical statement (Yin, 2009). As Yin (2009) points out the qualitative case 
method enables theoretical but not statistical generalization. 
Three main findings emerged from this research. First, by examining 
identity, conflict, and learning together I am able to provide insight into conditions 
under which learning between organizations in conflict is more likely to occur. 
While previous research has acknowledged the importance of conflict to learning 
and the centrality of identity to conflict and to a lesser extent identity‟s influence 
on learning, in this study I articulate the relationship between these three key 
concepts. This relationship extends beyond the emphasis in prior literature on 
cognition and provides a more socialized and behavioural view of inter-
organizational learning. 
Second, I identified a critical link between individual learning and inter-
organizational learning in situations of conflict. Individuals in my case study were 
able to use conflict as a motivating point to advance learning within their 
organization. Specifically, individuals from two of the organizations in my study 
were able to use the practices associated with a shared identity to engage in 
collective action (praxis) and consequently bridge across the conflict. Their 
repeated interaction and engagement prompted new interpretations, and 
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integration of their shared understanding. This in turn prompted further 
experimentation both together and in their respective organizations, leading to 
altered practices, and ultimately altered meanings. This outcome extends the 
dominant view in the literature, that of identity as a constraint to learning and 
source of conflict and revealed a more nuanced picture of identity‟s impact on 
individual interaction and its (identity‟s) impact on learning. 
Finally, this case study showed the role of identity in shifting behaviour and 
the role of conflict and learning processes in shifting the salience of certain 
aspects of identity. Change in individuals‟ and organizations‟ response to conflict, 
their learning, and aspects of their identity was anchored in feedback and feed 
forward cycles. Conflict, identity, and learning appeared to evolve through the 
situated activities (praxis) of individuals and ensuing shifts in the practices of 
organizations or groups. This finding highlights the multi-level nature of both 
identity and learning and in particular the importance of behaviours or practices 
associated with identity at the individual and collective levels. 
In this chapter, the findings of my research are interpreted within the context 
of the proposed theoretical model by first examining the relationship between 
conflict, identity, and learning. Then, I address my research questions by 
exploring the role of identity in inter-organizational learning via the processes 
through which inter-organizational learning between enemies occurs. The pen-
ultimate section explores several new ideas related to the impact of identity on 
conflict and learning processes which emerged during the research process. The 
final section assesses the quality of this research. 
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6.2 Understanding Identity, Conflict, and Inter-Organizational 
Learning 
Prior research has acknowledged that conflict can instigate learning (Argyris 
& Schon, 1978), that identity is central to conflict (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008), and 
that identity has an influence on learning (Nag et al., 2007); however the nature 
of the relationship between these concepts has not been articulated. In particular 
prior research has been unable to explain the paradoxical phenomenon of 
organizations that are able to learn from each other despite high levels of identity 
based conflict, the source of conflict shown to be most dysfunctional for learning. 
So while previous research has looked at these concepts in isolation my research 
considers all three together to uncover the activities that underlie inter-
organizational learning. The relationships I uncovered, along with the processes 
that shape these relationships, contribute to a richer understanding of how 
organizations learn, in general and in situations of conflict in particular. 
The first two of the five premises underpinning my theoretical model 
describe fundamental connections between identity, conflict and learning. First, 
that identity, conflict and learning are inter-related, in that one influences the 
formation of the others. As expected, my data show that identity and learning are 
embedded in the activities (praxis) of individuals and in practices at the collective 
level. However, conflict appears to act as a stimulus to activity and is not 
embedded in it in the same way as is identity and learning.  Second, identity, 
conflict and learning are inter-related across individual and collective levels via 
feedback and feed forward mechanisms. Again as expected, my data provide 
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multiple examples of the existence and importance of links between levels for 
each of identity, conflict and learning. 
Prior literature has focused on one of two somewhat simplistic views of 
conflict: the information processing view in which conflict is seen as promoting 
learning and the social identity view where conflict negatively affects learning.  In 
the latter perspective, identity is characterized as a constraint to learning by virtue 
of the organizational and individual defensiveness it can trigger (Argyris, 1991; A. 
Brown & Starkey, 2000; Nag et al., 2007). By considering conflict, identify, and 
learning together in this research I  found that under certain conditions identity 
can enable learning despite identity differences. This is an important insight into 
the learning literature because it brings together two hitherto separate 
explanations of the relationship between conflict and learning and specifically 
addresses the conflict based on identity difference, considered by some 
researchers to be both the most prevalent and dysfunctional form of conflict 
(Mannix & Neale, 2005; Mooney et al., 2007). 
The third and fourth premises in my model describe change in identity, 
conflict and learning and how change results from the activities (praxis) of 
individuals and the practices of groups when they engage inter-organizationally. 
My data show how the practices associated with individual and organizational 
identity can support shifts in behaviour.  Over repeated engagement identity, 
conflict and learning continued to evolve as a result of individuals recognising and 
exploring their assumptions, developing shared understandings, and introducing 
those understandings to their respective organizations. My case study provides 
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strong evidence of the importance of actions and practices at the individual level 
and the implications for practice and learning at the collective level over time. 
The final premise underpinning my model deals with certain pre-existing 
conditions identified in prior literature that appear to be particularly relevant to 
inter-organizational learning in situations of conflict. They relate to the conflict 
itself, the organizations and the individuals involved. Previous research has 
tended to treat these as discrete situations, for example examining the level of 
inter-organizational learning experience but not considering the root of the conflict 
that created the learning opportunity or the positions of the individuals directly 
engaged with one another. In my research, in addition to the organizational 
learning capability and inter-organizational learning experience, I drew insight 
from social psychology and considered the relative importance of the socio-
cognitive aspects of the conflict (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008), and the motivation 
and confidence of individuals in the possibility for change (Pruitt, 2005). In 
explaining the conditions required for exploring assumptions I drew on social 
psychology and sociology, to consider the impact of power, institutions, and 
prolonged engagement on learning (Allport, 1954; R. Brown, 2000; Parker-Follett, 
2003).  Most importantly, my research demonstrated the importance of individual 
and organizational identities to learning which I discuss in detail in the following 
section. 
This dissertation was guided by two research questions. First, what is the 
role of identity in organizational learning between organizations in conflict? 
Second, how does an organization learn from another organization with which it 
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is in conflict (the process of learning)? In the next sections I answer these 
questions. 
6.3 The Role of Identity in Inter-Organizational Learning in 
Conflict 
I focus on identity because research and practice have shown that all 
conflicts are at least in part rooted in the identities of the individuals, groups, or 
organizations involved (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008). Specifically I explored the 
conditions that allowed organizations and individuals to overcome the constraints 
that prior research suggests that social, role, and organization identities imposed 
on learning. Whereas previous research has focused on how the practices 
associated with identity deterred learning, especially across organizational 
boundaries (Hong & O, 2009; Macpherson & Clark, 2009; Nag et al., 2007) my 
case study shows how practices associated with specific individual and 
organizational identities can support learning even across significant boundaries. 
6.3.1 Organizational Identity 
 Organizational identity has been defined as the “central and enduring 
attributes of an organization that distinguish it from other organizations … 
reflected in its unique pattern of binding commitments” (Whetten, 2006, p. 220). 
Similar to institutionalized learning, organizational identity is often described as a 
"cognitive map" that filters and molds an organization‟s interpretation of stimuli 
and activates a set of familiar routines in response (Albert & Whetten, 1985; 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Organizational identity has 
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been shown to delineate what are considered acceptable or legitimate solutions 
(Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and it is one of the vehicles 
through which "preconceptions determine appropriate action" (K. Weick, 1988, p. 
306). My research reinforced the notion that interpretations shaped by the 
organization‟s identity can shift individuals‟ behaviour in particular directions and 
thereby direct and shape organizational actions (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). In 
particular, it demonstrated that an organizational identity defined by learning 
processes, such as the scientific method, can direct individual behaviour (praxis) 
toward exploration (Barney et al., 1998; Schon, 1986), especially when 
individuals strongly identify with their organization (Schwenk, 2002). For example, 
Marine Harvest‟s emphasis on dialogue and openness encourages individual 
managers, several of whom openly expressed their pride in the organization‟s 
approach to sustainability, to undertake projects outside the boundaries of the 
industry without fear of reprisal. This demonstrates the role of organizational 
identity in directing behaviour as well as illustrating the behavioural impact of an 
identity defined by deutero-learning processes. In contrast, Mainstream‟s 
emphasis on financial sustainability encourages individual managers, who are 
equally proud of their organization‟s approach to sustainability, to devote time 
and resources to improving internal operations and exploiting existing knowledge.  
In my case study, the way in which key organizational players expressed 
their organizational identities had an impact on the learning processes they 
undertook. Stolt described itself as a collaborative research organization 
particularly within the aquaculture research and development community. 
However, Stolt was private and focused on “like minded” organizations in their 
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consultation. Stolt consulted directly and privately with research organizations 
with recognized expertise, until the sea lice issue. They were more like 
Mainstream in that regard. CAAR, in a similar vein, described itself as a 
collaborative organization that is able to navigate/negotiate difficult relationships 
and coordinate research in support of protecting the marine habitat also with “like 
minded” organizations. 
In my case study conflict motivated a relaxation of the constraints that 
organizational identity places on individual behaviour. Consistent with prior 
findings, my study confirmed that the interaction between external stimuli and 
internal feedback and feed forward processes drive organizational identity 
dynamics (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004) and that feedback from the external 
environment destabilized organizational members‟ self-perceptions (e.g. D. Gioia 
et al., 2000; Hatch & Schultz, 2002). Until 2004 inconsistencies between external 
perceptions and internal beliefs regarding their organization‟s identity triggered 
defensiveness. By 2004 the serious discrepancies activated by the sea lice 
debate, induced individuals at Marine Harvest/Stolt to reevaluate their 
understandings (D. Gioia et al., 2000; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). With the “filter 
and mold” of their organization‟s interpretations in flux individuals within Marine 
Harvest and CAAR were able to suspend their belief systems and thus be open 
to new interpretations (Inkpen & Crossan, 1995). My research suggests that the 
influence of organizational identity on individual behaviour depends on its degree 
of stability. 
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6.3.2 Individual Identity 
While key behavioural aspects of the organizational identities of Stolt and 
CAAR were aligned this was not sufficient to overcome the dysfunctional 
responses prompted by what Stolt viewed as illegitimate targeting by CAAR. That 
initiative came from individual action prompted by external feedback and 
sustained through a period of multiple mergers that introduced ambiguity to the 
organization‟s identity. Contrary to the predictions of my original model, in my 
case study identity and learning are embedded in praxis and practice. Conflict, 
identity, and learning are inter-related through action. Conflict stimulates praxis 
which is an expression of identity and learning. 
Identity ambiguity implies multiple possible interpretations about which core 
features should define the organization (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2004). The 
ambiguity introduced by merger activity appears to have increased the 
opportunities to ask the question “who are we” and the positive feedback from the 
environment may have provided guidance as to a desired identity and the 
behaviours associated with that identity for the company created by the merger of 
Stolt, Marine Harvest and PanFish. 
The extent of the feedback around the sea lice issue seemed to shift the 
root of conflict to the apparent gaps in knowledge about sea lice as well as 
highlight to managers within Stolt the ineffectiveness of its approach to 
addressing the issue. This prompted the senior manager in Canada to seek 
information from new sources, albeit one with recognized expertise in managing 
stakeholder conflicts and to eventually engage that well regarded third party to 
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contact CAAR. The key individual in CAAR believed that Stolt had been harmed 
by their (CAAR‟s) aggressive anti-farmed salmon campaign. She believed that 
they were ready to consider a new approach and that made her interpret, albeit 
cautiously, the offer as a sincere request to explore possibilities. Both of the key 
individuals involved thought the other party had much to gain from the interaction 
and used what they interpreted as an opportunity to potentially advance their own 
agenda. Their change in behaviours created the opportunity for experimental 
learning as they entered into the interaction with openness to behavioural 
change. 
In my case study, inter-organizational learning appeared to begin with 
actions that minimized, to the extent possible, identity differences between 
individuals and emphasized joint problem solving. Initial contact was made via an 
individual that was not strongly or personally identified with either “side”. Over an 
extended period of first indirect and then direct interaction individuals‟ from both 
Stolt/Marine Harvest and CAAR were able to tap into practices related to their 
common social and role identities. The individuals involved in the salmon farming 
industry had a range of relevant social and role identities including, scientists, 
issue consultants/managers, and coastal community residents. Most importantly 
they were able to coalesce around the identity of “scientist” interested in 
understanding the impact of sea lice. Also, as in this case, an identity such as 
scientist may connect individuals, whereas within an organization it is often a role 
identity that differentiates them. By matching individuals who shared the identities 
of scientist or issue manager, individuals were able to use the common protocols 
and practices associated with those communities of practice, as well as the 
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language to experiment with collective action without changing their beliefs.  In 
particular the matching of scientists supported their focus on joint research while 
allowing them to “delegate” the controversial relationship issues to the issue 
managers. 
Contrary to my original expectations the conflict in my case study did not 
appear to activate different individual identities but rather different aspects of 
individuals‟ salient identities. For example, the most important aspect of the 
identity of “scientist” shifted from being the “expert” and to being the guardian of 
the scientific method. 
Once the Framework for Dialogue had been developed and integrated 
within each of their respective organizations  the individuals could suspend their 
beliefs, and  behave according to the agreement, which was built around five 
scientific investigations and well established scientific (and conflict management) 
protocols. They had begun to move from using the end products of science as a 
weapon against each other to using the practices associated with the scientific 
process as the mechanism through which they could cooperate. Science 
continued to provide a neutral and honourable identity with which all parties 
(individuals and organizations) could identify. It also provided sufficient ambiguity 
to allow the group to agree on action while retaining whatever individual beliefs 
that were needed to reach consensus (Eisenberg, 1984). This shared action and 
experience created sufficient shared understanding for CAAR and Marine 
Harvest to enter into an agreement and to subsequently undertake a major 
experiment and to jointly lobby government. 
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6.3.3 Shifting Aspects of Identity 
The collaboration process between Marine Harvest and CAAR was 
enthusiastically supported by local institutions, in particular government. The 
behavioural change was so strongly supported that Marine Harvest and CAAR 
came to share an identity as leaders in resource company/environmentalist 
collaboration. In a sense their response to the feedback from the environment put 
them in the “iron cage” together (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Given that the 
institutional (regulatory) support for the new practices after five years of repeated 
engagement, they appear to have altered some of the meanings attached to 
identity (K. Corley & D. Gioia, 2003).  Most dramatically, CAAR decreased its 
membership primarily as the result of asking the questions “who are we” and 
“what activities will we undertake” during their decision to support the CAMP. The 
changes to CAAR‟s membership and Marine Harvest‟s operations demonstrate 
their respective integration of new common understanding of “who we are” and 
“what we do” and hence inter-organizational learning. 
Building on the work of Nag and colleagues (2007), my research 
demonstrates that the possibility for inter-organizational learning can occur at the 
intersection of identity (who we are), learning (what we know), and practice (what 
we do) both within and between organizations in conflict. By attending to the 
socio-cognitive aspects of the conflict individuals from each organization begin to 
distance themselves from their identity based differences. Consequently, these 
individuals, within the context of their unique social, role and organizational 
identities, interpret the stimulus provided by the conflict differently. Their 
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interpretation and therefore their responses are enormously affected by their 
repertoire of individual identities, the nature and stability of their respective 
organizational identities, and by their level of identification with their organization. 
If the hold of their organizational identity is sufficiently loosened or supportive of 
exploration, then the practices associated with a common social or role identity 
may provide the common language and protocols to undertake collective action. 
It is the identities of the individuals representing each organization and the 
practices and actions through which they express their identities that initially 
facilitates or constrains interpretation and integration and hence organizational 
learning (Crossan et al, 1999). 
6.4 The Process of Inter-Organizational Learning 
At the heart of the process of “learning between enemies” lies the concept 
of dialogue (Bohm, 1996). Dialogue goes beyond typical notions of conversation 
and exchange to explore “the manner in which thought … is generated and 
sustained at the collective level” (Bohm, 1996, p. vii) and as such it requires that 
individuals and their respective organizations have both the ability and the 
willingness to engage, to explore assumptions, and to collectively learn. Whereas 
prior research has tended to deal with the issues of willingness and ability 
separately, my research considers the conditions necessary at the individual and 
collective levels for “enemies” to engage and to sustain that engagement such 
that they learn from each other. 
Prior research has tended to focus on one of three broadly defined sources 
of conflict; resources, identity, or socio-cognitive differences. There has been 
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limited recognition that all sources can be present in any situation of conflict and 
no consideration of the implications that has for progression of the conflict (for an 
exception see DeDreu & Gelfand, 2008). My research showed that by managing 
the identity aspects of their conflict and focusing on its socio-cognitive aspects 
individuals were able to undertake and sustain collective action, which resulted in 
individual and collective learning, even while their resource based conflict 
persisted.  Through addressing or distancing themselves from the facets of their 
identities that were different and focusing on the practices of identities that they 
shared, individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR were able to access the 
productive problem solving features of socio-cognitive conflict and avoid, for the 
most part, the dysfunctional defensiveness of identity conflict. 
My case study reinforced the importance of an organization‟s internal 
learning practices and its prior experience with inter-organizational learning. My 
data demonstrated how well developed organizational learning capabilities and 
established practices to manage inter-organizational interactions help to facilitate 
the challenging interactions typical of “learning between enemies”.  CAAR and 
Marine Harvest each had established learning practices which, while relatively 
new, were robust enough to endure despite repeated mergers in the case of 
Marine Harvest and personnel changes in the case of CAAR. Each had had 
experience of learning across organizational boundaries. Most recently, Marine 
Harvest had incorporated learning from its interactions with a First Nation, 
demonstrating an ability to learn from an organization that operated under a 
different logic. 
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The willingness and abilities of the individuals directly involved are critical to 
inter-organizational learning outcomes. Whereas previous research on inter-
organizational learning has hinted at the importance of individuals (i.e. Inkpen & 
Tsang, 2007), my research draws a direct link between individual learning and 
inter-organizational learning. My data demonstrates that individuals can be 
motivated and optimistic about engaging with the “enemy” for different reasons.   
However, in order to initiate contact individuals must be confident that the 
potential benefits of working with unfamiliar and possibly hostile individuals 
outweigh the personal cost. 
Previous empirical research on inter-organizational learning has given 
limited attention to power shifts in inter-organizational collaborations (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008; Inkpen & Tsang, 2007). In my case study the relative balance 
of power between the individuals involved has been maintained, while the power 
between their organizations has vacillated. My data shows that a shift in first the 
balance of power and then in the nature of the power between the two key 
organizations was critical to maintaining their engagement and to supporting the 
exploration of assumptions underlying their behaviour and expectations. The 
apparent shift from a “power over” paradigm to a more interdependent “power 
with” approach has supported continued and productive engagement (Parker-
Follett, 2003). Further to notions of power and consistent with the predictions of 
institutional theory and organizational learning theory, in my case study, 
institutional support from the relevant levels of government as well as in Marine 
Harvest‟s case the corporate head office was critical to sustaining the 
engagement. 
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My case study reinforces and elaborates on previous research on inter-
organizational learning that describes the structures and mechanisms necessary 
for learning.  My data show a gradual shift from very structured formal 
interactions between a few senior people to less formal more social interactions 
between people at various levels of the organization and even external to the 
organization. Early in their engagement formal, structured interaction was 
conducted through a consultant and then with the help of a mediator. These third 
parties focused the information exchanged, thus helping the parties to focus on 
certain aspects of the conflict and on common aspects of their identities. From 
this common base the individuals were able to negotiate an agreement that 
included behavioural protocols as well five specific research projects. Over time 
there was a de facto separation of duties with the scientists managing the various 
research projects and the consultant and manager/activist managing the day-to-
day conflicts. Individuals‟ responsibilities became aligned with their identities and 
abilities. Thus, these structures and mechanisms of engagement sustained the 
interaction enabling dialogue. 
My data show clear instances of individuals engaging in dialogue, that is  
exploring deeply held assumptions about their expectations, the meanings they 
attach to their own and to others identities‟. By recognizing these assumptions, 
individuals appear to have gained new understanding of themselves and others. 
In this context they began to understand the extent to which they were 
automatically responding based on their interpretation of the situation. With such 
understanding, Bohm (1996) suggests that defensive posturing will diminish and 
deep collective learning is then possible, although not assured.  For example, the 
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negotiation of CAMP resulted in a new interpretation of the identity of CAAR, as 
evidenced by its binding commitment to support CAMP.  It also resulted in an 
affirmation of the identities of those organizations that left CAAR. The more that 
the balance of power, the relevant institutions, and the structures and 
mechanisms of engagement between the organizations are able to support and 
sustain dialogue, the more likely inter-organizational learning will occur. 
6.5 Beyond the Model: Sub-Process of Inter-Organizational 
Learning  
The focus of this dissertation has been on understanding the relationship 
between identity, conflict, and inter-organizational learning using an extreme case 
study of a single industry. This research was grounded in a process model of 
inter-organizational learning developed from an eclectic review of the literature 
and the recent theoretical lens of the practice based view. However during the 
course of the field work, data analysis and consolidation, several patterns outside 
the scope of the proposed model have surfaced. I discuss these in this section. 
The primary evidence of inter-organizational learning between the two 
“enemies” in my case study was their willingness to jointly undertake increasingly 
bold experiments even while continuing to target and respond to each other 
negatively in the media. The repeated engagement via experiments between 
individuals from Marine Harvest and CAAR seemed to mediate the relationship 
between conflict and learning, prompting a three step learning process that I have 
labeled as distancing, pairing, and rule setting. In the period under study I 
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identified two cycles of distancing, pairing, and rule setting each culminating in an 
experiment, overall reduction in targeting in the media, and an increase in the 
extent of experimentation. See Figure 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational 
Learning in Conflict. 
 
 Figure 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational Learning in Conflict 
 
The first sub-process that I uncovered involved a detachment or separation 
by individuals from aspects of the conflict or of their identities that were both 
problematic and fixed, such as shifting focus away from the conflict in values 
between salmon farming companies and environmentalists and toward their 
common knowledge gap (i.e. the impact of sea lice). Individual activities (praxis) 
that comprise this include seeking information from new sources, communicating 
via a neutral third party, and talking privately. By consulting new sources, both 
parties displayed a willingness to consider new approaches to the issue of sea 
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lice. Their subsequent communication via a neutral third party and in private talks 
further demonstrated their motivation to distance themselves from the behaviour 
that had been ineffective in resolving the sea lice issue. Organizationally, there is 
also evidence of actively detaching from past practices, such as when Stolt 
began posting sea lice data on the internet. By sharing information publically Stolt 
was distancing itself from its “private” and less than transparent identity and 
showcasing its accountability and operationally superior aspects. Also, hiring a 
well regarded neutral consultant to represent the company with CAAR minimized 
the risk of identity conflict rooted in that individual‟s identification with Stolt.  
Similarly, CAAR hired an experienced issue manager/activist with no prior 
connection to the sea lice issue to manage day to day interaction with Marine 
Harvest once the Framework was in place.  I summarized these behaviours as 
distancing to describe what both individual managers and organizations were 
doing to shift attention away from the identity conflict and toward socio-cognitive 
conflict both prior to and during engagement with each other. 
The second sub-process that emerged, involved a matching of individuals 
and groups based on those aspects of their respective identities that were 
compatible particularly from a work practice or skill perspective. In my case study, 
scientists were assigned to design and manage research projects and over time 
communicated directly. Perhaps most importantly, conflict professionals such as 
the consultant and the experienced manager/activist were hired by Marine 
Harvest and CAAR respectively and tasked with managing the day to day 
relationship as well as any non-science conflicts that emerged in the projects. 
This ensured that the individuals that were most skilled in handling conflict were 
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responsible to do so. These individuals were relatively less identified with the 
issue or their organizations than others interviewed; however they were very 
identified with making the Framework a success. Organizationally, Marine 
Harvest and CAAR carefully matched the individuals they initially put forward to 
negotiate. Tellingly, CAAR did not include the individual most closely associated 
with sea lice and arguably the most knowledgeable, even though she was part of 
the coalition. The CAAR team included two individuals trained in negotiation and 
two scientists, while the core Stolt team included a consultant/negotiator and a 
scientist who had spent a multi-faceted career in salmon related issues. By 
matching the identities of the individuals they put forward the two organizations 
helped to provide common skills and language. Additionally, over time the 
organizations that had compatible aspects in their identities continue to work 
together (i.e. Living Oceans Society, David Suzuki Foundation, the Watershed 
Watch Salmon Society), while those that could not distance themselves from the 
problematic aspects of their organizational identity, left the coalition (i.e. 
Raincoast Research).  I summarized these behaviours as pairing to describe how 
common aspects of identity and especially role identities form the basis for 
individual practitioners to engage and how organizations undertook to match the 
common aspects of their organizational identities. 
The third sub-process that emerged dealt with setting the rules for ongoing 
interaction between the paired individuals and organizations, such as the 
agreement to discuss a joint initiative, agreeing to the terms contained in the 
Framework, and agreeing to the process for specific research projects. This sub-
process involved negotiating both the procedures and the nature of the 
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interaction using the language and protocols of the common identities that had 
been paired for the engagement. Importantly, it did not include negotiating 
outcomes. I labeled this sub-process rule setting. The rule setting process 
evolved from highly focused, controlled and mediated face to face interactions in 
the beginning to less formal, and less centralized direct and indirect interactions 
across a range of activities such as project management, and project initiation.  
At the individual level rule setting activities (praxis) included meetings, phone 
calls, emails, and modeling acceptable behaviour. At the collective level rule 
setting was demonstrated by the agreement and subsequent adherence to the 
communication protocols, the roster of scientists, the project hierarchy and 
structure and respectful interaction. 
For some examples of these sub-processes at the praxis (individual) and 
practice (collective) levels, see Table 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational 
Learning in Conflict. 
Table 6-1: Sub-processes of Inter-organizational Learning in Conflict 
Sub -Process Praxis  Practice  
Distancing  Sought information from new 
sources 
Contact via 3rd party 
Private talks 
Shared sea lice data on-line 
Hired neutral consultant (MH) and 
a manager/activist (CAAR)   
Pairing  Scientists- Consultant- 
Lawyer 
Scientists –Scientist 
Consultant – Experienced 
Activist 
Hired mediator   
Built an extended team 
Delegated tasks to “specialists” 
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Rule setting  E-mail, phone calls, 
meetings 
Teaching respectful 
interaction 
Negotiate list of scientists 
Project management 
activities 
Communication protocols 
“Respect costs you nothing”  
List of “acceptable” scientists 
Project hierarchy & structure 
Bold 
Experiment  
Negotiating process & 
prohibitions 
Monitoring sea lice together 
Developing terms of 
reference  
Joint lobbying 
Agreement to negotiate 
Framework for Dialogue 
Sub-contract research  
CAMP 
 
 
In my case study each cycle of distancing, pairing, and rule setting 
culminated in collective action which I termed a bold experiment. The negotiation 
and implementation of each bold experiment increased the shared understanding 
between Marine Harvest and CAAR and thus created an ever firmer foundation 
for the next cycle of learning and experimentation. I define a bold experiment as a 
collective behavioural change undertaken with no apparent cognitive change, 
which is described as surprising by participants and/or other individuals or 
organizations in the industry. The bold experiments include the original 
agreement to negotiate, the Framework for Dialogue, the joint sub-contracting of 
research, and CAMP. My research revealed a general increase in both the 
“boldness” of the experiments undertaken by Marine Harvest and CAAR as well 
as the level of shared understanding between the two organizations. While this 
increase in shared understanding was accompanied by a decrease in 
expressions of identity based conflict, the underlying identity and resource conflict 
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between the two organizations persists (See Figure 6-2: Inter-organizational 
Learning in Conflict). 
 
 
Figure 6-2: Inter-organizational Learning in Conflict 
 
These sub-processes begin to provide a deeper understanding of the 
practitioner- praxis- practice relationships that I describe in my conceptual model 
of inter-organizational learning (see Figure 3.5) and the relationships between 
conflict, identity, and learning that comprise the primary contribution of this 
research. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Summary of Contributions 
This research makes four primary contributions. The main contribution of 
this dissertation is highlighting the importance of the relationship between 
identity, conflict and learning at the individual and collective levels. The relatively 
narrower focus of prior research has neglected the important connections 
between these three crucial areas. The presence of conflict brings behaviour to 
the foreground in learning theories, while at the same time emphasizing the 
processes of identity protection and maintenance. This case showed the 
importance of identity in shifting behaviour and the role of conflict and learning 
processes in shifting aspects of identity. Examining these concepts together 
provides insight into the conditions under which inter-organizational learning is 
more likely to occur. 
My research highlights the role played by the practices associated with 
social, role, and organizational identity in shaping individual praxis in response to 
conflict. Hence, it extends current understanding of the implications of individual 
behaviour for organizational learning, particularly in situations of conflict. This 
work explicitly addresses the identity-based conflict inherent in inter-group 
interactions and, by suggesting that learning depends on the aspects of identity 
that organizations and individuals activate in response to a situation, I provide 
direction for realizing the benefit of diverse perspectives. The common practices 
either prescribed by communities or co-created by individuals engaged in a 
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common task may hold the key to sustained behavioural change which may 
generate cognitive change. Individuals can use conflict as a motivating point to 
advance learning within their organization, via the practices of their common 
identities. Unless we understand how individual and organizational identities are 
connected to behaviour it is hard to understand their impact on learning. In 
addition, in a case of conflict, learning may depend on the ability of individuals to 
come together through behaviours or activities related to common identities. 
My process model of inter-organizational learning as practice provides a 
more socialized theoretical background for understanding the challenges of inter-
organizational learning. It highlights the importance of considering all of the 
components of learning and suggests that it is the nexus of practitioners, 
practice, and praxis that delivers inter-organizational learning. Instead of 
conceptualizing inter-organizational learning as an outcome, my research 
explores how individuals and organizations tend to respond to each other and 
how behavioural practices, such as engagement and dialogue, play a critical role 
in shaping their organizations‟ learning. 
Finally, I contribute to the understanding of the implications of different 
sources or roots of conflict to inter-organizational interaction. A shift in emphasis 
from identity based conflict to the socio-cognitive aspects of the conflict, 
preceded mutual problem solving behaviour, even while the underlying conflict of 
interest persisted between the parties. The individuals and their respective 
organizations were able to undertake collaborative action once they reached 
consensus on the gaps in their collective knowledge. This research underscores 
the importance of understanding that at some level all conflicts are identity based, 
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and the need to understand how organizations come to work together despite 
and in the presence of their identity differences. 
7.2 Practical Implications 
There has been much discussion recently of the possibilities inherent in 
conflict and in interaction with diverse organizations (Hart & Sharma, 2004). If 
through these interactions organizations are more attuned to social trends and 
sensitivities, managers may be alerted to risks and opportunities they might not 
otherwise have spotted, and organizations will likely develop or augment their 
capabilities (“A Survey,” 2008).  Yet few organizations readily embrace those 
learning opportunities, and managers appear skeptical about the power of conflict 
to invigorate problem solving (Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Tjosvold, 2008). Although 
organizations increasingly participate, voluntarily or in some cases by mandate, 
in cross sector initiatives with diverse organizations, they struggle with how to 
simultaneously manage the conflict and make use of the learning opportunities. 
My research shows that by focusing on their mutual knowledge gaps and the 
practices associated with common identities, managers and organizations may 
be able to defuse the more dysfunctional aspects of their conflict to permit mutual 
problem solving. 
My insights from this research are an important step in understanding ways 
in which organizations can create mutual strategic advantage out of apparently 
intractable conflicts. This work has demonstrated that engagement over a well 
known, albeit poorly understood conflict, can also confer social legitimacy, a key 
component to competitive advantage in highly regulated industries and likewise 
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crucial to non-government organizations. Organizations that confront the diversity 
amongst economic, social, and environmental views in their decision making may 
be better able to shift their thinking toward an integrated view. This in turn may 
engender more innovative responses. While the conflict may never be resolved- 
indeed it may be “unresolvable”- much can be learned through carefully delimited 
cooperation on specific tasks.  
This research demonstrates that strategic advantage can be derived from 
engagement in situations of intractable conflict. It also emphasizes the range of 
conditions that are necessary before organizations can realize the “promise” of 
conflict, extending from intractable to more mundane forms of conflict and 
situations. Learning in the presence of identity differences, for instance during 
mergers or acquisitions, requires well established internal and inter-
organizational learning processes. If senior managers consider the extent and 
nature of the learning and inter-organizational learning capabilities of both 
organizations, they will be better able to assess the synergies possible from the 
merger or acquisition.  
This research highlights the importance and influence of an organization‟s 
current strategy and goals on individual behaviour. Marine Harvest‟s and CAAR‟s 
mutual emphases on dialogue and science provided their members with both the 
motivation and the “permission” to experiment with new behaviour and to learn. In 
this way, both organizations‟ current strategies supported adaptive behaviour, 
and ultimately strategic renewal. Strategies that acknowledge and support 
deutero-learning processes play an important part in strategic adaptation and 
renewal. 
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My research demonstrates the importance of deliberately emphasizing 
certain aspects of the conflict between organizations. By actively highlighting the 
socio-cognitive aspects of the conflict, which may not be readily apparent to 
participants, managers may increase the likelihood of them engaging in problem 
solving. In addition, by framing responses around the socio-cognitive aspects of 
the conflict that are significant to both the managers and organizations involved, 
senior managers may increase the likelihood of repeated engagement. This facet 
of the research illustrates the role senior managers and other organizational 
leaders can play in creating the conditions conducive to learning in the face of 
identity difference. 
My research provides important guidelines for managers when structuring 
and staffing inter-organizational initiatives, such as joint ventures, research 
consortiums, and stakeholder engagement processes. Individuals in boundary 
spanning roles may be more effective if they are less identified with the more 
contentious aspects of their organization‟s identity. This raises the issue of how 
managers might weaken or transform existing aspects of an individual‟s 
identification with their organization. Conversely, if the boundary spanning 
individuals are strongly identified with an established process or set of protocols 
they may be relatively more effective in bridging across conflict. The key lesson 
for external advisers is that their focus should be instigating and maintaining 
learning processes in situations of conflict – not working to resolve the conflict, as 
is typically the case. 
Finally, my research demonstrates the significance of clearly articulating the 
behaviour expected in the inter-organizational relationship. In the same way that 
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“good fences make good neighbours”, enacting rules and sanctions for breaking 
the rules is important to cooperation. By developing protocols for communication, 
with each other and with the public, the focal organizations in this study were able 
to create common practices. Established rules and holding each other 
accountable for adhering to those rules reduced the ambiguity associated with 
different identities. Over time, repercussions for breaching the agreement 
became consistent, helping to decrease uncertainty in the relationship and 
ultimately to increase cooperation. These practices are generalizable and 
beneficial whatever the organizational interaction.  
The connections identified in this study will be relevant to a range of 
situations where learning must overcome differences in identity. While I studied 
an extreme case of identity difference, my findings will be useful to organizations 
in a range of situations, as they come to grips with increased interaction, across 
sectors and across organizational and national boundaries. 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research 
As with any research this study has limitations. First, I realize that focusing 
on one situation, in this case a protracted resource conflict, will limit the 
generalizability of my conclusions.  However, as Yin (1994) and Johnson et al. 
(2007) suggest, the case study method provides an opportunity for analytic 
generalization from the case study to theory which is achieved by the proper 
selection of the case study. Also many industries are increasingly faced with 
conflicts of interest with stakeholders and while they may not be as targeted as 
the salmon farming industry, they nevertheless face the challenge of adapting to 
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changes in their environment. Future research should investigate whether the 
practices associated with identity relate to the reduction of identity conflict and a 
shift to socio-cognitive conflict and learning in other industries and other perhaps 
less extreme contexts. Furthermore, this research could be used to develop 
measurable items to test the relative mix of the sources of conflict and the 
relationship between for example socio-cognitive conflict and learning. 
Second, using the case method means the researcher begins with a 
proposed theory (Yin, 2009) which may constrain them from seeing new patterns. 
However, the iterative nature of my design allowed me to modify my model 
because the data were repeatedly compared with theory. 
Third, interview data may suffer from biases, including social desirability 
bias. However, careful construction of interview questions, along with 
triangulation with other data sources, helped mitigate this problem. Additionally, 
participants‟ answers can be influenced by question wording, format, and context. 
To avoid such biases, I pilot tested the interview questions on individuals 
associated with but not directly involved with the BC salmon farming industry. 
Fourth, access was a problem in the second phase of my data gathering. A 
number of external events, in addition to the contentious nature of the topic, 
limited individuals‟ willingness to have meetings observed. However, given their 
vivid recollections of particular events and meetings I was able to employ analytic 
techniques (described in Section 4.5.5, Mapping of Statements into Practice and 
Praxis) to distinguish practice and praxis from respondents‟ statements during 
interviews. 
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Despite the above limitations, I believe this research provides a first step in 
understanding the relationship between identity, conflict, and learning in 
organizations. 
Finally, past findings have found a relationship between innovation, 
especially complex and radical innovation and engagement with a range of 
partners, allowing for the “integration of different knowledge bases, behaviours, 
and habits of thought” (Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, Denyer, & Neely, 2004, p. 
150). Indeed, in a group situation, scientists have been identified as being 
particularly adept at using diversity to their advantage (Pelz, 1956). However, my 
research suggests there are significant challenges to engaging with diverse 
individuals and organizations, even scientists, and success depends on a number 
of conditions. Future research should re-examine the relationship between 
innovation and engagement between diverse organizations, in light of the more 
socialized explanation of inter-organizational learning processes presented by my 
research findings. 
7.4 Final Thoughts 
The impetus for strategic renewal often comes from a misalignment of an 
organization‟s current strategy with its environment. Increased inter-
organizational conflict can be a signal of such misalignment. There is evidence 
that accessing diverse or hitherto unavailable sources of ideas may increase an 
organization's ability to adapt to its environment and learn. Accessing those 
sources however is likely to be fraught with conflict because the focal 
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organizations almost certainly have different perspectives, making interaction 
problematic and potentially costly in both financial and reputational terms.  
Increasingly complex issues, such as sustainability and globalization, have 
increased pressure on organizations to integrate disparate perspectives. Yet 
relatively few firms embrace the learning opportunities inherent in diverse or 
adversarial situations. Responding to conflict provides an opportunity to learn. 
The ability to learn from disparate and diverse organizations perhaps even 
“enemies” has the potential to produce positive variations in firms‟ capabilities. 
This is the promise of conflict. 
This research speaks to that promise by examining inter-organizational 
learning and the role of identity in such learning. The behaviours associated with 
identity are important to inter-organizational learning because in practice, identity-
based conflict often inhibits learning.  However, under certain conditions the 
practices related to common identities may act as a bridge across conflict and 
allow the development of shared understanding through collective action. In this 
way individuals and their organizations are able to realize the promise of conflict 
and successfully adapt to changes in their environment. 
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE 
BC SALMON FARMING INDUSTRY 1970 – 2009 
Year Event 
Early 
1970s 
Salmon farming begins on the Sunshine Coast in BC with small 
locally owned operations and limited regulation.  
Early 
1980s 
Norwegian salmon farming companies enter BC, buying and 
consolidating small operations. They also introduce the Atlantic 
salmon species to the region. 
Mid 
1980s 
Toxic algae blooms devastate fish inventories and salmon farming 
moves to Vancouver Island, primarily around Nanaimo, Tofino and 
the Broughton Archipelago. 
1986 Demand for salmon farming licenses explodes and conflicts with 
other coastal users escalate. The government declares a moratorium 
on new licenses and organizes an inquiry into the industry. 
1987 Moratorium on new licenses lifted after inquiry calls for increased 
regulation and monitoring of the industry, increased First Nation 
consultation and formal conflict resolution processes. 
The United Fisherman‟s and Allied Workers Union becomes salmon 
farming‟s most vocal critic and calls for a moratorium on fish farms 
until strict regulations are in place. 
1988 Simon Fraser University creates an aquaculture research institute 
and later the University of British Columbia creates a Chair of 
Aquaculture Research. 
Department of Fisheries & Oceans (DFO) assigns legal authority to 
regulate aquaculture to the province of BC via a Memorandum of 
Agreement 
1989 BC has its strongest sockeye salmon run in 76 years. Increased 
supply results in a drop in price and many salmon farms go bankrupt. 
Federal and provincial officials reiterate their support of salmon 
farming and announce funding for a research program to investigate 
its impact on wild salmon. 
Concerns are raised in the media about escaped Atlantic salmon and 
their impact on the native wild salmon. Concerns regarding disease 
and effluent are ongoing. 
Early 
1990s 
The concerns raised by the Fisherman‟s Union are now shared by 
the provincial New Democratic Party, the BC Liberal party, the Green 
party, the Alaskan government, the Native Brotherhood of BC, the 
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Year Event 
Ocean Resource Conservation Alliance, the David Suzuki 
Foundation, and various local environmental groups. 
Environmentalists increasingly use the media to raise public 
awareness of the potential harmful impact of salmon farming caused 
by the drugs used in the feeding and disease treatment of farmed 
fish, the waste produced by the farms, and the escape of non-native 
species into the wild. The industry minimizes or ignores these 
concerns. 
1991 The US levies an anti-dumping tariff on Norwegian salmon effectively 
shutting them out of the market and providing a significant market 
opportunity for the emerging Chilean and the Canadian industries. 
1994 Sea lice from salmon farms are identified as the sole cause of the 
Irish sea trout collapse, prompting calls in the BC media for a federal 
or provincial review of the environmental impact of salmon farming.   
1995 The BC government in consultation with the federal Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) places a moratorium on new farm 
licenses and announces the creation of the Salmon Aquaculture 
Review Panel to review the current methods and processes used in 
regulating and managing salmon aquaculture operations. 
1997 The report of the Salmon Aquaculture Review Panel concluded that 
salmon farming could be managed to prevent or mitigate adverse 
impacts and avoid conflicts, leading to a sustainable industry in BC's 
coastal communities. The moratorium remains in effect. 
The landmark Delgamuukw case is decided in favor of First Nation 
consultation or compensation for activities on territory that they claim, 
thus ensuring significant First Nation involvement in all fish farm 
licensing in traditional territories. 
1998 The first evidence of successful Atlantic salmon spawning was 
discovered in the Tsitika River on Vancouver Island, reigniting public 
debate about the risks of salmon farming and in particular the risks 
related to escaped Atlantic salmon.   
1999 The Alaskan government publishes a white paper on its concerns 
about BC salmon farming and begins to lobby the BC and Canadian 
governments to continue the moratorium on salmon farming. 
2000 The Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform (CAAR) is formed, 
made up environmental groups and First Nations including the Living 
Oceans Society, The David Suzuki Foundation, The T. Buck Suzuki 
Foundation, The Georgia Strait Alliance, Raincoast Conservation and 
others.  
2001 The federal Auditor General announces that the federal government 
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Year Event 
is failing to protect wild BC salmon stocks from farmed salmon. 
A Senate Committee finds that escaped Atlantic salmon are 
aclimatizing and spawning and the Atlantic Salmon Watch, a joint 
federal and provincial program to research escaped salmon is set up. 
The David Suzuki Foundation hires a former BC Supreme Court 
Judge to conduct an independent inquiry into salmon farming. He 
concludes that closed containment farming is the only 
environmentally acceptable alternative. 
CAAR coordinates 140 conservation groups, First Nations, and 
businesses in Canada and the US, 20 scientists and 31 members of 
the Alaska State Legislature, to petition Prime Minister Jean Chretien 
and President George Bush not to lift the moratorium until a 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act Review was conducted. 
The pink salmon run in the Broughton Archipelago collapses and 
Local First Nations and the David Suzuki Foundation blame it on an 
infestation of sea lice in the adjacent salmon farms. 
2002 The moratorium placed on new site licenses in 1995 is lifted. 
Two salmon farming companies are charged for violating 
environmental regulations. 
Grieg Seafoods is granted a new farming license in the Broughton. 
CAAR launches an international boycott of BC farmed salmon. 
The Pacific Fisheries Resource Conservation Council (a federally 
funded independent conservation Council) concludes that sea lice 
“amplified” by the salmon farms is the likely cause of the collapse of 
the pink salmon run.  
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2003 An international workshop examining sea lice research is organized 
by UBC and includes First Nations, government, industry, scientists 
and non-government organizations. The scientists encourage the 
province to act quickly to monitor and control sea lice.   
Class action suit filed in Washington state against three major 
supermarket chains, Safeway, Krogers and Albertsons, for allegedly 
deceiving their customers about the origins of their salmon.  
The BC Salmon Farmers Association hires the public relations firm, 
Hill & Knowlton to “revamp the way it presents itself to the public”. 
The Heiltsuk First Nation initiates a lawsuit against the BC 
government and PanFish over a new hatchery PanFish is building on 
Heiltsuk territory, without proper consultation. 
The federal Minister of Fisheries and the provincial Ministers 
responsible for Treaty Negotiations and Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries appoints an independent two-person task group to review 
the approaches to fisheries settlements in treaties. 
The federal government announces administrative reforms giving 
environmentalists, aboriginals and the provincial government more 
control over managing Pacific salmon.  These reforms had been 
developed with the consensus of stakeholders including commercial, 
aboriginal and sport fishers. 
2004 “Science” (one of the foremost scientific journals) publishes an article 
by Hites examining the links between farmed Atlantic salmon and 
toxins, PCBs in particular that are hazardous to human health. 
Marine Harvest, Stolt Sea Farm Group and 48 other US and 
Canadian salmon farms, fish processors and grocery chains 
(including Safeway, Albertson‟s and Costco) were quickly named as 
defendants in a legal action in California for failing to warn consumers 
that salmon may contain potentially dangerous levels of PCB‟s 
Stolt Sea Farms, BC‟s largest salmon farming operation, begins 
posting sea-lice and water quality data on the company web-site 
seeing it as “an educational opportunity for both researchers and the 
general public” and to “demonstrate we are serious about our 
commitment to having sustainable salmon farm operations”. 
Provincial government creates the Pacific Salmon Forum to study the 
health of wild salmon. 
2005 Members of the BC Wilderness Tourism Association demand the 
fallowing of fish farms in the Broughton Archipelago because of their 
impact on wild salmon. 
The newly re-elected provincial government makes the 
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unprecedented move of setting up a Special Committee on 
Sustainable Aquaculture led by someone from the opposition party 
with the majority of its members drawn from the opposition (6 from 
opposition, 4 from government).  
2006 CAAR and Marine Harvest (newly merged with Stolt Sea Farms) 
announce an agreement to conduct joint research. Titled the 
Framework for Dialogue, the agreement outlines 5 areas of mutual 
interest with the initial research to be on sea lice. 
The Special Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture conducts public 
hearings on salmon farming and hears testimony from the industry, 
the environmentalists and scientists. 
Sea lice research published by Simon Fraser University scientists 
linking farms to reductions in wild salmon. DFO and industry refutes. 
DFO research suggesting that farmed and wild salmon can co-exist is 
released. Environmentalists refute. 
Grieg Seafoods is granted the second new farm license in the 
Broughton since 2002. It is done with the consultation and agreement 
of the Tlowitsis First Nation. 
First Nations, along with Don Saniford from the Pure Salmon, protest 
at the AGM of Cermaq in Stavanger, Norway. 
BC Salmon Farmers Association begins giving salmon farm and 
processing plant tours. 
Alexandra Morton unsuccessful in suing salmon farms for “releasing” 
sea lice. However, her methods and “science” are commended be a 
world renowned expert.  
A study, published on-line by Marty Krkosek using 40 years of DFO 
data suggests that sea lice from salmon farms killed 95% of wild 
juvenile smolts swimming by. 
2007 BC Supreme Court upholds Creative Salmon of Tofino‟s successful 
libel/defamation suit against Don Saniford, a former employee of 
Friends of Clayoquot Sound.  
A CAAR member publishes a peer reviewed journal article linking sea 
lice from salmon farms to wild salmon decline, based on sea lice data 
shared through the Framework for Dialogue. 
Friends of Wild Salmon run ads in major newspapers in BC to stop 
fish farms in the North. 
The Special Legislative Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture 
recommends a move to closed containment within 5 years, supported 
by government funded development of technology, a moratorium on 
new licenses in the North, moving regulation from Agriculture to the 
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Environment Ministry. 
One week after the report is tabled Greig Seafoods is granted a new 
farming license in Nootka Sound. The Mowachaht/Muchalaht First 
Nation agreed. 
CAAR runs ad in NY Times targeting Safeway‟s sale of farmed 
salmon. 
“Confidential” report authored by Watershed Watch‟s Craig Orr, for 
the Pacific Salmon Forum is “obtained” by the CanWest News 
Service. It did not meet their test for scientific rigour and they asked 
that he not speak about it.  
The Pacific Salmon Forum, in its interim report, called on the 
government to develop a new way of managing watersheds to better 
protect wild salmon, including federal, provincial, regional and 
aboriginal governments. They also called for proper analysis of what 
is known about closed containment before either investing 
government funds in it or requiring industry to move to it. 
Two new farm licenses are approved for sites near Klemtu on the 
Central Coast. 
Middle Bay Sustainable Aquaculture Institute (Agri-marine) gets $2.4 
million in federal funding, in addition to $1.2M from the Moore 
Foundation. Another $1.2M and $2M are expected from the Moore 
Foundation and the province‟s Island Coastal Economic Trust 
respectively. 
Grieg Seafood B.C. Ltd. of Campbell River was granted approval for 
a new farm site in Nootka Sound, the 4th since the report of the 
Committee on Sustainable Aquaculture in May. It has the support of 
the Mowachaht/Muchalaht First Nation. 
18 respected scientists and researchers send an open letter to the 
PM and the Premier calling for immediate barriers between wild and 
farmed salmon. 
A group of British Columbia business owners took a full-page ad in 
the first section of The Globe and Mail. The ad, addressed to Premier 
Gordon Campbell and the provincial and federal ministers of 
fisheries, was entitled "The Future of B.C. Salmon Is In Your Hands" 
and ran in the national edition of The Globe. 
An article in Science (one of the foremost scientific journals), based 
on 37 years' worth of fish- survival data collected by DFO, asserts 
that some wild pink salmon populations are in a mortal decline as a 
direct result of lice infestations from farms. Martin Krkosek and B.C.'s 
Alexandra Morton, looked at DFO data for 71 central coast rivers. 
DFO and others allege it is shoddy science. The Pacific Salmon 
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Forum later agrees, in part, with its conclusions. An earlier version of 
the paper had been published on-line at the end of 2006. 
2008 Research by Dalhousie scientists Ford and Myers reports that fish 
farms are associated with plummeting populations of salmon and 
trout in all jurisdictions that farm fish.  
A group of ecotourism businesses, native organizations and 
environmentalists announce a plan to “medi-evac” smolts past 
salmon farms in the Broughton. 
Grieg Seafood B.C. was issued a farm license in Nootka Sound on 
Muchalat Inlet. It is the sixth site granted in a settlement with the 
Mowachaht/Muchalaht First Nations.  
A finfish license went to Creative Salmon Company Ltd. to raise 
chinook salmon at the entrance of Tofino Inlet.  
A major story in the New York Times outlining the difficulties plaguing 
Chile's salmon farms. 
The provincial government declared a moratorium on fish farms on 
B.C.'s North Coast. 
The Scottish government's Fisheries Research Services found 
"strong evidence that sea lice from caged salmon contaminate wild 
fish -- and the problem seems to be getting worse." 
Marine Harvest runs full page ads in major newspapers describing its 
success in minimizing sea lice on its farms during the out-migration of 
juvenile wild salmon.  
BC Salmon Farmers Association reports that demand for BC salmon 
is outstripping supply and has been for 3-4 years  
Canada's department of fisheries and oceans confirms that Canada, 
Ireland, Scotland and Norway plan to coordinate field experiments 
and hold meetings where scientists share knowledge, methods and 
experimental results. Environmental organization Pure Salmon 
obtained this information from Scotland's government using freedom 
of information laws. 
Taras Grescoe‟s book Bottom feeder: A seafood lovers journey to the 
end of the food chain is published in Canada. It claims that sea lice 
are wiping out wild salmon  
Vancouver‟s sustainable seafood guru executive chef Robert Clark 
announced he was taking wild Pacific salmon off the menus of C 
Restaurant, Raincity Grill and Nu  
The legal authority of the provincial government to regulate fish farms 
on the West Coast is challenged in the Supreme Court of British 
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Columbia.  Alexandra Morton, the Wilderness Tourism Association, 
the Southern Gillnetters Association, the Fishing Vessel Owners' 
Association of B.C. and the Pacific Coast Wild Salmon Society  
petition to have the province's right to regulate ruled constitutionally 
invalid and to strike down all the aquaculture regulations B.C. has put 
in place over the past 20 years. Representing the petitioners is a 
highly skilled environmental lawyer. Gregory McDade, former head of 
the Sierra Legal Defence Fund.  
A request for an emergency debate in the House of Commons on the 
dwindling number of Pacific salmon was denied.  
First nations in British Columbia have added their voice to a call from 
The B.C. Wildlife Federation, Fraser Valley Salmon Society, 
Sportfishing Defence Alliance and others for the Auditor-General of 
Canada to investigate the actions of the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans on the West Coast. The petition by the B.C. organizations 
followed an earlier petition filed by several prominent individuals - 
including broadcaster and author David Suzuki, and Daniel Pauly, a 
leading fisheries scientist - that called on the Auditor-General to 
examine DFO's policy decisions on the West Coast.  
Marine Harvest announces a Coordinated Area Management Plan 
(CAMP) to create safe corridors for migrating pink salmon in the 
Broughton Archipelago by emptying salmon farms during the spring 
out-migration of wild juvenile fish from March 1 to June 30 each year. 
The company is ready to move forward with the plan pending 
government approvals. Marine Harvest had briefed the government, 
first nations, and environmental groups.  
30,000 salmon escape from a Marine Harvest farm near Campbell 
River, BCs largest escape in 8 years. 
BC Supreme Court hears petition to have the province's right to 
regulate ruled constitutionally invalid. 
Applications for amendments to license at specific existing Marine 
Harvest and Mainstream fish farms are “happened upon” by CAAR 
members and reported as applications to increase production in the 
media. 
Sea lice genomics project, funded by DFO, University of Victoria, 
Vancouver Island University, four fish farm companies and the 
province, has  discovered Pacific sea lice are very different from their 
Atlantic and European cousins – sufficiently so that they could be 
another species.  
2,500 salmon escape from a Mainstream farm in Clayoquot Sound. 
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2009 First Nations in the Broughton Archipelago announce they will file a 
class-action lawsuit against the B.C. government for damages 
caused to wild stocks by salmon farming. 
The Pacific Salmon Forum report concluded that wild salmon require 
the protection of a new agency dedicated to taking an ecological 
approach to all watershed activities that might threaten fish habitat. It 
also concluded that farmed and wild salmon can co-exist, but 
recommended limits on salmon farming, including a cap on 
production in the Broughton Archipelago at current levels and 
managing farms to meet sea-lice limits on young wild salmon. The 
forum also recommended a science secretariat to co-ordinate salmon 
research and urged the province to lead a pilot program to see if 
salmon farming can be economically viable using closed-containment 
systems. 
The B.C. Supreme Court (Justice Chris Hinkson) ruled that the 
federal government -- not the province -- has exclusive jurisdiction 
over the management of salmon farming.  
Alexandra Morton sends letter and petition to federal Fisheries 
Minister Gail Shea asking her to apply the Fisheries Act to the 
“salmon feedlot fishery”.  
Marine Harvest announces it is appealing the B.C. Supreme Court 
ruling that the federal government, not the province, has jurisdiction 
over fish farms, claiming that "Domesticated creatures, like farm-
raised salmon, are private property, and are not part of the fishery as 
a public resource."  
The provincial government will not appeal the B.C. Supreme Court 
ruling that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over fish 
farms. 
Alexandra Morton re-sends letter and petition to federal Fisheries 
Minister Gail Shea and BC Premier Campbell weekly with more 
names. By the end of March there are 8,400 signatures on the 
petition. 
A team led by a professor at the University of Guelph, has used DNA 
barcoding techniques to trace the path of transmission of lice to and 
from wild fish  
Greenpeace rates the sustainability of the seafood offerings at 
Canada‟s major supermarket chains. The report gave highest marks 
to Loblaw, because it announced that by 2013, it would sell only 
sustainable seafood. Second place went to Sobeys.  
Federal Fisheries Minister Gail Shea announces 6 BC aquaculture 
companies will get more than $930,000 to pursue innovative ideas. 
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An additional $848,000 will go to the six projects from the province, 
industry and universities. 
Sea-lice levels dropped between 2008 and 2009 on young pink and 
chum salmon migrating through the Broughton Archipelago. The 
Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform and Marine Harvest Canada 
both credit a fish farm management program. "This is a historic 
release in that it marks the first time that former adversaries have 
come forward in agreement." 
While some parts of the province have strong sockeye runs, the 
Fraser River sockeye run collapses.  
Record runs of pink salmon.  
Federal government calls for Judicial Inquiry in to the collapse of the 
Fraser River Sockeye run. The Cohen Inquiry will investigate reasons 
for the decline of the sockeye salmon in the Fraser River. 
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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 2005, 2006, 2007 
CONFIDENTIAL 
Respondent:_________________________Organization: _________________ 
Years with Org:  _____ Years in Position: _____ Title: _____________________ 
Interviewers:  ____________________________Date:   ___________________ 
Thank you for taking the time to meet with us(me) today.  Your expertise 
and perspective is very important to our research. The PURPOSE of multi-year 
Research Project is to better understand the global salmon farming industry, what 
important strategic issues the industry is faced with and how it deals with them. 
Our research team is made up of several business strategy professors from both 
Canada and Australia.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Re: Strategic Issues 
What are the most pressing issues facing YOUR INDUSTRY at this time? (What 
is your industry? Domestic issues? International issues?) 
 
What are the most pressing issues facing YOUR ORGANIZATION at this time? 
(Domestic? International? Competitive? Regulatory? Stakeholder issues?) [for 
diversified bus] 
 
Re: Issues (e.g., regulatory, trade, certification, health, environment, safety) 
What are the most pressing issues facing the salmon farming industry at this 
time? And facing your organization at this time?  Specify via list below: 
 
Competitive issues for INDUSTRY; for YOUR ORG 
 
International trade-related issues for INDUSTRY; for YOUR ORG 
 
What are the major regulatory or political issues the INDUSTRY / YOUR ORG 
has to deal with?  (domestic and international) 
 
What certification issues does salmon farming face?  
 
What environmental issues does salming farming face? does YOUR ORG face? 
 
What health-related issues does salmon farming face? Does YOUR ORG face? 
 
What other issues are on the radar?  Add q on cc impacts / on the radar screen? 
RE: Issue Salience 
How do these issues become issues for your organization? 
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Of all these issues, which do you consider the three most critical ones for THE 
INDUSTRY?  
 
Of all these issues, which do you consider the three most critical ones for YOUR 
ORG? 
 
Re: Industry & Supply Chain 
Do actions of firms in other parts of the salmon farming supply chain affect your 
business?  In what way? 
 
 How do you manage this?  (i.e., work with them, pressure them, develop 
standards, etc.) 
 
In what ways do you work with/talk with other industry members (associations 
belonged to, conferences attended, alliances, etc.  Specify names and 
approximate dates of joining, belonging to, etc.)?   
 
What‟s the role of organic salmon?  Possible?  Emerging product?   
Is land based aquaculture going to become more important?  Why or why not?   
 
Re: Critical Events  
What were the major events impacting the INDUSTRY in the last 5 years? 
What were the major events impacting YOUR ORG in the last 5 years? 
 
What are the critical events you anticipate to happen in the INDUSTRY in the 
next 5-10 years?  
What are the critical events you anticipate to happen in YOUR ORG in the next 5-
10 years?  
 
Re: Crises 
Considering all business issues, have you felt that the industry was in a crisis 
during the last 3-4 years? (“Crisis is an event that hits unexpectedly and changes 
things dramatically in the organization”).  
How was the crisis perceived inside the organization? Was there 
agreement within the organization about what the crisis was and how to 
handle it? 
 
Re: Organization‟s Objectives 
Over the last few years, what have been the major strategic decisions and 
strategic shifts in YOUR ORG?  
 
What, in your opinion, are the primary objectives of YOUR ORG today? Of your 
SBU? 
 
Re: Important Stakeholders 
What stakeholders do you consider as important to your firm?  
Who are they and how important are they? (Scale I)  
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Are there primary objectives of your main stakeholders that are in conflict with the 
objectives of the company today? (How did you derive your stakeholders‟ 
objectives?  What, if any, kind of communication do you have with different 
groups?) 
 
What means do your stakeholders use to try to influence you?  How do you try to 
influence your stakeholders? 
 
Do you hear much from activist groups?  How do they attempt to influence your 
organization? 
What kind of an impact are your critics having on your market?  How?   
 
Has your own perspective changed regarding environmental issues? How did 
that happen? 
 
Re: Leadership 
What is the position of the board on specific strategic, social and environmental 
issues?  
(Is the board generally in agreement regarding environmental issues? Can you 
give examples?) 
 
 
What is the position of Top Management on specific strategic, social and 
environmental issues?  
 
Re: Wrap up: 
What have we missed? 
Any comments on our interview? 
What‟s ahead for Your Organization? 
Can you suggest anyone else we should interview about the salmon farming 
industry? 
May we contact you in the future for clarification questions? 
 
Thank you for your time! 
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In general, what stakeholders do you consider as important to your 
organization? 
Please rate the importance of each of the following stakeholder groups: 
 
 
 
Most important……   least important 
 
local communities 
          1                2               3                  
 
industry & trade associations 
          1                2               3                  
 
provincial government agencies 
          1                2               3                  
 
federal government agencies 
          1                2               3                  
 
environmental regulators 
          1                2               3                  
 
non-regulatory gov. pressure 
          1                2               3                  
 
financial institutions 
          1                2               3                  
 
environmental groups 
          1                2               3                  
 
international groups 
          1                2               3                  
 
other NGOs 
          1                2               3                  
 
the media 
          1                2               3                  
 
consumers/customers  
          1                2               3                  
 
shareholders/BOD 
          1                2               3                  
 
employees / unions 
          1                2               3                  
 
top management 
          1                2               3                  
 
suppliers 
          1                2               3                  
 
First Nations / aboriginals 
          1                2               3                  
 
other: ______________ 
          1                2               3                  
 
other: ______________ 
          1                2               3                  
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APPENDIX D: NOTE SENT TO POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS 
Dear  
 
My name is Patricia MacDonald and I am a doctoral candidate at the Ivey 
Business School at the University of Western Ontario.  I am inviting you to take 
part in a research study on Inter-Organizational Learning in the Salmon 
Farming Industry. The purpose of this research is to study the conditions under 
which inter-organizational learning occurs between companies and their 
stakeholders, particularly with respect to conflict laden issues. I am conducting 
this research within the context of the BC salmon farming industry, its issues, and 
its stakeholders. This research builds on prior work that I did with Dr. Monika 
Winn, University of Victoria, Business. The information that I am currently 
collecting will be used in my thesis. The purpose of this letter is to provide you 
with the information you require to make an informed decision on participating in 
this research.  
You are being asked to participate in this study because you were identified 
as an expert on aspects of salmon farming, through for example public sources 
or by other persons knowledgeable in this field. Salmon farming is multi-faceted 
and generates many diverse viewpoints; it is important for this study to fully 
understand your perspective.  
I will be conducting interviews on Vancouver Island and in the Vancouver 
area between September 15 and 29. I would very much like to interview you 
about the issues faced by your organization and other stakeholders and 
members of the industry, and the impact they have had on companies. 
If you agree to voluntarily participate in this research, your participation will 
include an interview of about 60 to 90 minutes, at a time and location of your 
choosing. There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this 
research. You and your organization‟s anonymity and confidentiality of data will 
be assured. If you agree to a meeting, we will provide you with a formal consent 
form which spells out the information provided above in more detail.  You will also 
receive a signed copy of this consent form for your records. 
The potential benefits of your participation in this research include your 
contribution to an enhanced understanding of how companies learn from conflict 
laden issues and how to better manage this process. I would be happy to share 
results with you at the conclusion of the research project.  
 
Thank you for considering this request. I will contact you shortly to discuss 
further details. 
 
Sincerely, Pat MacDonald 
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APPENDIX E: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION & INFORMED 
CONSENT FORM 
Research Project: Inter-organizational Learning in the BC Salmon Farming 
Industry 
Dear  
My name is Patricia MacDonald and I am a doctoral student at the Ivey 
Business School at the University of Western Ontario and the information I am 
collecting will be used in my thesis. 
You are being invited to take part in a research study looking at how 
organizations learn from one another in the salmon farming industry in British 
Columbia.  The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information you 
require to make an informed decision on participating in this research.  
The study is expected to add to our collective knowledge about 
organizations‟ interactions with their stakeholders and the conditions under which 
inter-organizational learning occurs.  Approximately 25 other representatives of 
salmon farming companies and their stakeholder groups are being contacted. If 
you like, you may receive summaries of the findings of this research, which may 
benefit you in your own organization.  The results of this research are expected to 
be published in academic journals. 
I will contact you to set up an interview at your office location that will 
consist of a number of open-ended questions designed to capture your 
recollections of events and actions regarding stakeholder interactions around 
conflict laden issues affecting your industry.  It should take approximately 60 
minutes to complete and there are no known risks to your involvement in this 
study.  Please note that your responses are strictly confidential, that your 
participation is completely voluntary.  You may refuse to participate, refuse to 
answer any questions or withdraw from the study at any time with no effect on 
your future.  Should the results of the study be published, your name will not be 
used.  With your permission, the interview will be audio taped and transcribed 
and will be labeled and identified with a code, not your name.  
Should you have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact 
Dr. Mary Crossan at XXXXXXXX.  If you have any questions about the conduct of 
this study or your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Office of 
Research Ethics, the University of Western Ontario (519-661-3036 or email at: 
ethics@uwo.ca).  Signing the consent form indicates consent to participate in the 
study.  
I look forward to talking to you, and wish to thank you again for your time 
and participation.  
Yours sincerely, 
 
Patricia MacDonald,  
PhD Candidate, Richard Ivey School of Business, University of Western Ontario 
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Consent Form 
 
Research Project:  Inter-organizational Learning in the BC Salmon Farming 
Industry 
 
I have read the letter of information, have had the nature of the study explained to 
me and I agree to participate.  All questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
Name (please print)___________________________ 
 
Signature_______________________ 
 
Date_____________________ 
 
 
Person Obtaining Consent______________________ 
 
Signature_____________________ 
 
Date_______________________  
 
 
Please indicate if you would like to receive summaries of the research 
findings.    
Yes______ No________.   
These will be sent to you at your work address unless you indicate 
otherwise. 
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APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 2009 
Research area Preliminary interview questions 
Background/context Describe what has been happening in the BC salmon 
farming industry between the companies and their 
stakeholders since the most recent government review 
was begun? (possible prompts – behaviour around  
issues, Behaviour between companies and stakeholders) 
What has been your involvement with stakeholders?  
Individual Identity Describe your role in the organization? In the industry? 
When did you first get involved? What were you doing 
before? 
How long have you been with (organization) and in what 
roles? 
How much of your time do you spend on conflict issues 
related to salmon farming?  
Someone said it takes a certain kind of person to be 
involved with these issues – what are your thoughts on 
that? What kind of person would you say has been 
involved? 
You mentioned that you see yourself as ----- could you tell 
me what that entails? 
Organization 
Identity  
How would you describe your organization‟s response to 
the issues related to salmon farming?  
How have you felt about your organization‟s responses?   
Are there different types of salmon farming companies?  
What makes you say that?  
Can you give me an example of something that 
demonstrates that? 
Are there any other things that your consider central to 
your organization? 
Are there different types of ENGOs? 
What makes you say that? Can you give me some 
examples? 
Has (organization) always been like that?  
When did it change (if at all)? 
Have the mergers in the salmon farming industry affected 
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relationships within the industry? In what ways? 
You mentioned that you see your organization as a ----- 
could you tell me what that entails? 
Learning  Do you conduct joint initiatives with other organizations? 
Who is involved? What is your role in those initiatives? 
Describe how the organizations work together?  
Has that changed over time? 
Describe how decisions are made and actions taken?  
Has that changed over time? 
Describe how conflicts are resolved within the initiative? 
Has that changed over time?  
What have been the results/ output from the research 
done with other organizations? For you personally? For 
your organization? For the industry? 
Conflict How would you describe the situation in the salmon 
farming industry in BC? 
How would you describe your organization‟s actions in 
response to conflict? Have they changed over time? 
Can you give me an example that illustrates what you 
mean by that? 
Is your organization similar or different (in its actions in 
response to conflict) from other organizations involved in 
the BC salmon farming industry? 
Engagement 
practices 
Who do you deal with on these issues? Is you contact 
director indirect? 
Tell me about your interaction? Where does it take place? 
How does it unfold?  
Describe your formal versus informal interaction?  
Has your interaction changed over time?  
What have you observed in terms of the activities of 
others involved? 
Can you think of any other ways that you interact with 
stakeholders? 
Are you familiar/involved with the Framework for 
Dialogue?  
Could you describe it to me?  
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APPENDIX G: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITIES IN THE INDUSTRY 
Individual and Organizational Identities in the Salmon Farming Industry in 
BC 
Company 
  Level 
 
Identity 
Description 
 
Representative Quotations 
Marine 
Harvest 
Individual 
Open 
Facilitator 
Broadly 
knowledgeable on 
salmon farming 
Community 
member 
“I started out as a fish biologist... then worked in 
research and production ...production support... 
environmental management... I had an affinity to 
work with people so I just kind of naturally started to 
gravitate towards that” 
“I build bridges” 
“I was always very big on just open up your books, 
we‟ve got nothing to hide, let‟s show people ... show 
constant improvement” 
“… my son goes to school with the son of the 
councillor who had opposed fish farming but when 
we see each other on the soccer field we can 
actually talk about it because we‟re there on the 
soccer field together.” 
Marine 
Harvest 
Organization 
Transparent 
Collaborative 
Innovative 
Socially  
responsible 
Industry leader  in 
collaboration 
“... you can only find a solution when you put 
different people with different backgrounds and 
different views of the world together... not the 
different disciplines within one company, but now 
the NGOs and the government representatives and 
the scientists” 
 “Dialogue is important to build trust ... transparency 
builds trust ... we are a very open company” 
“... we were very out there, we were very 
transparent and I made sure our story got told a lot 
... I really broadcast our successes in order to shore 
up the ability to do more work” 
“this is a dynamic industry with lots of innovation 
and every year we get better” 
“...  big on social accountability, big on 
environmental accountability, even though they 
didn‟t have First Nations issues, they took 
leadership roles – Marine Harvest did 
internationally.” 
308 
 
 
Stolt 
Individual 
Scientist 
Data driven 
Facilitator 
Knowledgeable on 
salmon issues 
(wild and farmed) 
“I am a marine biologist ...  a scientist that supports 
the scientific process”  
“I am just someone who has spent their lives 
working with salmon habitat and conservation 
issues” 
“I ...  focus on doing and helping” 
“I am a facilitator” 
Stolt 
Organization 
(pre-merger) 
Private 
Accountable 
Ethical  
Industry leader 
size and 
profitability 
 “we undertake cooperative research and 
development on ecosystem principles that were put 
under stress through various impacts” 
“Stolt was quieter … were also working on a very 
high level of compliance, a very high level of 
accountability.  Very good ethics.  And very 
profitable … but no so out there and not so much 
into the ... social issues ...  kind of stayed back a bit 
... not as transparent” 
“... the number of lobbyists and activists with 
positions on aquaculture is startling ...  there is 
nothing we can say or do to satisfy all of these 
interested parties. What we can do is adhere 
rigorously to all regulations ... and to follow our own 
conscience and set our own high standard” 
“... it is our responsibility and commitment to meet 
high standards of husbandry and care for the 
environment” 
Mainstream 
Individual 
Business person 
Rational 
Knowledgeable on 
business issues 
(running a salmon 
farming operation) 
“I don‟t necessarily believe we are the best at what 
we do but I‟d say we do it definitely better than the 
rest of the group ... we run our business better” 
 “... make sure that  you educate yourself as to what 
sustainability means.  It‟s a tough one to quantify.” 
“if you don‟t make money you are not sustainable” 
“... we have more revenue than the largest 
company” in Canada” 
“You‟ve got to be continually looking for innovation 
and development” 
“I believe it is the future ...we‟re going to focus ... on 
the bigger picture ... it‟s just not one little industry 
causing an issue” 
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Mainstream 
Organization 
Sustainable 
Rational 
Innovative 
Risk balancer 
Focused on the 
business of salmon 
farming 
“we ...  have set a goal for ISO ... we will be able to 
hold our heads up high and say we are sustainable” 
“We had to emphasize the financial sustainability of 
everything we did. We had to regain our financial 
freedom by focusing on operations, cautious 
stewardship of our assets ...” 
“We take the long-term view and act responsibly 
with respect to nature and society. We place great 
emphasis on environmental sustainability ... 
However, sustainability also means running a 
profitable business, where we balance risks and 
opportunities based on our recognized strengths” 
“Cermaq has established a strong international 
network both within and outside the industry…. the 
company participates in various research projects 
with public and industrial research establishments 
around the world” 
“As an industrial R and D institution we have a 
highly commercial focus. Our slogan “Knowledge 
makes the difference” ...  results in actual 
competitive advantages for our customers... we are 
increasingly collaborating on the basis of the 
licensing of exclusive rights, which enables unique 
product advantages” 
CAAR 
Individual 
Scientist 
Data driven 
Logical 
Strategic 
Knowledgeable on 
environmental and 
social  issues  
Community 
member 
“I‟m an ecologist.  We have a fisheries biologist on 
staff, we have another staff member who has an 
oceanography degree, so we have a strong science 
background” 
“There‟s piece after piece after piece that builds 
your case, and your case has to be solid and it has 
to be based on science and it has to be rational and 
you can use a million different tactics to deliver that 
message, some people use irrational tactics but the 
message can still be rational. “ 
“my husband ... was a salmon fisherman and it just 
became an issue that we couldn‟t not look at” 
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CAAR 
Organization 
Cooperative  
Logical 
Strategic 
Focussed 
Skilled in 
coordinating inter-
organizational 
activity 
“We got together into a group and said, “you know 
what we have to make the sum greater than the 
individual part,” that we had to work together to try 
to deal with it because the salmon farming 
companies are multi-national corporations ... we 
can‟t outspend them so we have to outthink them ... 
It was by having everybody pool all their information 
and work collaboratively we‟re able to take it ...  to 
being one of the most prominent environmental 
issues in BC” 
“... when we started the question was - are we 
trying to stop salmon farming altogether, or are we 
trying to reform it.  That was a huge question, and I 
think one of the successes around our coalition is 
that we actually took the time to answer that 
question, and to build consensus around it” 
“The science is pretty clear on this, but science 
alone is not a driver in social change.  It‟s just the 
underpinning ...  You have to get the public really 
behind all this stuff.” 
“CAAR is the best coalition I‟ve ever worked with in 
my life.  It‟s phenomenal.  We‟ve met every two 
months for going on seven years, and always 
consensus, it‟s a phenomenal group of people.  I 
always say it‟s an honour to work with that group.” 
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APPENDIX H: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF LEARNING ACTIVITIES AND OUTCOMES 
Company Organizational Identity Learning Activities Learning Outcomes (post-
merger) 
Marine Harvest Transparent 
Collaborative 
Innovative 
Socially  responsible 
Industry leader  in 
collaboration 
 
“Learning is collaborative 
process. We can all learn 
from each other. Knowledge 
must be shared so everyone 
can benefit.” 
Internal consultation  
ISO certification 
External consultation with customers, 
supply chain members, regional 
governments, financial community, 
NGOs, other stakeholders  
International, Regional and National 
Conferences 
Research consortiums with supply 
chain participants 
Collaborative research with 
universities, NGOs, independent 
and/or  
Private research institutes 
Public-private partnerships with 
governments 
Articles in peer reviewed 
science and ecology journals 
Awareness of issues 
Programs to manage social, 
environmental, and animal 
welfare issues 
Other niche conferences (i.e. 
salmon farming jurisdictions) 
Revised operational practices 
Approaches to stakeholder 
management and 
engagement 
Cooperation and collaboration 
with suppliers, customers,  
stakeholders 
Stolt Private 
Accountable 
Ethical  
Industry leader in size, 
Internal research and development 
Internal consultation 
Collaborative research with 
universities and  independent private 
research institutes 
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profitability 
 
“Learning and knowledge 
support achieving and 
maintaining our high 
operating standards.” 
Collaborative research with CAAR 
 
CAAR Cooperative  
Logical 
Strategic 
Focused 
 
“Learning and knowledge 
support our advocacy work.” 
Partnering on research with experts 
on specific issues 
Partnering with international 
environmental groups on campaigns 
and research 
Partnering with corporations 
Funding graduate students 
Attending International industry 
conferences 
Accessing information via the 
Freedom of Information Act 
Participating in international 
government sponsored research 
symposiums  
Workshops in conjunction with 
universities 
Community  science outreach 
through brochures and speaches 
Position on aquaculture in 
general and open net farming 
in particular 
Articles in peer reviewed 
science and ecology journals 
Approaches to target firm 
engagement 
Access to proprietary 
corporate data 
313 
 
 
Mainstream Sustainable 
Rational 
Innovative 
Risk balancer 
“A Business” 
 
“Learning supports us 
achieving a competitive 
advantage. Knowledge is an 
asset to be developed and 
exploited.” 
Internal research and development  
ISO certification 
Internal consultation with senior 
managers 
Local community consultation  
Collaborative research projects with 
public and industrial research 
establishments around the world 
Participate in international networks 
within and outside the fish feed and 
fish farming industry 
Revised operational practices 
– greater efficiency, reduction 
in violations 
Revised management 
practices 
Mechanisms for monitoring 
performance  
Lower costs 
Employee training 
requirements 
Employment standards  and 
expectations 
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APPENDIX I: COMPLETE LIST OF FINAL NODES, CASES, 
AND RELATIONSHIPS 
Tree Nodes 
Identity Individual Identity Roles 
  Social 
  Tapping other identities 
 Group Identity  
 Organizational Identity Organization identity in flux 
  Shift in organization identity 
 Relations between levels   
Conflict Conflict dynamic Individual 
  Group 
  Organizational 
 Conflict source Identity 
  Socio-cognitive 
  Interests 
Learning Outcomes Individual Learning 
  Collective learning 
  Inter-organizational learning 
 Processes Individual 
  Organizational 
Practice Identity  
 Conflict  
 Learning  
Practitioners   
Praxis Identity  
 Conflict  
 Learning  
Repeated engagement Individual interactions Dialogue 
  External 
  Internal 
 Inter-organizational dynamics  
315 
 
 
Free Nodes 
Distancing 
Pairing 
Rule Setting 
Experiments - Bold 
Ongoing conflict 
 
Relationships 
From Name Type To Name 
Identity - individual Associated Learning – individual 
Conflict - individual Associated Identity - individual 
Learning - individual Associated Conflict - individual 
Identity - organizational Associated Learning - - organizational 
Conflict- organizational Associated Identity - organizational 
Learning - organizational Associated Conflict - organizational 
Practitioners Associated Inter-organizational learning 
Practitioners Influences Organizational learning 
Practice Influences Praxis 
Praxis Influences Practice 
 
 
Cases 
CAAR 
Marine Harvest 
Mainstream 
Industry Associations 
Media 
Observers-academics 
Regulators-government 
Suppliers 
Other ENGOs 
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APPENDIX J: LEARNING ACTIVITIES AND OUTCOMES OVER TIME 
Relationship 
of Learning 
and 
Identity 
Learning 
Activities/Prac
tice  
prior to 2003 
Learning 
Outcomes 
prior to 2003 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice 
2004-2006 
Learning 
Outcomes 
2004-2006 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice  
after 2006  
Learning 
Outcomes 
2009 
Marine 
Harvest 
Learning is 
collaborative 
process. We 
can all learn 
from each 
other. 
Knowledge 
must be shared 
so everyone 
can benefit. 
(more at the 
corporate level 
and more 
superficial) 
 
Internal 
consultation 
across regions 
(MH and Stolt) 
Internal 
research and 
development 
(MH and Stolt) 
Collaborative 
research with 
universities, 
research 
institutes, 
governments 
(MH and Stolt) 
ISO 
Certification 
(MH and Stolt) 
External 
consultation 
Programs to 
manage social, 
environmental, 
and animal 
welfare issues 
(MH) 
Recognize 
value in 
collaborating 
across a range 
of stakeholders 
(MH) 
High standards 
and first-rate 
operations 
(Stolt) 
Ongoing 
understanding 
of the eco 
system impacts 
of farms (Stolt) 
Direct 
interaction -
Facilitated 
direct 
negotiation of 
a joint 
research 
agreement 
with CAAR 
(Stolt) 
Collaboration 
with the 
Monterey 
Bay 
Aquarium 
(MH) 
Recognition at 
the BC level of 
the need to 
engage with a 
broader  range 
of 
stakeholders 
(albeit for 
different 
reasons) 
Recognition of 
a different 
logic  
Recognition 
that the conflict 
was escalating 
and was costly  
Recognition of 
the importance 
of non-
economic  
Collecting data to 
address broader 
marine 
environment 
questions and 
compiling 
databases  
Developing 
research 
questions 
collaboratively 
with CAAR 
Listening to both 
camps of 
researchers and 
acknowledging 
there are 2 camps 
Contracting with 
neutral scientists 
and bringing pro 
and anti salmon 
Proactive 
environmental 
management 
has value = 
good 
management 
Engagement 
with 
stakeholders 
has value, 
despite the 
risks  
Have to deal 
with the issues 
(one way or 
another)  to 
remain credible  
No risk from 
corporate from 
engaging in 
this process 
Stolt 
Learning and 
knowledge 
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Relationship 
of Learning 
and 
Identity 
Learning 
Activities/Prac
tice  
prior to 2003 
Learning 
Outcomes 
prior to 2003 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice 
2004-2006 
Learning 
Outcomes 
2004-2006 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice  
after 2006  
Learning 
Outcomes 
2009 
support 
achieving and 
maintaining our 
high operating 
standards 
with customers, 
suppliers,gover
nments, 
financial 
community, 
NGOs, other 
stakeholders 
(MH) 
Participation in 
the WWF 
Salmon 
Dialogue (MH) 
Negotiation 
with First 
Nations re. 
leases (MH 
prior to it 
becoming law, 
Stolt when it 
was legally 
required) 
Good 
management = 
good science 
(Stolt) 
 
metrics  
Engaging  
does not mean 
agreeing or 
even changing 
that much 
Ongoing 
revised 
operational 
practices 
based on 
feedback 
Recognition of 
similarities 
(CAAR is a 
business) 
farming scientists 
together 
Monitoring the 
farms and 
identifying 
patterns in the 
data in 
collaboration with 
stakeholder 
personnel 
Weekly contact – 
across a number 
of individuals – in 
a variety of ways 
Engaging directly 
with communities 
alone and with 
CAAR 
Engaging with 
new critics  
Different and 
deeper 
understanding 
of sea lice  
Revised 
understanding 
of the nature of 
the 
relationship. 
Revised 
understanding 
of their 
responsibility in 
the relationship  
Understanding 
the conflict 
trade offs 
(speed vs. 
completeness) 
Revised 
approach to 
structuring 
engagement  
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Relationship 
of Learning 
and 
Identity 
Learning 
Activities/Prac
tice  
prior to 2003 
Learning 
Outcomes 
prior to 2003 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice 
2004-2006 
Learning 
Outcomes 
2004-2006 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice  
after 2006  
Learning 
Outcomes 
2009 
(structure, 
openness, 
acknowledgem
ent of different 
perspectives – 
of 
responsibility) 
CAAR 
Learning and 
knowledge of 
science 
support 
advocacy work. 
Facilitated 
development of 
the coalition, 
over a year 
funded by 
foundations 
Funding 
research 
internally and 
at universities 
Conducting 
independent 
research 
Conflictual 
interaction 
mediated by 
third parties 
Focus on 
science and on 
specific long 
term goals – 
sea lice – 
closed 
containment 
Positioning to 
maximize 
effectiveness – 
credibility – 
good science – 
rational 
arguments 
Value in 
collaborating 
with other like 
Direct 
interaction  
with industry 
– negotiation 
of a joint 
research 
agreement 
with MH 
Ongoing 
research 
using MH 
data 
Access to data 
and funding for 
staff provides 
immediate 
value in 
engaging with 
Marine 
Harvest  
Potential value 
in collaborating 
with industry  
despite the 
risks  
Strategic use 
of interest 
based 
approach 
Monitoring the 
farms and 
identifying 
patterns in the 
data in 
collaboration with 
company 
personnel 
Increased 
specialization of 
function (within 
CAAR and 
between MH) 
Developing and 
implementing 
projects 
collaboratively – 
An article in 
peer reviewed 
science/ 
ecology journal 
– major 
breakthrough in 
terms of data 
access 
There is value 
in engaging 
with industry 
despite the 
risks 
Value is viewed 
differently by 
different people 
“Respect costs 
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Relationship 
of Learning 
and 
Identity 
Learning 
Activities/Prac
tice  
prior to 2003 
Learning 
Outcomes 
prior to 2003 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice 
2004-2006 
Learning 
Outcomes 
2004-2006 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice  
after 2006  
Learning 
Outcomes 
2009 
Ongoing 
collaborative 
activities of the 
coalition – 
regular 
meetings – 
committees – 
communication
s - facilitation 
Market analysis 
and 
understanding 
of business 
models  
Consumer and 
community 
development/o
utreach 
minded 
researchers 
and 
organizations 
Collaborative 
skills, conflict 
management 
skills internally 
Importance of 
“semantics” – 
speaking the 
language of 
business 
Strategic use of 
conflict/power – 
new targets – 
new methods 
Empathy for 
salmon 
farmers – 
separating the 
people from 
the issue – 
seeing them 
as members of 
the same 
community 
Initial 
recognition of 
their 
similarities 
meeting 
constantly – on 
the phone etc.  
Direct interaction 
between more 
people inter-
organizationally – 
delegation of 
relationship and 
task responsibility 
– open door 
Managing 
interpretation and  
integration 
internally- two 
layers of 
negotiations 
Contracting and 
collaborating with 
independent 
scientists together 
– choosing one 
that understood 
the conflict and 
you nothing” 
Interest base 
approaches 
worth a try – 
can always go 
back to power 
and rights 
based 
Third parties 
decrease the 
perceived risk 
of engagement 
and of identity 
conflict 
Engaging  does 
not necessarily 
mean agreeing 
(high on 
relationship, 
high on goal) 
Recognition of 
similarities 
Strategic use of 
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Relationship 
of Learning 
and 
Identity 
Learning 
Activities/Prac
tice  
prior to 2003 
Learning 
Outcomes 
prior to 2003 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice 
2004-2006 
Learning 
Outcomes 
2004-2006 
Additional 
Learning 
Activities/ 
Practice  
after 2006  
Learning 
Outcomes 
2009 
was able to 
manage it 
Ongoing day to 
day conflict 
managed by 
external 
consultant - 
Really big issues 
mediated by the 
mediator  
Joint 
presentations to 
government, 
community 
groups, WWF‟s 
Salmon 
Aquaculture 
Dialog  
Collaboration with 
other companies 
conflict to 
achieve goals 
Focus on 
interim goals 
Trust is not as 
important as 
behaviour 
change  
Science can 
bridge 
internally and 
externally 
Greater 
empathy/appre
ciation of the 
other 
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APPENDIX K: SUMMARY OF THE FRAMEWORK FOR 
DIALOGUE 
COASTAL ALLIANCE FOR AQUACULTURE REFORM (“CAAR”) AND 
MARINE HARVEST CANADA (“MHC”) 
FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOGUE – SUMMARY 
JANUARY 12, 2006 
BACKGROUND 
The Coastal Alliance for Aquaculture Reform (CAAR) is a coalition of First 
Nations and conservation groups working to stop the negative impacts of salmon 
farming on wild salmon and the marine ecosystem in British Columbia. The 
member organizations of CAAR are theDavid Suzuki Foundation, Friends of 
Clayoquot Sound, Georgia Strait Alliance, Living OceansSociety, Musgamagw 
Tsawataineuk Tribal Council, Raincoast Conservation Society, Raincoast 
Research, T. Buck Suzuki Environmental Foundation, and Watershed Watch 
Salmon Society Marine Harvest is the world's leading producer and supplier of 
farmed salmon and is committed to continual improvement with respect to its 
products and environmental practices. 
In British Columbia, Marine Harvest Canada (MHC) operates ISO 14000 and 
9000 certified salmon farms on Vancouver Island and the mid coast. In the spring 
of 2004, CAAR and MHC each, independent of the other, recognizes the salmon 
farming debate in British Columbia is highly polarized and not likely to produce 
positive results in its current format. The chronology of the ensuing dialogue is as 
follows: 
a) June 2004 - CAAR and MHC initiate exploratory discussions to determine if 
there is potential value and mutual interest in engaging in some direct discussion 
around aquaculture issues. 
b) October 2004 - based on these exploratory discussions, CAAR and MHC 
agree there is value in engaging in such direct discussion and begin to meet 
periodically – discussion initially focuses on identifying the scope of issues that 
would benefit from direct discussion, relative priorities, principles to govern 
dialogue such that the likelihood of success within a polarized climate was 
maximized, identifying research priorities required to support effective 
discussion/resolution of the issues, and identifying precautionary measures that 
could be undertaken relative to each party‟s interests while research and 
discussion takes place. 
c) December 2005 – CAAR and MHC reach agreement on the substantive 
elements of a framework for Dialogue – (see below for a summary of the 
Framework). 
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d) The Province was advised early on that these discussions were taking place 
but not briefed as to specifics/details until November 2005. The Province 
supported the successful conclusion of the Framework by agreeing to fund 
certain interim measures identified in the Framework. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE “FRAMEWORK” 
The Framework is a comprehensive document. Following is a summary of those 
matters addressed within the Framework – this is intended for illustrative 
purposes only and, by its summary nature, does not address every detail. 
Purpose 
The Framework is intended to 
a) Support constructive, efficient, interest-based results that address the needs of 
both MHC and CAAR; 
b) Increase knowledge with respect to environmental, social and economic 
factors associated with salmon farming; 
c) Reduce conflict associated with MHC‟s salmon farming; and 
d) Direct change to current practices where best available information 
demonstrates there are impacts to the environment and wild salmon as a result of 
current practices; 
2. The Framework is not intended to fulfill and constitute duties of consultation or 
accommodation owed to First Nations. 
3. The Framework is not intended to create legal rights or obligations.   
Background/Context 
4. The Framework sets out a number of background/contextual matters 
acknowledged and/or agreed to by both MHC and CAAR including the ecological, 
cultural, and economic importance of wild salmon, salmon farming is part of the 
economy of coastal communities, there are environmental impacts associated 
with salmon farming that need to be reduced, mitigated or eliminated, both CAAR 
and MHC have invested in research however some further research is required. 
5. The Framework states that MHC maintains the right to exercise their business 
operations as required on a day-to-day basis and to publicly respond to criticism 
or third party assessment of their business or effects of their business on the 
environment, especially wild salmon. 
6. The Framework states that CAAR maintains the right to exercise its campaigns 
and public education initiatives related to aquaculture and marine conservation; 
Guiding Principles for Dialogue 
7. The Framework sets out a number of principles CAAR and MHC agree will 
govern their ongoing dialogue (e.g. interest based dialogue, respectful dialogue, 
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both parties having access to information in a timely and transparent manner, 
willingness to change perspectives based on new information etc) 
Salmon Farming Issues 
8. The Framework describes the broad range of issues associated with salmon 
farming in BC (these are summarized in Appendix A), acknowledges that some 
are most appropriately addressed bilaterally while others are best addressed in 
multi-lateral public policy forums, commits the parties to: 
a) periodically reviewing this list of issues; and 
b) periodically identifying priorities for research and dialogue based on these 
issues 
9. The Framework identifies the short term priorities for research being 
a) the interaction between wild salmon, farmed salmon, and sea lice 
b) the economic feasibility of commercial scale closed containment 
c) wild salmon migratory routes 
10. The Framework provides that discussion, dialogue and decisions need to be 
informed by 
best available information (i.e. information that is peer reviewed, research that is 
undertaken collaboratively, and documented local knowledge). 
 
Sea Lice Research 
179. The Framework provides that research is best undertaken collaboratively 
and in a manner that seeks to reduce the polarity that has existed within the 
scientific community regarding aquaculture issues 
18. The Framework describes an agreed upon list of priority questions that need 
to be addressed through research relative to the sea lice issue in the Broughton, 
a process to annually review these questions, the research priorities based on 
these questions, and certain specific research projects that need to be 
undertaken collaboratively in 2006 including,: 
a) Morbidity/mortality/behavioral effects on juvenile pink and chum salmon 
associated with sea lice infections; 
b) The source of sea lice (i.e., from farms or other sources) infecting out 
migrating juvenile salmon; 
c) The migration pathways of out-migrating juvenile wild salmon in the Broughton; 
d) The relationship between the age of farmed fish (time in salt water) and sea 
lice i.e. after what period in salt water do farmed fish develop the capacity to 
contribute a significant amount of sea lice to the surrounding environment; 
                                            
9
 Non-sequential numbering appeared in the original  
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e) What date within the period January 18 and March 1 constitutes a reasonably 
precautionary commencement date for a migration corridor in each year. 
19. The Framework provides that in some circumstances research will be 
undertaken by MHC and CAAR directly and in other circumstances they will 
jointly advocate that such research be undertaken by others on the basis of 
agreed upon Terms of Reference (e.g. the Pacific Salmon Forum) 
Closed Containment Research 
20. The Framework establishes as a priority collaborative research into the 
economic feasibility of commercial scale closed containment to be completed by 
August 31, 2006 and includes agreed upon Terms of Reference for such 
research 
21. The Framework provides that MHC and CAAR will mutually agree upon a 
researcher to complete this analysis and to jointly advocate for funding from the 
BC Pacific Salmon Forum or other appropriate bodies. 
22. The Framework provides that upon completion of the closed containment 
research, both parties will seek to identify ways to overcome the economic 
obstacles to adapting closed containment as identified in that research 
23. The Framework provides that upon economic viability of commercial scale 
closed containment being demonstrated, MHC will work to incorporate closed 
containment into its operations 
Communications 
24. The Framework establishes a communications protocol that will govern how 
CAAR and MHC will communicate both internally and externally regarding those 
matters addressed in the document. 
25. The Framework provides that CAAR will not directly target MHC or its 
products in the local, national and international market campaigns and that MHC 
will communicate with CAAR on an ongoing basis regarding any new tenure 
applications, relocations, or siting requests. 
Process 
26. The Framework provides that the parties will meet as required on an ongoing 
basis to implement the Framework 
27. The Framework provides for parties other than CAAR and MHC becoming 
involved in discussions under the Framework subject to mutual agreement 
28. The Framework provides for dispute resolution. 
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Appendix A (to FRAMEWORK FOR DIALOGUE – SUMMARY) 
: General Summary of Issues Related to Salmon Farming As Identified in 
the Framework 
• farmed salmon /wild salmon interactions (e.g., sea lice, disease transfer) 
• escapes of farmed fish and non-native species 
• use and application of chemicals and medication 
• overall wellbeing of seafood industry (e.g., competition, integration) 
• jobs and economic development, wellbeing of coastal communities 
• reputation (e.g., credibility of claims, public perception) 
• application of technology (e.g., closed containment, management systems, fish 
husbandry) 
• tenure allocation including siting impacts and First Nations interests 
• fish husbandry (composition of fish feed, antibiotics etc.) 
• the impacts of waste from salmon farms on the water column, benthic 
environment, and 
marine ecosystem in general 
• sustainable fisheries at the global and local levels (e.g., fish meal/fish oil) 
• human health and safety (e.g., nutrition, contamination) 
• business viability (e.g., investments, cost control, markets) 
• aboriginal rights, traditional use and land claims 
• communications (e.g., information sharing, public claims, marketing) 
• research and development 
• regulatory environment 
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